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1. Introduction 
Investments into infrastructure assets are the key to maintaining Europe's competitiveness 
(Woetzel, Garemo, Mischke, Hjerpe, & Palter, 2017). According to the European 
Commission, by 2020 there are investment needs of 2 trillion Euros in European energy, 
transport, and information and communication technology infrastructures, to keep the 
European Union competitive (Scannella, 2012). Further, disruptive technologies change the 
user's needs for infrastructure and might increase this investment need e.g. drone delivery and 
autonomous driving (Woetzel et al., 2017). 
However, all over the world, including Europe, there is a gap in infrastructure financing 
(Heath & Read, 2014). Main reasons for this gap are the constrained public budget and long-
term funding from banks, as well as problems to match supply of private sector finance with 
investable projects (Woetzel et al., 2017).  
There are different ways to close this gap. One way is to attract more banks and institutional 
investors to provide the funds needed (Woetzel et al., 2017). Another way to close the 
financing gap is to optimize public and corporate spending by e.g. prioritizing the right 
projects and improving the productivity of projects.  
Many large construction projects face substantial cost and time overruns; therefore, 
investments are not efficient. A typical cause for this lies already in the planning phase of a 
project: A combination of delusion (unrealistically optimistic planning behavior of project 
planners due to inside view in forecasting) and deception (misrepresentation by project 
planners) often leads to artificially low costs expectation, exaggerated benefits, and 
underestimated risks (Flyvbjerg, Garbuio, & Lovallo, 2009).  
Both public and private infrastructure spending can be optimized by using project finance 
(PF) in the project implementation. In the case of PF, investors and lenders do not only play 
8 
 
 
an important role in the provision of capital for projects, they also evaluate, monitor, and 
control risks (Alfen et al., 2009). Thus, PF is not only a way to finance a project, but also a 
project risk management tool. The implementation of public infrastructure projects as Public 
Private Partnership (PPP) PF can optimize public spending by transferring risks from the 
public to the private sector (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2016). Also, corporate projects 
can achieve efficiency gains from the risk transfer by using PF. However, PF does not only 
have the advantage of the risk transfer, it also is a project management tool that provides 
agency cost advantages (Müllner, 2017), reduces the risk of managerial mismanagement due 
to the monitoring of banks, and produces synergies (Esty, 2003).  
However, PF, as a way to not only finance but also to manage a project, can only contribute to 
closing the infrastructure gap, if it is implemented efficiently. The risk management process 
and the risk transfer to the party that can best carry this risk play a vital role (Irimia-Diéguez, 
Sanchez-Cazorla, & Alfalla-Luque, 2014) in an efficient project implementation.  
1.1 Overall problem definition and research gap 
Although the risk management process is vital in large infrastructure construction projects, 
research in this area is not exhaustive. A vast set of specific risk factors for infrastructure 
construction projects has been identified in the megaproject literature. Several typologies exist 
and many researchers have focused on specific risk factors of construction projects. One 
characteristic all existing typologies have in common is that they neglect a detailed account of 
estimator related risks. Estimator related risks are risks the decision maker brings into the 
project by assessing risks too low or too high (Baloi & Price, 2003). Why do estimator related 
risks occur? The decision-making process of individuals changes if risk or uncertainty are 
involved in the decision. Kahneman and Tversky (1982) state that if faced with uncertainty 
decision makers more frequently apply heuristics and fall prey to cognitive biases in their 
decision-making-process.  
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An important challenge for lenders and investors in making decisions in the context of 
infrastructure PF is therefore to overcome own biases. While there is some literature on biases 
in the decision making of project planners in the initial financing of an infrastructure project 
(Flyvbjerg, 2009), little research in the field of financing projects focusses on other 
stakeholders in PF such as lenders. Further, until now in this area there is no research that 
takes the organizational perspective on biased information processing i.e. previous research 
did not determine what characterizes companies, whose decision makers are on average 
biased and bring a high degree of estimator related risk with them.  
1.2 Objective and purpose 
The overarching purpose of the dissertation effort is to analyze what causes individual 
decision makers and organizations to add estimator related risks to European infrastructure 
projects implemented with PF. To achieve this purpose, four key aspects will be covered: 
RQ1: Which are the typical risks and uncertainties of large infrastructure construction 
projects that need to be evaluated, and which stakeholder are they typically transferred to in 
the common delivery model used in PF: the Fixed Price, Date-Certain Turnkey Construction 
Contract? 
RQ2: How do personal and company factors influence heuristics and unconscious biases of 
infrastructure PF decision stakeholders and how do these heuristics and unconscious biases 
influence the perception of risks and rewards, in this study subsumed under “unrealistic 
optimism”?  
RQ3: Are certain stakeholders less biased than other stakeholders and are therefore better 
equipped to assess risks of large European infrastructure projects? Can personal or company 
related factors be identified to drive differences between lenders and investors and made  
accessible for best practice learning? 
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RQ4: What are the characteristics of companies that are less unrealistically optimistic than 
others?  
Figure 1: Overview of research questions 
 
1.3 Relevant limitations 
Overall, in this dissertation the rational planning view is to be taken in which successful 
projects are portrayed as a product of advanced planning and failures results from planning 
errors. Hence, accurate decisions in the planning phase contribute majorly to project success. 
As stated above, the main purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the causes of estimator 
related risks regarding PF infrastructure projects. To focus the research, limitations are taken 
regarding the way estimator related risks are measured, as well as regarding the decision 
makers and projects in focus. Regarding estimator related risks, bias in decision making is not 
measured in real project decisions but is limited to laboratory like decision situations with 
relevant decision makers. This is a common method in empirical social science (Vetter, 
Benlian, & Hess, 2011). As relevant decision makers PF lenders and investors are defined due 
to their important risk management role in PF. With regard to the kind of projects studied, this 
Source: Adapted from Hampl and Wüstenhagen (2012)
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RQ2: How do personal and company factors influence heuristics and unconscious biases of 
infrastructure PF decision stakeholders and how do these heuristics and unconscious biases 
influence the perception of risks and rewards, in this study subsumed under “unrealistic 
optimism”?
RQ3: Are certain stakeholders less biased than other stakeholders and are therefore better 
equipped to assess risks of large European infrastructure projects? Can personal or company 
related factors be identified to drive differences between lenders and investors and made 
accessible for best practice learning?
RQ4: What are the characteristics of companies that are less unrealistically optimistic than 
others?  
RQ1: Which are the typical risks and uncertainties of large infrastructure construction projects that 
need to be evaluated, and which stakeholder are they typically transferred to in the common delivery 
model used in PF: the Fixed Price, Date-Certain Turnkey Construction Contract?
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dissertation focusses on (1) large European infrastructure construction projects with (2) Fixed 
Price, Date-Certain Turnkey Construction Contracts financed with PF. In the following, a 
brief definition of these terms is presented, a more detailed description of the concepts follows 
in chapter 2. 
1.3.1 Large European infrastructure construction projects 
Weber, Staub-Bisang, and Alfen (2016) define infrastructure as: “all physical assets, 
equipment and facilities of interrelated systems and the necessary service providers, together 
with its underlying structures, organizations, business models, and rules and regulations, 
offering related sector-specific commodities and services to individual economic entities or 
the wider public with the aim to enable, sustain or enhance social living condition” (Weber et 
al., 2016, XXVI). This definition will be used in the following, infrastructure thus includes 
transport assets (roads, railways, bridges, tunnels, ports, and airports), public utilities (oil and 
gas networks, energy generation utilities including renewable energy, water supply, waste 
water, and waste disposal), as well as social infrastructure (schools, hospitals, administrative 
buildings, and social housing). An infrastructure construction project is any project in which 
an infrastructure asset is built. Infrastructure construction projects shall, in this dissertation, 
only be seen in the light of the European Union, with large projects costing more than 500 
million US dollar, following Esty’s (2004b) definition of large infrastructure projects1. 
1.3.2 Fixed Price, Date-Certain Turnkey Construction Contracts financed with PF 
In PF, lending funds is based on future cash flows of the project. The Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision defines PF as: “The lender is usually paid solely or almost exclusively 
out of the money generated by the contracts for the facility’s output [...]. The borrower is 
usually an SPE (Special Purpose Entity) that is not permitted to perform any function other 
                                                 
1 In the relevant literature there is no consistent definition of a “large construction project”, compare Kostka and 
Anzinger (2015). 
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than developing, owning, and operating the installation. The consequence is that repayment 
depends primarily on the project’s cash flow and on the collateral value of the project’s 
assets.” (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004, p. 61).  
Currently the most accepted delivery model in PF is the Fixed Price Date-Certain Turnkey 
Construction Contract (Böttcher & Blattner, 2013). A Turnkey Construction Contract is 
defined as “the most extreme form of placing design and construction responsibility on the 
contractor, such that after completion the employer need only turn the key to commence 
operation of the constructed facility” (Huse, 2002, p. 5). 
1.4 Methodology 
Overall this research takes a practical angle focusing on problems in the infrastructure 
industry the researcher has experienced in practice. As the researcher knows the relevant 
decision situations well, the approach is pragmatic, combining experience from infrastructure 
projects with theoretical modelling. In the following the research process and the structure of 
the dissertation are summarized. 
1.4.1 Research process 
RQ1: Which are the typical risks and uncertainties of large infrastructure construction projects 
that need to be evaluated, and which stakeholder are they typically transferred to in the 
common delivery model used in PF: the Fixed Price, Date-Certain Turnkey Construction 
Contract? 
In chapter 3 this research question is tackled in three steps. First, project risk factors are 
identified from relevant literature. In a second step, these findings are supplemented with own 
practical knowledge from three large scale infrastructure projects, publicized case examples 
stating main reasons why specific projects failed, a real project risk register, and eight 
explorative expert interviews, analyzed according to the process suggested by the Critical 
Incident Technique (CIT). Finally, the empirical findings are compared to the findings from 
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the literature review and used to create a typology of risks clustered by stakeholders that bear 
them typically. 
RQ2: How do personal and company factors influence heuristics and unconscious biases of 
infrastructure PF decision stakeholders and how do these heuristics and unconscious biases 
influence the perception of risks and rewards, in this study subsumed under “unrealistic 
optimism”? 
This research question is tackled in three steps. First, a review of the behavioral finance 
literature is conducted in chapter 4 leading to a theoretical causal bias model, which includes 
all biases applicable in the project financing of large infrastructure projects, as well as 
relevant influencing factors. Second, eight open interviews are conducted with lenders and 
investors from relevant companies to find out what impact biases had on their decision 
making in PF situations and which bias from the framework are most relevant. The 
framework is adapted and simplified according to these interviews. In a third step, presented 
in chapter 5, a survey among 102 lenders and investors is conducted and a regression is 
performed to test the framework.  
RQ3: Are certain stakeholders less biased than other stakeholders and are therefore better 
equipped to assess risks of large European infrastructure projects? Can personal or company 
related factors be identified to drive differences between lenders and investors and made 
accessible for best practice learning? 
This research question is tackled in two steps. In chapter 4 hypotheses are developed from 
theory regarding the differences between lenders and investors. Second, in chapter 5, using 
the data from the causal model Anovas are performed to compare whether the different 
stakeholder groups are significantly different on the dependent variable “unrealistic 
optimism“. Also, an analysis of variance is performed for the enhancing and diminishing 
factors in the causal model to identify what causes the difference between the groups. 
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RQ4: What are the characteristics of companies that are less unrealistically optimistic than 
others?  
To answer this research question, a model identifying which characteristics best predict the 
tendency of a company to be biased is created in two steps. First, possible characteristics that 
differentiate biased and non-biased companies are researched from literature and presented in 
chapter 4. In a second step, the characteristics of biased and non-biased companies in terms of 
three classes of factors (objective company characteristics, overconfidence, and institutional 
characteristics) are compared through the analysis of variance in chapter 5 to identify factors 
that distinguish biased from non-biased companies.  
1.4.2 Structure of the dissertation 
In chapter 2, following this introduction, the concepts large infrastructure construction project 
and PF will be defined and explained in the European context. Additionally, a brief overview 
of recent literature in the field of large infrastructure PF will be given and gaps highlighted. In 
chapter 3, an overview of risk management in infrastructure PF projects is given. Further a 
typology of risks grouped by stakeholders that bear them typically will be derived (RQ1). In 
chapter 4, research on cognitive aspects, perceived risk, and decision making is discussed. 
Based on this a causal bias model will be developed for project financiers (RQ2), hypothesis 
about the difference between stakeholder groups will be developed in the light of the causal 
bias model (RQ3), and a model of company bias is developed (RQ4). In chapter 5 the causal 
bias model, the hypotheses about stakeholder group differences and the model of company 
bias will be tested empirically. In chapter 6 all findings will be summarized and discussed 
regarding theoretical and practical contribution. Additionally, an outlook will be provided. 
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Figure 2: Overview of structure 
 
Part 1 Introduction
Part 2 Theoretical principals “Infrastructure Project Finance” 
Part 3 Risks of large infrastructure construction projects
▪ RQ1: Which are the typical risks and uncertainties of large infrastructure construction projects that 
need to be evaluated, and which stakeholder are they typically transferred to in the common 
delivery model used in PF: the Fixed Price, Date-Certain Turnkey Construction Contract?
Part 4 Cognitive aspects, perceived risk, and decision making in infrastructure PF –
development of a theoretical framework
▪ RQ2: How do personal and company factors influence heuristics and unconscious biases of 
infrastructure PF decision stakeholders and how do these heuristics and unconscious biases 
influence the perception of risks and rewards, in this study subsumed under “unrealistic 
optimism”?   
▪ RQ3: Are certain stakeholders less biased than other stakeholders and are therefore better 
equipped to assess risks of large European infrastructure projects? Can personal or company 
related factors be identified to drive differences between lenders and investors and made 
accessible for best practice learning?
▪ RQ4: What are the characteristics of companies that are less unrealistically optimistic than others? 
Part 5 Empirical test of developed causal model and hypotheses 
Part 6 Conclusion
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2. Infrastructure PF – object of research, terminology, and 
fundamentals 
In the following, (1) a brief overview of recent literature in the field of large infrastructure PF 
will be given to narrow down the object of research and provide the relevant terminology and 
fundamentals. Subsequently, (2) a market overview is conducted that discusses current 
problems in infrastructure project finance and highlights the importance of this research. 
2.1 Status quo relevant literature infrastructure PF 
Addressing the status quo of relevant literature, (1) the terminology mentioned in chapter 1 
will be elaborated in more detail, followed by (2) an overview of relevant infrastructure PF 
research streams and gaps, as well as (3) a deep dive into the theoretical foundation of PF. 
2.1.1 Terminology infrastructure PF  
In this review the concepts (1) large infrastructure construction project and (2) PF that were 
named in chapter 1.3 will be defined and explained in the European context.  
2.1.1.1 Large infrastructure construction projects 
Projects in general are characterized by a limited lifespan with a defined start and end, a 
unique risk profile, a defined limited budget, and the production of a unique product, service, 
or process (Drees, Lang, & Schöps, 2010). In the following the term large infrastructure 
construction project will be defined in detail and the status of research summarized. 
Esty (2004b) defines large projects as those costing more than 500 million US dollar. As this 
size seems common for large infrastructure construction projects in Europe, this definition 
will be used in the following. Why focus this study on large projects? First, the larger the 
project the more significant the financial, developmental, and social return it can provide 
when it succeeds and the higher the risk in case of distress (Esty, 2004a). Second, large 
projects are mostly more complex than small projects and involve more risks (Esty, 2004a). 
Third, large projects affect more stakeholders than small projects (Esty, 2004a, 2004b).  
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 A construction project is any project in which an asset is built. Non-construction projects are 
for instance acquisitions. Within construction projects there are two different types: greenfield 
and brownfield projects. Greenfield projects are those where a new asset is created, 
brownfield are those where an existing asset with an existing revenue stream is improved, 
upgraded, or expanded2 (Rossi & Stepic, 2015). Construction projects typically have four 
distinct phases: planning, construction, operation, and decommissionung (Ehlers, 2014). Risks 
differ between these phases (Ehlers, 2014). A typical risk in the planning phase is the design 
error risk i.e. the risk that the design as specified is not appropriate (Yescombe, 2013). In the 
construction phase however, a typical risk is the cost overrun risk i.e. the risk that the 
completion of the project will cost more than expected (Yescombe, 2013). Finally in the 
operating phase a typical risk is the market risk i.e. the risk that the demand for the asset is 
lower than expected (Yescombe, 2013).  
Several different definitions of infrastructure are used in the relevant research field (Blanc-
Brude & Makovsek, 2013). As noted in chapter 1, the definition of infrastructure in this study 
is based on the definition and examples Weber et al. (2016) provide and shall include 
transport assets (roads, railways, bridges, tunnels, ports, and airports), public utilities (oil and 
gas networks, energy generation utilities including renewable energy, water supply, waste 
water, and waste disposal), as well as social infrastructure (schools, hospitals, administrative 
buildings, and social housing).  
Infrastructure projects such as power plants, wind parks, and airports have distinct 
characteristics that make their implementation and especially their financing particularly 
challenging. First, taking only direct payoffs into account a project’s net present value (NPV) 
can be negative for infrastructure projects, making investments unattractive for the private 
sector. However, indirect benefits to communities may make even these seemingly 
                                                 
2 Sometimes brownfield projects that require significant improvements, upgrades, or expansions are referred to 
as yellow field. 
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economically unprofitable projects worthwhile for the public sector (Ehlers, 2014). Second, 
the cash flow time profile of infrastructure projects is quite unattractive. The initial upfront 
investment is not only usually substantial e.g. 500 million Euro, but is also tied for many 
years. Cash flows that cover costs may be generated only in the last project phase (Ehlers, 
2014; Sorge, 2004). Finally, infrastructure projects are very complex as often a large number 
of parties are involved (Ehlers, 2014; Sorge, 2004). The success of the projects depends on a 
joint effort of all parties. Coordination problems, conflicts of interest, and freeriding can lead 
to project failure (Sorge, 2004). Depending on the asset, governments may have a high 
interest to maintain complete control to prevent a company from abusing the monopoly power 
of the infrastructure. 
On the other hand infrastructure investments can be financially attractive because often these 
projects offer long term predictable and stable cash flows3 that allow the projects to have a 
high leverage (Rossi & Stepic, 2015). Additionally many infrastructure projects protect 
against inflation, as payments, such as tolls, are connected to inflation security due to PPP 
arrangements (Rossi & Stepic, 2015; Weber et al., 2016). 
Large construction projects in infrastructure have popped up like mushrooms in recent years, 
regardless of the current economic developments worldwide. Particularly in emerging markets 
the demand for energy supply and other infrastructure is growing rapidly (Ladislaw, 2011). 
Even in the European Union an investment need into infrastructure of up to 2 trillion Euro 
until the year 2020 is estimated (Sauter, Illés, & Nunez Ferrer, 2014). Many infrastructure 
construction projects in Europe are implemented with PF (Project Finance International, 
2017). The next chapter will introduce this concept. 
                                                 
3 Due to monopolistic characteristics of the infrastructure assets and in many cases concession agreements with 
governments. 
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2.1.1.2 Implementing projects with PF 
Generally, there are three possible financing approaches for a project: corporate finance based 
on the creditworthiness of the company i.e. traditional lending, object finance based on the 
value of the asset, and PF based on future cash flows of the project. The main difference 
between PF and traditional lending is illustrated below in Figure 3. While in traditional 
lending the investor borrows money from banks to finance the project, in PF the project 
special purpose vehicle (SPV) takes the loan.  
Figure 3: PF concept 
  
However, PF is more than just a means to finance a project. It is a project implementation 
form with several distinct features. First, PF usually relies on a SPV4 (Miller & Lessard, 2001; 
Scott-Quinn & Cano, 2015). All assets the SPV owns are the project’s assets and all liabilities 
the project’s liabilities. Typically, PF is off-balance sheet for sponsors (Daube, Vollrath, & 
Alfen, 2008). Second, in PF the capital investment focusses on a single purpose asset, which 
is operated by the SPV for a specific finite time (Scott-Quinn & Cano, 2015). Third, the future 
cash flow of the project serves as collateral for all debt (Daube et al., 2008). Loans are given 
                                                 
4 Also called SPE e.g. by Basel committee - the term SPV will used for in the following.  
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on a non-recourse or limited recourse basis (Daube et al., 2008; Esty, 2004a). Non-recourse 
means that the borrower’s financial liability for the loan is limited to the value of the 
collateral. If the borrower defaults and the collateral is worth less than the amount outstanding 
under the loan, the lender has no further recourse against the borrower and must absorb the 
loss (Miller & Lessard, 2001). Credit evaluations are based on the future cash flows, the value 
of the asset is only considered for collateral (Scott-Quinn & Cano, 2015). Fourth, the project 
is financed with high leverage: by up to 90% debt and only 10% equity (Daube et al., 2008). 
Debt capital is usually raised by a consortium of foreign and domestic banks. Equity is 
contributed by several sponsoring companies that have know-how in the specific area of the 
infrastructure project in question. Fifth, risk analysis and allocation i.e. risk sharing is a 
central element of project financing (Daube et al., 2008; Miller & Lessard, 2001): Risks 
should be identified, assessed and allocated to the party that can carry the risk at the least cost 
(Brealey, Cooper, & Habib, 1996; Esty, 2004a; Irimia-Diéguez et al., 2014; Miller & Lessard, 
2001).  
The Modigliani Miller proposition states that if a certain investment decision is given, the 
capital structure i.e. whether to use corporate finance or PF is irrelevant (Modigliani & Miller, 
1959). So why use PF instead of other financing structures? Since several premises of the 
Modigliani Miller proposition (no transaction costs, no taxes, no cost of financial distress, no 
agency conflict, and no asymmetric information) do not hold in reality, capital structure can 
affect company value (Esty, 2004a; Yescombe, 2013). Esty (2004a) states that: “a 
combination of a firm plus a project may be worth more when financing separately with 
nonrecourse debt” (p. 5). 
 As for many financing means, PF only makes sense in certain situations. When deciding 
whether to use PF or traditional finance, advantages and drawbacks need to be considered. 
Companies typically compare risks and returns of different financing structures such as 
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corporate finance and PF and choose the alternative that generates the highest value or 
provides the lowest risk (Esty, 2004a).  
The public sector uses private finance such as PF for projects implemented as PPP. The 
motivation to implement a project as PPP is manifold - arguments include efficiency gains 
through appropriate risk allocation to the private sector (Daube et al., 2008) and the gain of 
competences, resources, and funds that are not available in the public sector (Alfen et al., 
2009). As owner of infrastructure the motivation for the public sector to use PF in a PPP 
project is threefold. First, by involving the private sector in financing the public sector can 
implement projects for which the necessary budget is not available (Böttcher & Blattner, 
2013). Second, by involving the contractor as equity sponsor into infrastructure projects and 
allocating risks to the contractor, agency problems and misaligned incentives are reduced 
(Böttcher & Blattner, 2013) and equity is gained as additional security (Daube et al., 2008). 
Third, by involving lenders the public sector does not need to carry the financing risks and 
insolvency risks alone and gains a monitoring partner (Böttcher & Blattner, 2013) and an 
evaluator of the projects financial viability (Daube et al., 2008).  
Also for commercial companies as project initiator the motivation to use PF has several 
important aspects. By using a SPV the sponsoring companies can reduce underinvestment in 
positive NPV projects due to the corporate debt capacity (Esty, 2004a; Pinto & Alves, 2016). 
In using PF, returns on investment can be achieved without any claim on the sponsor’s 
balance sheet, since the financing is non-recourse. Therefore, corporate debt capacity is 
preserved and can be used for other projects. Also larger project volumes can be handled 
because of this (Böttcher & Blattner, 2013). Further, by using PF companies can reduce 
incentive conflicts between different projects within the company (Esty, 2004a). Additionally, 
underinvestment in profitable projects due to risk contamination and managerial risk aversion 
is reduced (Esty, 2003, 2004a). PF exposes the sponsor company only to potential losses of 
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their equity contribution. Further in implementing projects with PF the risk is shared with 
other sponsors and lenders, so that overall default losses are reduced. Also, according to the 
portfolio theory project financing can decrease risk for the sponsor when the combined cash 
flow variance of the project and the sponsor together is higher than that of the sponsor alone 
(Esty, 2003). Financing theory has been optimistic about agency cost advantages of PF as the 
SPV structure provides incentives for stakeholders (Müllner, 2017). Brealey et al. (1996) 
state: “The dominant reason for the growing importance of project finance in funding 
infrastructure investment is that it addresses agency problems in a way that other forms of 
financing do not” (Brealey et al., 1996, p. 27). PF may also enable sponsors to benefit from 
tax shields due to the high leverage and thus high interest payments (Gatti, 2012). Finally, by 
involving banks an additional monitoring takes place reducing the risk of managerial 
mismanagement (Esty, 2003).   
However, there are also several drawbacks of PF. First, setting up the SPV is costly, complex, 
and takes a long time (Esty, 2003; Gatti, 2012; Müllner, 2017). Second, interest rates granted 
to a project are often higher than the ones that would be granted to public institutions or 
companies due to the non-recourse nature of the debt (Yescombe, 2013). Third, sponsors can 
to a certain extend lose control of the project to lenders (Yescombe, 2013). Lenders 
involvement can restrict managerial decision making due to extensive structure of contracts 
and monitoring requirements (Yescombe, 2013). 
2.1.2 Overview relevant literature streams and gaps for infrastructure PF 
Existing substreams in the field on PF literature, as highlighted by Müllner (2017) are finance 
research, management research, and international business research. The three streams cover 
numerous topics, however not all of them are relevant in the light of the overarching aim of 
this dissertation. As stated in chapter 1, this dissertation aims to determine if infrastructure PF 
can help to close the infrastructure finance gap through efficiency gains from synergies and 
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risk transfers, with a specific focus on estimator related risk and the role of lenders and 
investors. The international business literature stream however deals with the advantages of 
PF as an entry mode into high risk investment environments such as infrastructure investment 
in developing countries and thus does not contribute to the matter at hand. The other two 
streams (1) finance research and (2) management research touch upon relevant aspects of the 
defined research questions. These aspects will be highlighted in the following chapters. 
In general, many authors state that further research is needed in the field of PF. According to 
Esty (2004a): “the gap between theory and practice in the field of project finance has been 
growing over the last 25 years” (Esty, 2004a, p. 13). This gap seems to still exist, as Pinto and 
Alves conclude in 2016: “project finance is an economically significant growing financial 
market segment, but still largely understudied” (Pinto & Alves, 2016, p. 3). Regarding the 
aim of this dissertation the most relevant gap in the existing research is that concerning 
benefits of PF, project valuation methods, risk management, and decision-making, estimator 
related risks are not studied with regard to lenders and investors.  
2.1.2.1 Finance research 
In finance research two streams are relevant concerning the aim of this dissertation. 
One group of authors examine the factors underlying companies’ choice between PF loans 
and corporate finance loans; i.e., between off-balance sheet and on-balance sheet funding, 
focusing on a-priory benefits of PF (Brealey et al., 1996; Esty, 2003; Pinto & Alves, 2016). 
This literature stream provides the basic argument for PF being able to contribute to closing 
the infrastructure investment gap. Theories that explain the superiority of PF in certain 
situations are capital structure theories such as the pecking-order theory of capital structure5 
(Brealey et al., 1996; Myers, 1984), real options theory6 (Esty, 2003), and contracting theory7 
                                                 
5 Due to information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders, borrowers prefer debt in risky investments. 
6 Non-recourse finance is said to give investors a “walk-away-put option” and thus managerial flexibility. 
7 Contracts address and allocate risks before the initiation of the project and thus lead to active risk management. 
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(Blanc-Brude & Strange, 2007; Brealey et al., 1996). “The overarching agreement is that the 
separation of a project to a separate entity reduces information asymmetry between lenders, 
allows for tailored capital structure and provides optimal incentives for all participants” 
(Müllner, 2017, p. 109). The findings of this research stream show the potential upside of PF 
and are summarized above in chapter 2.1.1.2: increased debt capacity, reduced incentive 
conflicts, reduced risk of managerial mismanagement, reduced agency cost, and optimized tax 
shields. However, while lenders and investors are named in terms of their monitoring role and 
their role as taking over risks in general, an advantage regarding estimator related risks in not 
mentioned in this literature stream. 
The second relevant finance research stream evaluates project valuation methods. In PF the 
evaluation of the future cash flow is of high importance. Esty (2004a) states that many project 
financiers value cash flows using too simple tools such as the discounted cash flow method8. 
Gatti (2012) calls for using sophisticated methods such as Monte-Carlo simulations9. West 
(2015) even moves towards a more stakeholder-inclusive evaluation10 of project cash flows. 
This research stream highlights how much uncertainty is involved in the lender and investor 
decision situations. However, while different project valuation methods and thus also risk 
assessment methods are discussed, this stream does not touch upon the question which 
valuation method can help to reduce estimator related risks. 
There are other finance research streams that touch upon PF but these are not relevant for the 
questions at hand. For instance one research stream examines the characteristics of PF as 
syndicated loan (Blanc-Brude & Strange, 2007; Sorge, 2004) e.g. host country environmental 
factors such as inflation were found to strongly affect credit risk and pricing (Dailami & 
                                                 
8 The discounted cash flow method is a valuation method discounting the free cash flows of future periods 
determined through costs and benefits by a suitable interest rate. 
9 A Monte Carlo simulation is a simulation method that determines likely impact of risks and thus makes 
valuation more realistic. 
10 A stakeholder-inclusive evaluation includes non-economic social and environmental benefits in valuation. 
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Leipziger, 1998) and PF loans were found to have lower credit spreads than comparable non 
PF loans, more likely to have a fixed rate loan pricing and have fewer loan covenants 
(Kleimeier & Megginson, 2000). 
2.1.2.2 Management research  
Three streams are relevant in the management research, concerning the research questions in 
this dissertation. 
The first relevant management research stream evaluates the role of PF contractual structures 
in risk management and decision making (Blanc-Brude & Strange, 2007; Brealey et al., 1996; 
Gatti, 2012; Miller & Lessard, 2001). Contracts that address risks before the initiation of the 
project (Blanc-Brude & Strange, 2007) and allocate them to the parties that can best control 
them are recognized as risk management tools (Brealey et al., 1996; Miller & Lessard, 2001). 
Gatti (2012) further highlights the risk mitigating role of lenders such as lead arranging banks. 
Further specific risk typologies have been developed for different industries, also with regard 
to infrastructure construction projects. One characteristic all existing typologies have in 
common is that they neglect a detailed account of estimator related risks11. Overall, this 
stream provides further indications for the benefits of PF, especially focusing on risks of 
infrastructure projects. But although lenders are mentioned with regard to risk mitigation, the 
mitigation of estimator related risks in specific is not mentioned. 
The second relevant stream compares PPP, where PF is used often but not exclusively, and 
traditional public procurement. Authors found that PPP can generate value in certain settings 
but also comes at significant cost (Gatti, 2012). Also, authors of this research stream looked at 
questions from the above-mentioned streams in relation to PPP, such as pricing of loans and 
project risks e.g. Blanc-Brude and Strange (2007) analyze how loans are priced to PPP 
                                                 
11 Risk the decision maker adds to the project by assessing other risks too high or too low, compare Baloi and 
Price (2003). 
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projects and find that only systematic risks determine pricing. This stream is important to 
show the potential downside of PF and highlights that only if the risk transfer is optimal, 
overall efficiency savings can be achieved. Again – estimator related risks are not studied. 
Finally, authors also analyzed the disadvantages of PF in situations of project failure, taking 
into account agency problems, inter-partner complexities between the project stakeholders, 
and biases project managers are subject to (Flyvbjerg et al., 2009, 2014; Kostka & Anzinger, 
2015). Here estimator related risks are mentioned for project planners regarding risk 
management, it is however not considered if lenders and investors take these risks over in PF 
or what can be done to manage this risk. 
2.1.3 Theoretical foundation PF 
Based on the existing finance and management literature presented above, in the following (1) 
the structure of PF projects, (2) PF stakeholders and their roles in PF, as well as (3) phases of 
PF are elaborated, to highlight the unique characteristics of this project implementation form. 
2.1.3.1 Project structure of projects implemented with PF 
With regard to the project structure of a project financed with PF, three areas are of 
importance: (1) organizational structure (project ownership and source of financing), (2) 
governance structure (capital structure), and (3) contractual structure (packaging of work, 
delivery models, and pricing scheme) (Esty, 2004a). In the following, all three structural 
aspects will be elaborated. 
There are two ownership options for projects implemented with PF: public and private. 
Factors that determine which options are suitable for a specific infrastructure project are 
among others the strategic importance of the asset to the general public, the legislation, the 
ability of the private sector to manage the asset more efficiently, the financial resources of the 
public sector, and the ability of an asset’s revenue to cover costs of operations and financing 
(Weber et al., 2016).  
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Private ownership requires private investors to provide substantial equity - this can be 
a single investor or a group of investors. An example for private infrastructure projects are 
power plants in Germany. Private projects typically have long term contracts for their output 
e.g. electricity and input e.g. coal, that enable the projects to have predictable profit streams 
(Scott-Quinn & Cano, 2015). This ownership option can only be taken when the infrastructure 
project is self-supported, i.e. the project revenues are able to fully fund operational costs in 
addition to all costs of financing. 
In public ownership the state retains the entire ownership, or a large stake in the asset 
ownership. This is for instance the case for public schools in Germany (Weber et al., 2016). 
However, in the implementation the private sector may be involved. In PPP projects, in the 
UK also called Public Finance Initiative, the private sector typically constructs the assets and 
is allowed to operate and maintain it for 20-30 years, however the ownership of the asset 
remains public (Scott-Quinn & Cano, 2015). Examples for this are toll roads in Germany.  
In terms of the governance structure, a project can generally be either financed with equity, a 
mix of equity and debt, or pure debt. Typically PF infrastructure projects have a debt to equity 
ratio of 80:20 (Yescombe, 2013). The high leverage allows equity investors, that profit from 
all upside risk of the project, to maximize their equity returns (Scannella, 2012) and transfer 
part of the downside project risk to lenders (Miller & Lessard, 2001). Banks on the other hand 
maximize their total fees at bearable risk level (Scannella, 2012). Certain project 
characteristics determine the suitable level of leverage. Determinants named in literature are 
the project phase, the ratio of tangible assets12(Miller & Lessard, 2001), operation risk13, 
taxes, regulations, and the stakeholders ability to bear risk (Miller & Lessard, 2001; 
Scannella, 2012). For PF long term financing instruments are needed i.e. for longer than one 
                                                 
12 Tangible assets have a higher risk of expropriation than intangible assets, compare Miller and Lessard (2001). 
13 Projects with low operation risk such as roads typically have higher leverage than e.g. nuclear plants with high 
operation risks, compare Miller and Lessard (2001). 
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year. Financial long term debt can be classified based on the seniority of the debt (Böttcher 
& Blattner, 2013). Senior debt is paid back first in terms of project default. Subordinate debt 
is only paid back after all senior debt and thus it is riskier and requires a higher return.  
Financial instruments for debt are available in many forms. “One of the most basic 
choices is between using bank loans or project bonds” (Esty, 2004a, p. 11). Which form of 
debt instrument makes most sense for a specific infrastructure project depends on factors such 
as the kind of project, the amount of finance needed, and capital market conditions (Sorge, 
2004). In the following focus is based purely on bank loans as this is today the most common 
project financing instrument (Project Finance International, 2017). However it should be 
noted that banks also created open ended funds as new asset class to attract a larger number of 
investors to infrastructure PF (Sorge, 2004).  
Equity investment instruments are capital in form of cash or assets. Equity investors 
then become sponsors of the project company.  
Mezzanine finance instruments such as coupon bonds14 or zero-coupon bonds15 are 
also used in PF - these are senior to equity and subordinate to debt instruments. 
The contractual structure of a project is important in order to manage risks and thus reduce 
costly market imperfections (Esty, 2004a). In PF risks are ideally contractually allocated to 
the parties that can mitigate them best or that can carry them at the lowest cost (Brealey et al., 
1996; Esty, 2004a; Irimia-Diéguez et al., 2014; Miller & Lessard, 2001). These contracts are 
necessary to align interests by providing incentives and preventing opportunistic behavior and 
free riding (Sorge, 2004). The main contracts govern construction, operation, input supply, 
and off-take of the project (Sorge, 2004). Additional contracts can concern government 
concessions, financial options, insurances etc. Inevitably long term contracts between the 
various parties end up being incomplete - thus in addition to contractual agreements, 
                                                 
14 Coupon bonds are debt obligations with interest payments. 
15 Zero-coupon bonds are debt obligations without interest payments. 
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governance mechanisms need to be set up (Esty, 2004a). Three aspects determine the 
contractual structure: delivery models, package split, and pricing scheme. 
As mentioned in chapter 1.3, the most common delivery model is the Date-Certain 
Turnkey Construction Contract where the completion date for the project is specified in the 
contract and legally binding for the contractor. Full contractor liability makes this the least 
risky delivery model for project financiers. Other delivery models generally used in 
infrastructure construction such as Design-Bid-Build16, or Construction Management17 do not 
make sense in the context of PF. The risks that remains with the project company and thus the 
amount of interest charged by lenders would be too high for these delivery models (Huse, 
2002). 
The package split of a project determines the number of distinct packages, a project is 
divided into. Under a Turnkey Contract a consortium of contractors, that was awarded the 
Turnkey Contract, splits the project into several packages as few contractors have the ability 
to handle very large packages (Huse, 2002). A higher number of packages however increases 
interface risks (Huse, 2002). Determining the right number of packages and the right package 
split is therefore critical. 
The most common pricing schemes for construction projects are lump-sum (fixed-
price), cost reimbursable, and unit price. “The selection of a pricing method directly affects 
the distribution of certain risks, such as changes in the cost of labour and materials” (Huse, 
2002, p. 9). Lump-sum price means that the price of the project is fixed, regardless of the 
costs the contractor occurs (Huse, 2002). This pricing scheme is currently the most accepted 
one for PF (Böttcher & Blattner, 2013) due to the lower risks this pricing method holds for the 
project company and thus also for investors and lenders. In the cost reimbursable pricing 
scheme, the contractor is reimbursed for the actual costs he occurs plus an additional fee, thus 
                                                 
16 The project company is responsible for the design and the coordination of the project. 
17 The contractor manages the project but liability for design and construction remains with the project company. 
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the contractor is not incentivized to keep costs at a minimum. Therefore, risk is high for 
investors and lenders. Unit price is a pricing scheme in which a fixed price is paid for each 
completed unit of work, here the contractor is not incentivized to finish the entire project in 
case completion costs are higher than payments for incomplete units. 
2.1.3.2 PF stakeholders and their roles 
Due to their important role in the provision of funds and the assessment of risks, the focus in 
this dissertation is placed solely on (1) lenders and (2) investors, as mentioned in chapter 1.3. 
However, to show the perspectives that are neglected in this dissertation, in the following also 
the other involved stakeholder groups illustrated in Figure 4 below will be briefly presented: 
(3) contractors, (4) operators, (5) insurers, (6) suppliers, (7) multilateral agencies, (8) 
consultants, and (9) lawyers. 
Figure 4: Stakeholders involved in PF 
 
Lenders typically form a consortium to provide debt to large projects as this allows the 
diversification of the risk of the project across a group of banks (Ehlers, 2014; Miller 
& Lessard, 2001). The consortium itself often plays a great role in forming the contractual 
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structure of the project including step-in rights and loan covenants (Blanc-Brude & Strange, 
2007). The project company is typically not allowed to diversify debt sources – consortiums 
often require loan covenants that prohibit additional borrowing from different lenders (Blanc-
Brude & Strange, 2007). Often, lenders do not give loans over the entire project lifetime, but 
restructure debt after the risky construction phase is completed (Scott-Quinn & Cano, 2015). 
In order to reduce the probability of default, lenders often require credit guarantees - these can 
be provided by multilateral public sector agencies (Ehlers, 2014).  
In PF projects leverage is typically so high that lenders exert considerable control and fulfil 
the very important risk assessing and monitoring role during all phases of a project (Alfen et 
al., 2009; Asiedu, Frempong, & Alfen, 2017; Blanc-Brude & Strange, 2007). With entering 
into a PF contract, lenders provide a throughout analysis of the projects financial viability 
(Daube et al., 2008). Concentrated debt ownership makes monitoring easier, thus consortiums 
are formed rather than individual loans given (Sorge, 2004). The bank that acts as mandated 
lead arranger18 takes a leading role in the financing stage of the project, underwrites the 
financing, and handles syndication. Other banks in the consortium act as arrangers and 
structure the financing. Banks that act as participants provide funds to invest into the project. 
Further banks take advisory roles and consult sponsors (Blanc-Brude & Strange, 2007). Since 
interest rate charged by banks is low compared to the premium of investors, banks have to 
focus on avoiding credit losses rather than maximizing credit volume (Rad, 2017). 
Project sponsors i.e. investors invest capital into the project in exchange for a share of 
ownership in the SPV. Hampl and Wüstenhagen (2013) define investors as “project sponsors, 
financial or institutional (e.g. infrastructure funds, private equity funds, pension funds) and 
strategic (e.g. power companies) investors and other stakeholders that hold an equity stake in 
a project or SPV such as project developers or technology producers” (Hampl 
                                                 
18 A lead arranger is a bank or firm that facilitates a syndicated loan. 
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& Wüstenhagen, 2013, p. 573). Many projects have a consortium of multiple sponsors 
generally including strategic investors such as the construction company, as well as 
sometimes suppliers and operators (Scott-Quinn & Cano, 2015). Additional equity finance is 
mostly provided by specialized financial investors, also called institutional investors, such as 
private equity companies, infrastructure funds, pension funds, insurance companies, 
government agencies, and the European Investment Bank (Scott-Quinn & Cano, 2015). 
Equity investors are typically contractually committed to the project in the long term, as a 
possible change of control would make debt risky and thus interest expensive (Scott-Quinn 
& Cano, 2015). Normally, equity investors have no guarantee of a return on their investment, 
thus they expect a high surplus on their investment in exchange for the risk they bear and 
therefore are motivated to focus on large projects and a high project volume  (Ehlers, 2014).  
Contractors are those companies that are responsible for the planning, design, and 
construction of the project. Typically, several contractors form a consortium to bid for an 
infrastructure project contract. The contractors then involve subcontractors and suppliers in 
the project. As mentioned above, it is also common for contractors to hold an equity stake in 
the project. 
Operators are those that are responsible for maintaining and operating the infrastructure after 
completion. Also, operators commonly hold an equity stake in the project. 
Insurers are those that provide risk insurances, which offer PF stakeholders an opportunity to 
mitigate risks they bear contractually at a certain cost (Esty, 2004a). This is specifically 
interesting for risks that cannot be controlled, such as the risk of earth quakes. Lenders for 
instance typically protect themselves from specific political risk events such as expropriation 
and changing regulation (Sorge, 2004). Also sponsors use insurances to decrease risk they 
cannot control e.g. currency devaluation (Esty, 2004a).  
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Suppliers provide materials and components of the infrastructure e.g. in a power plant project, 
fuel suppliers would be involved.  
Further international financing institutions such as multilateral agencies or export credit 
agencies (ECAs) may be involved. Multilateral agencies such as the World Bank or regional 
development banks act as either lenders or provide loan guarantees for infrastructure projects. 
“ECAs try to help domestic firms to export their goods and services to international markets” 
(Esty, 2004a, p. 45). 
Consultants provide due diligences and support in choosing project structure and bank 
consortium.  
Lawyers set up the extensive contractual framework needed and support project initiators in 
choosing project structure and bank consortium. Further legal advisers aid in interpreting 
regulatory frameworks.  
Public sector entities take different direct and indirect roles. Public sector entities can for 
instance be project initiators, take the role of project sponsor either in project finance or in 
public finance, or provide guarantees. Government agencies can also be suppliers in case the 
commodity needed for the project is something non-tangible such as a mining concession or 
the right-of-way. Additionally, regulations and policies of local governments can influence 
infrastructure projects greatly.  
 Public institutions that are involved in projects as sponsors have a different 
institutional structure than private sector investors such as infrastructure funds. The 
institutional structure of public entities is characterized by election periods e.g. in Germany 4 
years, as well as the civil servant status (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2016). A 
complicating factor is that national and federal governments are often both involved and have 
different election periods, as well as different election results. While in investment funds, 
large projects are typically the responsibility of the top management, “politicians are always 
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happy to tout the success of completed projects, but if problems creep up in their construction, 
few are willing to take any responsibility” (Diekmann, Kröger, & Reimann, 2013) .  
2.1.3.3 Phases of PF 
After elaborating the typical structure of PF projects and the roles of PF stakeholders, in the 
following the typical phases of a PF project will be illustrated. 
Project financing can be divided into successive stages: initiation, project analysis, risk 
analysis and distribution, as well as implementation of financing and monitoring of the 
project. 
Project initiators, sponsors, consultants, and sometimes the public sector are involved in the 
initiating phase of PF. In this time consuming phase it is analyzed whether the project is 
financially viable (Alfen et al., 2009; Asiedu et al., 2017). If the result of this is that a project 
can be financed, lenders will be contacted with due diligence material (Scott-Quinn & Cano, 
2015).  
Then lenders and financial investors test the financial viability of the project and the 
prerequisites for PF with detailed due diligences (technical, environmental, legal, and 
economical) (Böttcher & Blattner, 2013). Valuing projects is complex as they are often 
exposed to unique risks and uncertain future cash flows (Esty, 2004a). Typically, complex 
cash flow models that also take real options into account are used for valuation. Credit rating 
agencies may be engaged in the process (Scott-Quinn & Cano, 2015). If the involved parties 
conclude that PF is an option, they will proceed with a risk analysis. 
In the risk analysis risks are identified, classified, and allocated. The impact and likelihood of 
materialization is assessed for each risk. Together with the relevant stakeholders the risks are 
mitigated to the greatest extend possible, and allocated to the party that can best control them 
or bear them at lowest cost (Brealey et al., 1996; Esty, 2004a; Irimia-Diéguez et al., 2014; 
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Miller & Lessard, 2001). In this phase not only lenders and investors, but also consultants, 
and insurers are involved. Assessing the impact and likelihood of materialization is often done 
by simulations and sensitivity analysis (Esty, 2004a). Risk allocation is accomplished through 
contracts (Esty, 2004a).  
The next step is implementing the PF by pricing the transaction and signing all documents. 
Contracts with lenders usually include step-in rights19 and extensive loan covenants20. 
Lenders and investors will demand regular reports on project performance, milestones 
reached, and the status of credit covenants to monitor the project and manage risks 
continuously (Scott-Quinn & Cano, 2015; Yescombe, 2013).  
2.2 Large infrastructure construction projects financed with PF in practice 
After providing a brief overview of recent literature in chapter 2.1, including terminology 
(2.1.1), research streams and gaps (2.1.2), as well as the theoretical foundation of PF (2.1.3), 
in the following an overview of the PF market in general and specifically in Europe is given. 
Globally PF has experienced strong growth over the last years, the infrastructure field 
(including renewables) is expected to be the main growth area for PF in the future (Project 
Finance International, 2017), underlining the practical relevance of this dissertation. There is a 
consensus among scholars that PF will grow in importance due to budget constraints of 
governments both in developed and developing countries (Müllner, 2017). Pinto and Alves 
(2016) for instance conclude that PF “represents a promising segment of global lending 
activity” (Pinto & Alves, 2016, p. 3). According to Project Finance International (2017)21 the 
global project loans market was at 236.4 billion US dollar in 2016, which is slightly lower 
                                                 
19 A step-in right is the right to take over project company in case of a breach in contract. 
20 Loan covenants are promises the project company makes to lenders e.g. to fulfill specific information 
requirements with reporting and to keep specific financial ratios e.g. a certain debt service cover ratio. 
21 According to Müllner (2017, p. 101): “The most comprehensive sources of PF information are the databases 
maintained by Dealogic and Thomson Reuters.”. Therefore, this effort uses the Thomson Reuters Project 
Finance International (PFI) annual league tables for the market overview. 
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than in 2015 due to a 40% decrease in PF activity in the US market (Project Finance 
International, 2017). The PF market in Europe 2016 remained at the same value as in 2015, 
sixty-five billion US dollar (Project Finance International, 2017). According to Project 
Finance International (2017) power was the single biggest PF loan sector globally and in 
EMEA in 2016, as can be seen in Figure 5. Growth in different sectors has been similar in 
recent years. The most relevant projects in Europe where in the offshore wind sector. 
 
PF debt is mainly financed via loans, in Europe for instance loans made out 73% in 2014 
(Scott-Quinn & Cano, 2015). Therefore, this dissertation focuses purely on loans as debt 
instrument, as mentioned in chapter 2.1.3.1. However, the importance of loans as PF 
instrument is slowly changing as according to Project Finance International (2017) “activity 
in the bond market was up in 2016” (Project Finance International, 2017, p. 50) while the 
loan market shrank. On the lender side banks remain the dominant lenders in Europe’s 
infrastructure financing. Increases in market share for the top ten players in recent years make 
Global loans by sector 2016 EMEA loans by sector 2016
Sector
Volume 
USD M Sector
Volume 
USD M
Power 110,915.8 Power 46,986.8
Oil & Gas 44,311.6 Oil & Gas 28,385.9
Transportation 43,278.6 Transportation 18,370.6
Petrochemicals 14,485.2 Petrochemicals 13,244.7
Leisure & Property 7,683.7 Industry 5,050.8
Industry 6,557.5 Leisure & Property 4,547.6
Mining 4,058.5 Mining 3,503.0
Water & Sewerage 3,371.1 Water & Sewerage 1,484.7
Telecommunications 942.7 Telecommunications 942.8
Waste & Recycling 851.1 Waste & Recycling 795.6
Total 236,455.8 Total 123,312.5
Source: Project Finance International (2017)
Figure 5: PF loans by sector 2016 
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it more challenging for other players to land project deals22. As the largest players increase in 
size, they gain access to the increasing number of very large deals, effectively pushing smaller 
players to the side concurrently (Project Finance International, 2017). Some significant banks 
in recent years have now decreased their PF activity, focusing more on acquisition finance 
(Project Finance International, 2017). On the equity side institutional investors such as 
pension funds start to enter the PF markets on mostly brownfield but also occasionally 
greenfield investments (Heath & Read, 2014; Scott-Quinn & Cano, 2015).  
Generally many large PF infrastructure projects face substantial cost and time overruns 
(Blanc-Brude & Makovsek, 2013). In 2014 the annual default rate in percent increased from 
0.9 in 2013 to 1.3 (Gevero & Baker, 2016). However, “the 10-year cumulative default rates 
for the PF study are consistent with the 10-year cumulative default rates for corporate issuers 
of low investment-grade (S&P Global Ratings Corporate Issuer Credit Rating of ‘BBB’)” 
(Gevero & Baker, 2016, p. 3).  
Currently the problem in the project financing industry is not the default rate, but rather the 
matching of finance from private investors with suitable projects (Ehlers, 2014). This (1) 
current challenge to finance infrastructure projects is explained in more detail in the 
following, further (2) the current political discussion is highlighted. 
2.2.1 Current challenges to finance infrastructure projects and possible solutions  
As mentioned in the introduction, there is a gap in infrastructure financing in Europe (Woetzel 
et al., 2017). It is vital to close this gap to keep the European Union competitive. 
Main reasons for the gap are the three following. First, the public budget is constrained in 
developed countries like those in Europe (Müllner, 2017). One reason for this is the high level 
                                                 
22 The China Developing Bank was the only global top ten lead arranger in 2016 that was a newcomer in the top 
fifty ranking according to Project Finance International (2017). However, the ranking of China Development 
Bank was only due to one single big deal, while the other top banks in EMEA (Europe, Middle East, and Africa) 
arranged between thirty-five and fifty deals in 2016 according to Project Finance International (2017), therefore 
it is quite possible that this player will not appear in the ranking again next year. 
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of public in indebtedness in Europe (Woetzel et al., 2017). Therefore, important projects are 
hold up e.g. offshore wind farms in the North Sea were stalled for a long time. Second, long 
term funding from banks is constrained and expensive. Since the financial crisis of 2007, 
capital and liquidity requirement have become stricter for banks due to reforms like Basel II 
and III (Scannella, 2012). Thus banks will not be able to provide the amounts of debt that are 
required by large-scale infrastructure projects (Scannella, 2012). Additionally, the bank 
regulation Basel III has demanded higher capital requirements for banks that grant PF loans 
and has thus made interest more expensive (Chan & Worth, 2011). Third, since public 
resources and long-term debt by banks are constraint, there is the need to attract other sources 
of finance into the infrastructure sector. However, there are problems to match supply of 
private sector finance with investable projects. Europe's capital market has a current high 
level of liquidity while interest rates offered by government bonds are extremely low and 
investors look for investment opportunities with attractive rates of return (Woetzel et al., 
2017). However, only few investors invest in infrastructure projects (Heath & Read, 2014). 
The reason for this is twofold. One the one hand, investors’ appetite for low risk stable cash 
flow is not compatible with high risk greenfield projects and construction projects. Further 
disruptive technologies and changing users’ needs increase uncertainty and risk (Woetzel et 
al., 2017). On the other hand, there is a lack of pipeline of properly structured projects. This is 
so because for some projects privatization is met with political skepticism. Often the early 
stages of project development are so complex and costly that many ideas do not move forward 
to an investable stage. Finally, many developers lack sufficient skill and resources for 
developing concepts into financeable well-structured projects. 
As the infrastructure finance gap has many different reasons, different measures have been 
named to close the gap. One way to close the gap is to increase available funds by attracting 
more banks and institutional investors (Woetzel et al., 2017). This can be achieved by a 
combination of several measures. For instance, the pipeline of well-developed projects needs 
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to be improved. Further, changes to regulation and risk mitigation need to be made. Market 
facilitation and standardization need to be increased. Moreover, solid cross border investment 
principles need to be established and new investment assets such as the “Europe 2020 Project 
Bond Initiative” need to be developed (Scannella, 2012). Another way to close the financing 
gap could be to optimize the use of the funds already available today i.e. optimize public and 
corporate spending by e.g. prioritizing the right projects and improving the productivity of 
these projects.  
Shifting more from asset, public, and corporate financing to PF in Europe can be a way to 
achieve optimized public and corporate spending. 
 As noted in chapter 2.1.1.2, using more PF for projects financed by corporates, this 
should lead to higher efficiency of projects due to agency cost advantages (Müllner, 2017) 
and reduced risk of managerial mismanagement due to the monitoring of banks (Esty, 2003). 
As further mentioned in chapter 2.1.1.2, for the public sector as project initiator, by 
using PPP with PF agency problems and misaligned incentives might be reduced, financing 
risks shifted, project risks revealed, and shifted risks managed more effectively (Böttcher, 
Blattner 2013). According to Daube et al. (2008): "PPP is not only a financing model, but an 
alternative, more profitable procurement method that involves a private contractor as well as 
private capital and know-how in realizing public infrastructure and services to reach value 
for money" (Daube et al., 2008, p. 377). Moreover, public spending can be optimized by using 
PF on more PPP projects. In Europe PF is already a common financing form for PPP projects 
(Müllner, 2017). Yet, in the specific example of Germany another financing form is still 
dominant: the forfaiting model (Daube et al., 2008). Between 2002 and 2007 73% of PPP 
projects in Germany were financed by this method in which the private contractor sells the 
claims he has in the PPP project e.g. for the construction of the infrastructure asset to the 
bank, while the public entity declares a waiver of objection (Daube et al., 2008). The risks of 
the forfaiting model are that the public principal carries the insolvency risk, that the contractor 
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is less incentivized in case of bad performance, and finally that lenders do not evaluate, 
monitor, and control risks of the project (Daube et al., 2008). So while PF "provides an all-
embracing security instrument for public authorities" (Daube et al., 2008, p. 381) the public 
principal carries more risks when using the forfaiting model. For all projects in which the 
risks of the forfaiting model are lower than the additional costs of PF, the forfaiting model 
optimizes the use of public spending. However, for many large projects this is not the case. 
Besides optimizing the risk allocation for corporates and public institutions PF can 
help decreasing the investment gap. For corporate projects the financing gap is partly closed 
by reducing underinvestment due to corporate debt capacity and the risk of risk contamination 
(Esty, 2004a; Pinto & Alves, 2016). For public projects, by implementing PPP projects and by 
involving the private sector and lenders the public sector can implement projects for which 
the necessary budget is not available (Böttcher & Blattner, 2013). Nonetheless, it needs to be 
mentioned that PF does only solve this partially because long term lending capacity is limited 
and does not solve the problem to attract more investor funds into infrastructure. However, by 
introducing new financing models for PF private sector investors could be attracted to 
infrastructure finance e.g. debt finance through specific bond structures.  
2.2.2 Current discussion about the use of PF for public infrastructure projects 
Since several years there is the discussion, if private capital should be used in public 
infrastructure (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2016). There is infrastructure that is 
historically public in Europe, either because of its characteristics as for instance a monopoly23, 
or because the private sector would not provide it sufficiently24 (Heath & Read, 2014). 
However, “although governments in many countries have historically played a dominant role 
in the construction, ownership and operation of key economic and social infrastructure, more 
recent decades have seen a shift towards greater involvement of the private sector, not just as 
                                                 
23 E.g. citywide public transportation. 
24 E.g. healthcare, education. 
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builders, but also as operators, financiers and owners of what would otherwise be considered 
‘public infrastructure’ assets and services” (Heath & Read, 2014, p. 100).  
Opponents of private investment in public infrastructure question whether the complexity and 
high cost of PPP with PF (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2016; Yescombe, 2013) is worth 
it for the taxpayer. For public infrastructure, interest rates granted to privately financed SPVs 
are typically higher than the historically low ones that would be granted to public institutions 
(Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2016; Yescombe, 2013). Yescombe (2007) estimates this 
premium to be as much as 200–300 basic points25. Given the capital cost premium there is the 
concern, that the efficiency savings of PPPs and savings due to risk transfer overall might not 
manage to outweigh these costs (Hodge & Greve, 2007). However, when discussing this 
concern, currently savings from efficient risk allocation are not regarded, as their calculation 
is complex (Daube et al., 2008). Additionally, like public debt, PPP with PF pushes public 
investment obligations into future election periods (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2016; 
Daube et al., 2008) not being visible in the budget. Thus in times of the debt break, project 
finance/PPP might be used for public projects, even if it is not suitable for the individual 
project (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2016). Finally opponents view the level of profit 
that private investors make unreasonable, compared to the risks they take on (Heath & Read, 
2014; Vecchi, Hellowell, & Gatti, 2013). 
Proponents see private capital as the only way to close the infrastructure gap. Governmental 
intervention has the drawback that it can create inefficiencies (Engel, Fischer, & Galetovic, 
2010; Gatti, 2012). In spite of the complex calculation of savings from efficient risk allocation 
there seems to be a consensus that private financing “can lead to efficiency benefits by 
harnessing the skills and know-how of private partners combined with commercial incentives” 
(Heath & Read, 2014, p. 106).  
                                                 
25 According to other authors, however, there is no general PPP premium, compare Heath and Read (2014).   
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2.3 Synopsis - problem definition and addressed gap 
Investments into infrastructure assets are the key to maintaining Europe's competitiveness, but 
all over the world, including Europe, there is a gap in infrastructure financing. Optimized use 
of available funds by e.g. prioritizing suitable projects and improving the productivity of 
projects seems to be one way to close this gap. Implementing projects with PF can help to 
achieve this if efficiency gains from synergies and the risk transfer to the party that can best 
carry the risk are higher than the costs of PF. For this, risks need to be understood far better 
than it is the case today. Especially estimator related risk i.e. the use of cognitive bias, 
triggered by high uncertainty of large infrastructure projects, is not accounted for sufficiently. 
Thus, in terms of the literature a gap exists regarding the benefits of PF, project valuation 
methods, risk management, and decision-making in the context of estimator related risks. 
Therefore, the aim of this study is to examine which estimator related risks are applicable in 
infrastructure PF in Europe, what fuels these risks, who can best carry them, and how they can 
be avoided. The relevant research questions can be reviewed in Figure 6.  
Figure 6: Overview of research question 
 
Source: Adapted from Hampl and Wüstenhagen (2012)
Project finance stakeholder specific decision-making process
Perceived risk
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RQ2: How do personal and company factors influence heuristics and unconscious biases of 
infrastructure PF decision stakeholders and how do these heuristics and unconscious biases 
influence the perception of risks and rewards, in this study subsumed under “unrealistic 
optimism”?
RQ3: Are certain stakeholders less biased than other stakeholders and are therefore better 
equipped to assess risks of large European infrastructure projects? Can personal or company 
related factors be identified to drive differences between lenders and investors and made 
accessible for best practice learning?
RQ4: What are the characteristics of companies that are less unrealistically optimistic than 
others?  
RQ1: Which are the typical risks and uncertainties of large infrastructure construction projects that 
need to be evaluated, and which stakeholder are they typically transferred to in the common delivery 
model used in PF: the Fixed Price, Date-Certain Turnkey Construction Contract?
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3. Risk management in infrastructure PF  
3.1 Problem statement 
Infrastructure projects are becoming bigger and more complex (Baloi & Price, 2003; 
Flyvbjerg, 2014). Thus, managing risks becomes increasingly vital to ensure not only the 
project success (Baloi & Price, 2003), but also the success of the stakeholders involved 
(Flyvbjerg, 2014). Due to their size, failed projects can lead to corporate bankruptcy, as well 
as downswings in national economy (Flyvbjerg, 2014). 
The implementation of projects as PF does not only feed “fresh” money to large infrastructure 
projects but simultaneously entails that risks are transferred from the public institution and 
corporates to contractors, lenders, and investors, as well as other PF stakeholders such as 
consultants. Risks are transferred optimally to the party that can bear the risk best at the 
lowest cost (Brealey et al., 1996; Esty, 2004a; Irimia-Diéguez et al., 2014; Miller & Lessard, 
2001). 
If this optimal risk transfer succeeds at a fair cost, shifting from asset, public, and corporate 
finance to PF as main financing method can be a way to achieve optimized public and 
corporate spending in Europe. At the same time, optimized spending can contribute to closing 
the infrastructure finance gap that was mentioned in the previous chapter.  
To start with, a reliable risk assessment and handling can only be achieved with a profound 
knowledge of the risks and uncertainties large infrastructural projects typically face, and to 
whom these are typically transferred to.  
3.1.1 Practical relevance 
As mentioned in chapter 2, PF is only better than other financing options if the costs of PF are 
less than the costs the risk transfer generates for the corporate or public institution. 
Understanding these risks is an essential foundation to assess this trade off properly.  
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3.1.2 Theoretical relevance 
A vast set of specific risk factors for infrastructure construction projects have been identified 
in the project management literature. Many researchers have focused on specific risk factors 
of construction projects. Blanc-Brude and Makovsek (2013) for instance examine the 
systematic nature of cost overruns as a planning or estimation problem.  
 However as can be seen in Table 1 no typology of the risks has been defined for 
infrastructure projects financed through PF that shows exactly which risks are taken over by 
lenders and private investors. This is surprising, because as described in chapter 2, the risks of 
infrastructure projects implemented with PF are different to risks of other project types, and 
PF is growing as an implementation form. Further lenders and investors take over specific 
roles in this implementation form, so the risks these stakeholders carry are vital and should be 
investigated. Additionally to the missing focus on PF, apart from Baloi and Price (2003), 
previous research omits estimator related risks, such as those caused by cognitive bias, from 
their risk taxonomies and typologies.  
Table 1: Selected previous studies on risks in infrastructure construction projects 
 Type of project     Allocation of risk                                                    Risks                                                      
 Author 
Infra- 
structure 
projects PF 
Public and 
private 
sector 
Stake-
holder 
groups 
Includes lenders and 
investors 
Risk factor 
categorization 
Specific 
risks 
factors 
Estimator 
related 
risks 
This paper x x  x x x x x 
Irimia-Diéguez et al. 
(2014) x   x x x   
Marques and Berg 
(2011) x  x   x x  
Ibrahim, Price, and 
Dainty (2006) x  x   x x  
Bing, Akintoye, 
Edwards, and 
Hardcastle (2005) x  x   x x  
Baloi and Price 
(2003) x     x x x 
Girmscheid and 
Busch (2003)      x x  
Grimsey and Lewis 
(2002) x     x   
Miller and Lessard 
(2001) x     x x  
Akintoye and 
MacLeod (1997) x     x   
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3.2 Goal and approach 
In the risk management literature, it was proposed to transfer risks of large infrastructure 
construction projects to private sector stakeholders because they have a higher motivation to 
avoid and diversify these risks (Flyvbjerg, 2013). However, it is not clearly defined which 
risks typically transferred to private parties. Already 14 years ago Sorge (2004) called for "a 
deeper understanding of risks involved in PF" (Sorge, 2004, p. 101), yet, still in recent years 
authors call for further research (Irimia-Diéguez et al., 2014; Müllner, 2017).  
The risk categorization of Irimia-Diéguez et al. (2014) is the latest typology in previous 
research. Therefore, goal of this chapter is to build on this typology and show which 
infrastructure stakeholder typically bears which risks, answering the research question 
highlighted in Figure 7 below.  
Figure 7: Research question relevant in this chapter 
 
To derive at an answer to this research question, the approach is threefold.  
 First, a comprehensive literature review of existing research on risk factors of 
infrastructure projects financed through a SPV is conducted to gain an overview of the 
concepts themselves (presented in chapter 3.3). A specific focus during the literature review is 
laid upon the typical allocation of these risk factors to project stakeholders and the project 
phases the risks occurred.  
Source: Adapted from Hampl and Wüstenhagen (2012)
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RQ1: Which are the typical risks and uncertainties of large infrastructure construction projects that 
need to be evaluated, and which stakeholder are they typically transferred to in the common delivery 
model used in PF: the Fixed Price, Date-Certain Turnkey Construction Contract?
46 
 
 
 Second, because risks are discussed in previous literature on a high level rather than 
detailed and are typically not defined for estimator related risks, an explorative approach was 
taken (presented in chapter 3.4). Following a qualitative research design, internal project 
documents of three projects (risk registers), publicized case examples stating main reasons 
why specific projects failed, and eight semi-structured interviews with PF decision makers are 
analyzed according to the process suggested by the CIT.  
 Finally, the empirical findings are compared to the findings from the literature review 
and used to create a typology of risks clustered by stakeholder that bears them typically 
(presented in chapter 3.5). 
3.3 Status quo relevant literature on risk management in infrastructure PF 
In the following (1) the terms decision under risk and decision under uncertainty are defined, 
(2) an overview of the relevant literature streams is provided, and (3) the typical risks present 
for large infrastructure projects are named.  
3.3.1 Terminology - decisions under risk and decisions under uncertainty 
Decision making situations are usually defined as either deterministic i.e. the outcome is 
known with certainty, decisions with risk involved, and decisions under uncertainty (Baloi 
& Price, 2003). In the following the term risk and uncertainty are defined for the course of a 
decision-making process. 
Infrastructure projects are full of risks for their stakeholders. But what is risk in this context? 
"Risks are parameters which can affect any venture either positively or negatively" (Ibrahim 
et al., 2006, p. 151), it is the chance of any outcome to be different than expected (Heath 
& Read, 2014). In a decision under risk a probability, objective or subjective, can be assigned 
to the materialization of the risk (Baloi & Price, 2003). Objective probabilities are those that 
are determined statistically e.g. based on historic data (Aven, 2016). Subjective probabilities 
are those that are based on personal experience, beliefs, or intuition (Aven, 2016). 
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In decision making, uncertainties are those parameters that are simply unknown and therefore 
no probability can be assigned to them (Baloi & Price, 2003). In infrastructure projects this 
can be e.g. completely unforeseen events, or errors (Baloi & Price, 2003). 
3.3.2 Overview of literature streams and gaps 
The following table gives a brief overview over the relevant research streams regarding the 
questions which the typical risks and uncertainties of large infrastructure construction projects 
are, as well as which stakeholder they are typically transferred to. Overall, a gap exists 
regarding the exact risks, including estimator related risks that are taken over by lenders and 
investors in infrastructure PF. This is surprising, because as was described in chapter 2, PF is 
growing as an implementation form with very specific risks, and understanding the risk 
transfer is vital to decide if PF can contribute to closing the infrastructure finance gap.   
Table 2: Overview of relevant literature streams for RQ1 
Literature stream Most relevant journal Latest review Aspects relevant for RQ1 Other aspects covered 
Risk management 
literature 
various Aven (2016) Development of concepts 
and tools for risk 
management, 
applicability of risk 
management to decrease 
risks of specific activities 
in practice  
 
PF literature International Journal of 
Project Management 
Müllner (2017) Management research 
(role PF in risk 
management, reasons for 
project failures) 
Financial research (benefits PF, project 
valuation methods, characteristics PF 
loans), management research 
(comparison and traditional 
procurement), international business 
research (benefits of PF in high risk 
investments) 
Megaprojects 
literature 
International Journal of 
Project Management, 
Project Management 
Journal 
Irimia-Diéguez 
et al. (2014) 
Risk analysis and 
management (risk 
typologies) 
Organization/stakeholder 
management, scope/procurement 
management, cost/schedule 
management, construction/site 
management megaproject 
management as new profession, 
central project monitoring/control, 
complex project management, 
information technology 
The overarching literature stream that contributes to the question at hand is the risk 
management literature. "The number of papers in this field has been increasing in recent 
years; consistent with the importance that this topic has assumed" (Irimia-Diéguez et al., 
2014, p. 415). This stream describes the risk identification, allocation, and response process in 
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detail. Regarding risk identification, findings were transferred to different literature fields and 
e.g. risk typologies and taxonomies exist for different kind of decision situations. Relevant for 
the research question at hand are decision situations discussed in the literature streams of PF 
and megaprojects. For these individual literature streams specific gaps of the existing risk 
typologies and taxonomies are highlighted in the next paragraphs. 
The PF management stream presented in chapter 2 is relevant for the research question at 
hand, as it evaluates the role of PF contractual structures in risk management and decision 
making, highlighting the risk mitigating role of lenders, and providing specific risk 
typologies. In the PF literature Müllner (2017) states: "IB research would benefit greatly from 
sharpening its perspective to differentiate between very broad uncertainty and specific 
sources of risks that are both measurable and manageable" (Müllner, 2017, p. 126).  
However, as mentioned in chapter 2, all existing typologies neglect a detailed account of 
estimator related risks, although they are investigated with regards to project planners. 
Also in the megaprojects literature a vast set of specific risk factors has been identified. 
Already Akintoye and MacLeod (1997) acknowledge “the construction industry and its 
clients are widely associated with a high degree of risk due to the nature of construction 
business activities” (Akintoye & MacLeod, 1997, p. 31). Many researchers have focused on 
specific risk factors in the construction phase of construction projects. Blanc-Brude and 
Makovsek (2013) for instance examine the systematic nature of cost overruns as a planning or 
estimation problem e.g. due to scope changes and design related errors and omission. 
However Irimia-Diéguez et al. (2014) state: "Further research into how these risks are 
managed in megaprojects is called for, in an effort to recognize risk mitigations and coverage 
measures" (Irimia-Diéguez et al., 2014, p. 416) and specifically highlight that in the 
infrastructure area there is only little research on labor risks and force majeure. However, not 
only labor risks and force majeure are understudied. Apart from Baloi and Price (2003), who 
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mention estimator related risk without providing further details, previous research omits this 
risk category completely in their risk taxonomies and typologies.  
Based on the existing risk management, PF, and megaproject literature above, in the 
following a summary of the status quo in (1) risks on infrastructure projects and (2) risk 
management is presented.  
3.3.3 Theoretical foundation - risks of infrastructure construction projects  
To see how risks are managed a first step should be to identify which specific risks are 
relevant in the context of infrastructure projects financed through a SPV. This will be done in 
the following.  
The desirable outcome for any infrastructure project is delivery according to specifications, as 
well as on-time and within the budget completion (Blanc-Brude & Makovsek, 2013). 
However, cost and schedule overruns happen frequently, e.g. according to Flyvbjerg, Skamris 
Holm, and Buhl (2003) in 90% of transport infrastructure projects. This phenomenon is global 
and seems to have persisted over time (Flyvbjerg, Skamris Holm, & Buhl, 2004). How risks 
are evaluated affects the financial viability of the cash flow analysis (Irimia-Diéguez et al., 
2014). Risk management is necessary on any kind of project, however in megaprojects it is 
especially relevant due to the large impact megaprojects have on companies and societies 
(Irimia-Diéguez et al., 2014). Grimsey and Lewis (2002) state that one of the greatest risks in 
any PF infrastructure project is, that the initially predicted revenues do not materialize. Other 
authors argue that the failure to meet construction cost, completion time, and quality targets is 
one of the main risks (Baloi & Price, 2003).  
The general risk of not achieving project targets, can be classified in more detailed risk 
categories. "The classification of risks constitutes a basic element in this process since not 
only does it help in the process of risk identification, but also in the subsequent steps, 
including how these risks should be managed" (Irimia-Diéguez et al., 2014, p. 413). Up to 
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today, no consistent classification of risks in infrastructure projects exists. Some authors 
classify risks in terms of influenceability by project management, others focus on impacted 
project areas, or originating sources (Baloi & Price, 2003). In Table 3 examples of different 
classifications are presented. 
Table 3: Selected risk categorizations 
Author Categories Categorization factor 
United Nations 
Industrial 
Development 
Organization (1996) 
General/country specific risks (political, country commercial, and 
country legal risks) and project specific risks 
Originating source 
Akintoye and MacLeod 
(1997)  
Physical, environmental, design, logistics, financial, legal, political, 
construction, and operation risks 
Originating source 
Miller, R. and Lessard 
(2001) 
Market related risks (due to revenue risks and financial markets), 
completion risks (related to construction and operation), and 
institutional risks (result of laws, regulations, public pressure) 
Originating source 
Grimsey and Lewis 
(2002) 
Global (not controllable by project participants) and elemental 
(controllable) risks 
Influenceability by 
project management 
Girmscheid and Busch 
(2003) 
Legal, financial, technical, and schedule related risks Impact area 
Baloi and Price (2003) Estimator related (cognitive biases), design related, level of competition 
related, fraudulent practices related, economic related, and political 
related risks 
Originating source 
Bing et al. (2005) Macro, meso, and micro levels of risks Influenceability by 
project management 
Ibrahim et al. (2006) Exogenous risks (political & governmental policy, macroeconomic, legal 
and legislative, social factors, natural factors) and endogenous risks 
(project selection, project finance, residual risk, design factors, 
construction risk, operation risk, relationship risk, third party risk) 
Influenceability by 
project management 
Marques and Berg 
(2011) 
Production, commercial, and contextual risks Originating source 
Irimia-Diéguez et al. 
(2014) 
Design, legal/political, contractual, construction, operation and 
maintenance, labor, clients/user/society, financial/economic, and force 
majeure 
Impact area 
As mentioned above, this research will use the categorization Irimia-Diéguez et al. (2014) 
proposed, as this seems to be not only the latest attempt to achieve an exhaustive and mutually 
exclusive classification, but as well considers most researched risks. However, estimator 
related risks i.e. the risk to assess risks incorrectly, is not included in the typology of Irimia-
Diéguez et al. (2014) but needs to be considered as an additional risk factor category. 
According to Flyvbjerg (2006): "a major source of risk in project management is inaccurate 
forecasts of project costs, demand, and other impacts" (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 5). Table 4 below 
shows this extended, full risk categorization used in the following and provides definitions of 
each of the risk factor categories. 
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Table 4: Risk categorization used in the following 
Risk factor category Explanation  
Clients/user/society “Include: (a) demand risks such as inflation, price trends, price range; (b) market risks, such as variations 
in the client's requirement, existence of the market; (c) social profitability risk which puts into question if 
the project provides the expected benefits to society; (d) impact on local groups’ risk arises when the 
inhabitants of an area are a source of risk due to not being managed correctly; (e) environmental risks, 
which are usually called environmental impact assessments (EIAs); and (f) reputational risks, including 
media and marketing control” (Irimia-Diéguez et al., 2014, p. 414) 
Construction “Cost overruns (or cost escalation), project schedule, coordination problems, an inappropriate design or 
accident during the construction are examples classified within this section” (Irimia-Diéguez et al., 2014, 
p. 414) 
Contractual “Those derived from the renegotiation of the contract, such as midstream change of project scope, and 
issues caused by imprecision and vagueness in the contract” (Irimia-Diéguez et al., 2014, p. 413) 
Design “Those related with the planning phase of the megaproject, such as delivery method, contract 
formation, and scope control” (Irimia-Diéguez et al., 2014, p. 413) 
Estimator related “Cognitive biases: availability, representative adjustment and anchoring, and motivational bias” (Baloi 
& Price, 2003, p. 264) 
Financial/economic “Encompass a variety of events related with the financing and performance of the megaproject. These 
are composed of: (a) economic risks related with the investment or economic structure of the 
megaproject, such as lower-than-expected profitability, and inappropriate metrics about the project; (b) 
financial risks due to the high level of leverage which exerts an impact on the megaproject solvency; (c) 
liquidity risks, such as financial restrictions, availability of funds, and downgrading of credit ratings; and 
(d) foreign-exchange and interest-rate risk derived basically from long-term interest rates and foreign 
exchange rate” (Irimia-Diéguez et al., 2014, p. 414) 
Force majeure “War, natural disasters, extreme weather conditions, terrorism” (Irimia-Diéguez et al., 2014, p. 414) 
Labor “Related with the workers linked to training, language, accident cost, and culture” (Irimia-Diéguez et al., 
2014, p. 414) 
Legal/political Derived from changes in the governing policy of the country where the megaproject is developed i.e. 
authorization criteria, political actors, changing government regulations, cancellation of a concession 
(Irimia-Diéguez et al., 2014, p. 413) 
Operation and maintenance Those related with the operational phase that can affect the operation cost, operation capacity or 
quality, such as economic viability issues, unnecessarily high operations costs, poor construction quality, 
and operator incompetence (Irimia-Diéguez et al., 2014, p. 414) 
Infrastructure construction projects have distinct characteristics as named in chapter 2. They 
are capital intensive, long term, and have an unattractive cash flow time profile (Ehlers, 2014; 
Sorge, 2004). Therefore, certain risks e.g. regulatory risks in the risk factor category 
clients/user/society are more relevant for these kind of projects than for other project types 
(Baloi & Price, 2003). The high uncertainty leaves room for estimator related bias (Flyvbjerg, 
2006). Furthermore, for infrastructure projects construction activities are customarily needed, 
and “construction cost overruns are generally considered to be one of the greatest risks faced 
in infrastructure project development” (Blanc-Brude & Makovsek, 2013, p. 3), with "the 
construction industry and its clients are widely associated with a high degree of risk due to 
the nature of construction business activities" (Akintoye & MacLeod, 1997, p. 31). 
Infrastructure projects are further typically very complex as often a large number of parties 
are involved (Ehlers, 2014; Sorge, 2004). The success of the projects depends on a joint effort 
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of all parties. Coordination problems, conflicts of interest, and freeriding can lead to project 
failure (Sorge, 2004). Naturally design risks related to scope and construction risks such as 
coordination problems are high in infrastructure projects (Blanc-Brude & Makovsek, 2013).  
Table 4 above shows a categorization for general risks a large infrastructure project faces. 
However, different (1) infrastructure project types and different (2) project phases carry 
different additional risks. These will be elaborated in the following. 
3.3.3.1 Specific risks of different infrastructure project types 
As this research uses the infrastructure definition of Weber et al. (2016) comprising transport 
assets, public utilities, and social infrastructure, in the following examples of specific risk 
factors for one specific project type in each of the mentioned infrastructure categories will be 
given, to highlight the difference between subsectors. However, although differences exist, 
the similarities prevail, so the overall focus of this work will be placed on large infrastructure 
construction projects in general. 
Transport assets comprise roads, railways, bridges, tunnels, ports, and airports (Weber et al., 
2016). For projects in the road sector for instance, an important risk factor belonging to the 
risk factor category clients/user/society is risk of changing customer demand, as it is often 
hard to predict traffic in the long run because alternative transport connections can be opened 
in parallel. Further political risks play a role such as the risk of a concession cancellation 
(Irimia-Diéguez et al., 2014).  
Public utilities are oil and gas networks, energy generation utilities including renewable 
energy, water supply, waste water, and waste disposal utilities (Weber et al., 2016). Risks for 
public utilities are partly different than those for transport assets. To highlight this, in the 
following specific risks for the wind energy sector will be named, as this is currently the most 
important project type in European infrastructure project finance, as pointed out in chapter 
2.2. In wind energy projects legal/political risks arise inside and outside the national 
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boundaries especially from the potential change in laws and provisions in Europe e.g. change 
in feed-in tariff (Lüthi & Wüstenhagen, 2012). In the risk category clients/user/society, 
community acceptance risk is quite specific for wind parks (Hampl & Wüstenhagen, 2013) as 
local resistance, frequently supported by activists from other regions and even other countries, 
might develop against installation of wind turbines. Protests or attempts to declare areas 
environmentally protected, can increase the project’s planning and construction phase 
(Horbaty & Huber, 2010). In addition, especially offshore wind projects have high 
construction risk due to the hash sea conditions, which make construction projects hard to 
implement. 
Social infrastructure, classified as schools, hospitals, administrative buildings, and social 
housing (Weber et al., 2016), has also a partly unique risk profile. In the following specific 
risks for the education sector will be named, in order to highlight the difference to transport 
and public utility projects. As education provides a guarantee for social security (Poole, 
Toohey, & Harris, 2014), privatization is seen more critical by society than in most other 
infrastructure subsectors. At the same time e.g. education projects have a closer long term 
involvement with local communities than other project types (Jefferies & McGeorge, 2009). 
Thus, if implemented as PF with private sector involvement, in the risk factor category 
clients/user/society there is a high risk of public opposition to the project. Further, changing 
education systems, and thus new requirements play a big role (Irimia-Diéguez et al., 2014). At 
universities for instance many students use online lectures today – thus university buildings 
do not need lecture halls in the same dimension as in the past. Further, in German highschools 
for instance there has been a recent change from morning only lectures to all-day schools, 
requiring lunch facilities that were not needed in the past. 
54 
 
 
3.3.3.2 Specific risks of different infrastructure project phases 
“Risks change as an infrastructure asset passes through the planning, construction, operation 
and decommissioning phases” (Poole et al., 2014, p. 14). Therefore, exemplary differences in 
specific risk factors between the project phases planning, construction, and operation (as 
highlighted in chapter 2.1.3.3) will be named in the following.  
"It must be emphasized that risks are present in a megaproject from the beginning, even in the 
very early planning stage" (Irimia-Diéguez et al., 2014, p. 413). A major risk in the planning 
phase is the so called optimism bias: often in the planning phase forecasts are too optimistic 
(Blanc-Brude & Strange, 2007; Flyvbjerg et al., 2009). Further risks associated with the 
bidding, planning, and approval processes are characteristic of this phase e.g. land acquisition 
risks (Alfen et al., 2009). 
"It is commonly acknowledged that cost estimates become more accurate through the project 
as a project’s scope becomes better defined" (Blanc-Brude & Makovsek, 2013, p. 5), thus 
often cost associated risks become smaller as the construction phase evolves. Specific risks in 
the construction phase are for instance changes in the design, unforeseen construction site 
costs, health and safety on construction sites, project schedule overruns, and coordination 
problems (Irimia-Diéguez et al., 2014; Poole et al., 2014). Overarching the risks can also be 
summarized as construction cost and time overrun (Alfen et al., 2009). 
Risks in general decrease dramatically as operations start. This becomes visible indirectly in a 
decreasing finance cost after the completion of the construction (Blanc-Brude, 2013). Specific 
risks in this phase are risk of expansion and major upgrading costs, increasing operation costs, 
and risk of inappropriate maintenance measures (Irimia-Diéguez et al., 2014), as well as 
demand risk (Alfen et al., 2009). 
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Not all infrastructure construction projects have a decommissioning phase (Poole et al., 2014). 
For those that do, e.g. nuclear power plants, risks are still present in this phase, for instance   
environmental risks (Poole et al., 2014). 
3.3.4 Theoretical foundation - risk management process 
Risk are typically managed by a formal risk management process, which runs continuously on 
a project (Alfen et al., 2009; Mills, 2001). The key to effective risk management in 
infrastructure projects is to allocate risks through contracting to the stakeholder that can carry 
the risks at the lowest cost (Brealey et al., 1996; Esty, 2004a; Irimia-Diéguez et al., 2014; 
Miller & Lessard, 2001). In practice due to a lack of knowledge and time constraints, risk 
management is often not done unprejudiced but based on "individual intuition, judgement and 
experience gained from previous contracts" (Akintoye & MacLeod, 1997, p. 37).  
The first step in the risk management process is risk identification and qualitative/quantitative 
risk assessment, followed by allocation to the relevant project stakeholder, and finally risk 
mitigation/response including risk monitoring and controlling (Baloi & Price, 2003; Irimia-
Diéguez et al., 2014; Marques & Berg, 2011). In the following these steps are shortly 
explained.  
Risk identification is vital, because only those risks that are identified can be managed (Mills, 
2001). Typically projects identify risks by using different methods like check lists, 
brainstorming, and site visits (Alfen et al., 2009; Eid, 2008).  
Once a potential risk is identified, a risk assessment is carried out in which the likelihood of 
the occurrence and the consequence of the risk materialization are analyzed (Alfen et al., 
2009). The assessment is typically either qualitatively or quantitatively, depending on the data 
available (Eid, 2008).  
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Different stakeholders can carry risks at different costs, therefore in construction contracts it 
is vital to assign risks to the stakeholder that can carry the risks at the lowest cost (Brealey et 
al., 1996; Esty, 2004a; Irimia-Diéguez et al., 2014; Miller & Lessard, 2001). This is not 
always straightforward (Poole et al., 2014), therefore typical allocation and problems in 
practice are presented in the following. While many researchers just discuss the allocation of 
risks between owners and contractors, or in case of PPP between the public and the private 
sector, Irimia-Diéguez et al. (2014) describe to which stakeholder groups relevant for PF risks 
(excluding estimator relate risks) are typically contractually allocated. From this allocation, 
that can be seen in Table 5, it can be derived which risks are relevant for the stakeholders in a 
Fixed Price Date-Certain Turnkey European infrastructure PF.   
Table 5: Typical allocation of risks 
Risk factor category 
Public 
sector SPV Contractor Consultants 
Private 
investor Lender 
Clients/user/society x x     
Construction   x    
Contractual x x   x  
Design x x  x x  
Estimator related ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Financial/economic  x  x x x 
Force majeure x x x     x26  
Labor  x x    
Legal/political x x  x x  
Operation and maintenance  x x    
 
While the ideal risk allocation looks straightforward in theory, in practice there are numerous 
problems with contractual risk allocation. Contracts between different stakeholders and 
especially between the SPV and the contractor are complicated to design, as risks are highly 
project specific. Contracting itself is thus a central risk in large infrastructure PF (Poole et al., 
2014). Further, when transferring risks, problems due to incentives for opportunistic behavior 
in contracts (principal agent, hidden intention, hidden action, cognitive bias) can appear 
(Flyvbjerg et al., 2009). Another important factor when transferring risks is, that a risk 
transfer always includes costs (Poole et al., 2014). Stakeholders therefore need to assess if 
                                                 
26 Adding to the allocation of Irimia-Diéguez et al. (2014), other authors also argue that investors additionally 
carry force majeure in fixed price contracts, as contractors can default, compare Blanc-Brude (2014). 
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transferring a specific risk away from them is worth the cost they pay to be freed from that 
risk. However, in practice a complete transfer of a certain risk is often not possible, as e.g. 
sponsors often contractually transfer construction related risks to contractors, but these can 
default contracts and go bankrupt, leaving the sponsor with a degree of risk (Blanc-Brude, 
2014; Grimsey & Lewis, 2002). 
After risk identification, assessment, and allocation the final step of the risk management 
process is risk mitigation/response. The stakeholder that carries and monitors a certain risk 
can take two different actions, when responding to it. Either the risk can be controlled or ways 
have to be found to finance losses from this risk (Alfen et al., 2009). To control risks, the 
relevant stakeholders can use elimination, transfer, or reduction of the risk (Ibrahim et al., 
2006). In order to e.g. control force majeure, insurances can be purchased that transfer the risk 
to insurance companies (Eid, 2008).  
3.4 Explorative approach - qualitative research design 
In the previous chapter the status quo of relevant literature was provided as foundation to 
answer the research question at hand, including terminology (3.3.1), description of relevant 
research streams and gaps (3.3.2), as well as the theoretical foundation of risks on 
infrastructure construction projects (3.3.3), and the risk management process (3.3.4). In the 
following, the general aim of the study design, the data collection method, and data analyzing 
method are explained. 
3.4.1 General aims 
The research question of this chapter is: Which are the typical risks and uncertainties of large 
infrastructure construction projects that need to be evaluated, and which stakeholder are they 
typically transferred to in the common delivery model used in PF: the Fixed Price, Date-
Certain Turnkey Construction Contract?  
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In the literature review, provided in chapter 3.3.2, it became visible, that existing typologies 
do not fully fit to the specific decision situation this research concerns itself with. Further, in 
all but one paper, estimator related risks are not examined. Therefore, data collection 
following a qualitative research design is necessary to adapt existing risk typologies to the 
specific decision situation this effort is concerned with. 
3.4.2 Data collection method 
The first step to answer the research question was to gain an overview of existing concepts for 
risk allocation and monitoring with a focus on project stakeholders and project phases the 
risks occurr in. This was provided in chapter 3.3.3. Now following is a qualitative research 
design, analyzing internal project documents of three projects (risk registers) and semi-
structured interviews with eight PF decision makers according to the process suggested by the 
CIT.   
 The interview method to collect data was chosen because it allows to access expert 
knowledge not only at factual but also at meaning levels (Kvale, 2007) and to get information 
that is not explicitly asked for. In risk management studies interviews are a commonly used 
method (Rad, 2017). Both semi-structured interviews and a focus group is used. 
Semi-structured interviews were chosen because they allow the experts being 
interviewed to steer the interview and provide enough room for the experts to share their 
specific individual expertise and perspective, as suggested by Silverman (2006). Finally 
interviews also offer the interviewer enough flexibility to discover hidden facets of human 
behavior such as perceptions. 
  A focus group interview, where three experts discussed their perceptions of risks 
simultaneously, was conducted to supplement the semi structured interviews. Main aim was 
to gain a broader understanding of the matter at hand, as suggested by Williams and Katz 
(2001). 
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The interviews were conducted over a period of three month. Each interview lasted between 
30 and 60 min. Whenever the experts allowed, taped recordings were made to ensure a 
throughout analysis of the collected data. Afterwards recordings were transcribed to prepare 
them for analysis. In two interviews experts did not want to be recorded – during these 
interviews detailed notes were taken.  
Interviewees were chosen both due to experience in the field of infrastructure PF, as well as 
due to their current position as either consultant active in the infrastructure sector, or investor 
and lender active in infrastructure PF. In Table 6, a description of the sample is provided.  
Table 6: Overview of experts interviewed 
Expert Anonymized description of expert 
Consultant I Head of consultancy company for capital projects, having also > ten years of experience as 
project owner and contractor (male) 
Consultant II Expert at global consultancy firm with extensive experience as project owner and > twenty 
years’ experience in the infrastructure sector (male) 
Consultant III Consultant with two years of consulting experience in the infrastructure sector (female) 
Investor I Investor with > twenty years of experience with different investment funds in the 
infrastructure industry (male) 
Investor II Investor with > twenty years’ experience as consultant and owner in infrastructure industry 
(male) 
Lender I Lending officer in market department focused on infrastructure financing (male) 
Lender II Head of bank branch with department focused on infrastructure finance and > ten years’ 
experience in infrastructure financing (male) 
Lender III Head of PF department at a European bank with > twenty years of PF experience with focus 
on the transportation sector and PPP projects (male) 
During the process of interviewing, risk categories and typical risk allocation were identified 
and noted until no new themes emerged, as proposed by Kutsch and Hall (2005). Relevant 
quotes from the experts can be found in the Appendix. Theoretical saturation seemed to be 
reached after analyzing three risk registers, and conducting interviews with eight experts. 
3.4.3 Method used for analysis 
Following a qualitative research design, the internal project documents of three projects (risk 
registers) and the interviews with eight PF decision makers were analyzed according to the 
process suggested by the CIT. The CIT was chosen, as it allows researchers to analyze data 
about human behavior such as risk management process (Butterfield, Borgen, Amundsen, & 
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Maglio, 2016; Flanagan, 1954). The method is flexible, it consists of a set of rules and 
guiding principles and can be adapted to various research fields and topics (Butterfield et al., 
2016). Focus of the method is to identify critical events.  
To ensure a systematic approach of the data analysis, the interviews were analyzed by first 
grouping the collected statements of each interviewee according to the risks involved in the 
projects and the stakeholder that carried the risk they described. The grouped statements were 
then compared across interviews together with the data from internal project documents of 
three projects (risk registers) and the existing typologies from previous literature, especially 
the risk categorizing framework of Irimia-Diéguez et al. (2014). 
In order to achieve reliability in the data analysis, suggestions for reality checks from 
Butterfield et al. (2016) were followed. One additional researcher familiar with the CIT 
method was used to extract several critical incidents from the transcriptions as well as to place 
a few critical incidents in the categories formed. This did not yield any other results.  
Further, with some interviewees a second interview or a follow up mail was used to check if 
the derived results were interpreted correctly. Finally, the list of risk factors and risk factor 
categories was viewed by two industry experts to enhance the lists credibility.  
3.5 Findings - generating a risk typology for PF infrastructure projects 
In the following, the main results are presented, with a focus on similarities and differences to 
previous literature. The full typology derived can be found in the Appendix. 
Building on the categorization of Irimia-Diéguez et al. (2014), who named nine risk factor 
categories and two to four exemplary risk factors per category, the mixed qualitative method 
resulted in a risk typology with ten risk factor categories and 175 detailed risk factors. 
Naturally not all identified risk factors have the same importance, likelihood, and impact, 
however it is still remarkable that more than 20% of risk factors can be classified 
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financial/economic and about 16,5% construction related, while only about 2% of risk factors 
are estimator related.  
The SPV itself carries the majority of the risk factors, as can be seen in Table 7, however 
most of these risk factors are shared with other stakeholders. Contractors are the only risk 
owner for construction risk.  
 Table 7: Distribution of risk among stakeholders 
 
Number of identified risk factors per stakeholder that 
typically carries the risk   
 
Risk factor category 
Public 
sector27 SPV  Contractor  Investor Lenders 
Consul- 
tants 
Number of identified risk 
factors per category 
Clients/user/society 13 13     13 
Construction   29    29 
Contractual 19 19  19   19 
Design 11 11   1 11  11 11 
Estimator related risks    1   2   1   1    3 
Financial/economic  38  38 38 38 38 
Force majeure   7   7   7      7 
Labor  13 13    13 
Legal/political 22 22  22  22 22 
Operation and maintenance  20 20    20 
Total 72 144 72 91 39 71 175 
Expert interviews, as well as risk registers showed that the allocation of typical stakeholder 
responsibility for risks made by Irimia-Diéguez et al. (2014), see Table 5, holds in general. 
The public sector (in case of public projects or PPP) carries risk factors included in the risk 
factor categories design, legal/political, contractual, clients/user/society, and force majeure. 
The SPV carries risk factors included in the risk factor categories design, legal/political, 
contractual, operation, labor, clients/user/society, financial/economic, and force majeure. The 
contractor carries risk factors included in the risk factor categories construction, operation, 
labor, and force majeure. Consultants carry risk factors included in the risk factor categories 
design, legal/political, and financial/economic. The private investor carries risk factors 
included in the risk factor categories design, legal/political, contractual, and 
financial/economic. And finally, the lender carries risk factors included in the risk factor 
category financial/economic.  
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A difference to the allocation of Irimia-Diéguez et al. (2014) is that design related risks are 
also allocated to contractors in this typology, because an interviewed expert described, that 
often contractors themselves must take on design risks in case projects are greenfield.  
Results regarding the gap of estimator related risks are that this risk category is threefold: 
construction costs can be over- or underestimated, as well as construction time, and future 
revenues from the project. The typical allocation of these risks can be seen in Table 8. In a 
Turnkey Contract the risk to under- or overevaluate construction costs is carried by the 
contractor. In Date-Certain Turnkey Contracts, the risk of time overruns is also carried by 
contractors, however, since future revenues are delayed if this risk materialized, the SPV, 
investor, and lenders also carry this risk. The risk of misevaluating future revenues is carried 
by the SPV (who needs the revenues to break even), investors (whose investment profit 
depends on revenues), and lenders (SPV’s ability to amortize the loan depends on revenue 
stream).  
Table 8: Estimator related risks in PF infrastructure projects 
  Stakeholder that typically carries risk   
Risk factor category   Risk factor 
Public 
sector27 SPV  Contractor   Investor Lenders 
Consul- 
tants 
  
Estimator related risks 
Risk of under- or overevaluating future 
revenue  x  x x  
Risk of under- or overevaluating 
construction cost   x    
Risk of under- or overevaluating 
construction time   x x x  
3.6 Discussion risk management in infrastructure PF 
The goal of this chapter was to build on the risk categorization of Irimia-Diéguez et al. (2014) 
and show which infrastructure stakeholder typically bears risks answering the following 
research question: Which are the risks and uncertainties of large infrastructure construction 
projects that need to be evaluated, and which stakeholder are they typically transferred to in 
                                                 
27 Here not in their role as investor/sponsor but as project initiator and supplier of e.g. concessions 
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the common delivery model used in PF: the Fixed Price, Date-Certain Turnkey Construction 
Contract? 
To derive at an answer to the research question, a comprehensive literature review was 
conducted, internal project documents of three projects and semi-structured interviews with 
eight PF decision makers were analyzed according to the process suggested by the CIT, and 
finally a typology of risks clustered by stakeholder that bears them typically was created. 
The full risk typology that answers the research question above can be found in the Appendix, 
risk categories can be seen in Figure 8 below. 
Figure 8: Risk categories relevant for PF stakeholder specific decision-making process 
 
The typology revealed (1) a comparably high percentage of financial/economic risks and (2) 
the fact that estimator related risks are carried also by project outsiders. 
The highest percentage of risk factors mentioned in the literature and by PF decision makers 
can be classified as financial/economic while the lowest percentage are estimator related. The 
high percentage of financial/economic risk factors underlines the high uncertainty in 
infrastructure PF. According to Kahneman and Tversky (1982) high uncertainty often leads to 
heuristics and cognitive biases in the decision-making process. Thus, it can be said that the 
high uncertainty in infrastructure PF provides room for estimator related risks, namely the 
risks of under- or overevaluating future revenues, construction costs, and construction time.  
While the risk category estimator related risks only contains these three different risk factors, 
Source: Adapted from Hampl and Wüstenhagen (2012)
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these might have a very large impact on the final project outcome (Flyvbjerg et al., 2014). 
Unrealistic optimism, which is directly related to these three risk factors, can lead investors to 
do less critical analysis (Baker & Nofsinger, 2002) and invest in unprofitable projects 
(Heaton, 2002).  
The risks to under- or overevaluate construction costs is carried by the contractor in a Turnkey 
Contract, while the risk of misevaluating future revenues is carried by the SPV, investors, and 
lenders. The fact that lenders and investors as project outsiders carry estimator related risks 
means, that banks and funds do not only provide money needed to close the infrastructure 
finance gap, but also take over risks attached to the risk management process. This is an 
interesting finding as so far, literature in the area of infrastructure projects usually emphasizes 
how an outside perspective prevent cognitive bias in risk assessment (Flyvbjerg et al., 2009). 
Our findings, however, suggest that outsiders might be impaired by cognitive bias themselves.    
In the following the (1) theoretical and (2) practical contribution are presented, (3) limitations 
are named, and finally (4) a brief outlook is given. 
3.6.1 Theoretical contributions 
A vast set of specific risk factors for infrastructure construction projects have been identified 
in the PF management and megaprojects literature stream. However, as can be seen in Table 1 
in chapter 3.1.2 no typology of risks has been defined for infrastructure projects financed 
through PF that shows exactly which risks are taken over by lenders and private investors. By 
developing a typology of risks involved in infrastructure PF and by deriving which risks are 
carried by which stakeholder, this research study attempts to close this inherent gap in the 
literature. Filling this gap is important, because knowing the specific risks for infrastructure 
PF, which is growing as project implementation form, is an essential foundation to assess if 
costs of PF are less than the costs the risk transfer generates for the corporate or public 
institution. However, as shown in chapter 2 the risks of PF are different than risks of other 
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project types and lenders, as well as investors have specific roles, so the risks these 
stakeholders carry are also specific. 
The second gap the typology addresses is that estimator related risks were not included in 
existing typologies and taxonomies. Closing this gap is important, because creating the 
awareness of these risks lays the foundation to manage them. While Baloi and Price (2003) 
mentioned estimator risks years ago, they did not elaborate on the importance of this risk 
category sufficiently to establish it as a relevant category in typologies and taxonomies 
published afterwards. By including this risk category it was further shown how vital it is to 
move beyond a theoretical discussion of risks towards a practice based view and an 
integration of different literature streams. The rational view in risk management will never be 
able to explain certain decisions in certain situations, therefore it is important to connect the 
risk management literature and the behavioral decision-making literature. Using the CIT, 
important insights could be gained from practitioners, that were not found in previous 
literature. The latest relevant typologies, e.g. Irimia-Diéguez et al. (2014) and Marques and 
Berg (2011) are based on a review of previous literature. Conducting interviews with relevant 
practitioners using the CIT should be used by future research to ensure including not only a 
theoretical but also a practical perspective in their typologies. 
3.6.2 Practical contributions 
Project finance is better than other project implementation options, if the costs of PF are less 
than the efficiency gains from the risk transfer. Knowing the relevant risks is an essential 
foundation to assess this tradeoff properly. The detailed risk typology in the Appendix can 
serve all infrastructure PF stakeholders as a checklist, when evaluating risks and returns, as 
well as in the process of transferring these. 
The main lesson learned is that estimator related risks, as an additional risk factor category 
should be considered, carried not only by the SPV and contractors, but also by lenders and 
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investors. These stakeholders should be aware of these risks and include them in their models 
and frameworks. 
3.6.3 Limitation 
The developed typology has the limitation that risk categories and risk factors are presented, 
however not how much impact the risks typically have. However, numerous studies 
concerning finding the reason for project failures and thus analyzing risk impact have been 
published already in the relevant literature, compare e.g. Flyvbjerg et al. (2004). 
One limitation of the qualitative research conducted is that the number of interviews 
conducted, or incidents discussed, is below the number of 50 incidents recommended by 
Flanagan (1954). However, saturation was already achieved after the conducted interviews. 
This was not surprising, as extensive research already exists regarding risk typologies and the 
gap concerning estimator related risks was very specific. 
3.6.4 Outlook 
It should be researched to what degree lenders and private investors are subject to estimator 
related risks. Are lenders on average less prone to cognitive biases because they get involved 
in projects later and thus view the project as an outsider as described by Flyvbjerg et al. 
(2014)? How can estimator related risks be best managed and controlled? Further, research 
should focus on the next stages of the risk management process to see how stakeholders 
handle risks when projects evolve. 
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4. Cognitive aspects, perceived risk, and decision making in 
infrastructure PF – development of a theoretical framework 
4.1. Problem statement  
One way to close the infrastructure financing gap is to optimize public and corporate 
spending. As introduced in chapter 2, PF might provide a solution to this gap. However, PF 
can only be better than other financing options if costs of PF are less than the costs of the risks 
that are transferred away from the corporate or public institution.  
In chapter 3 a typology of risks has been defined for infrastructure projects that also reveals 
how these risks are typically allocated to different actors. It was shown that most authors do 
not incorporate estimator related risks decision makers adds to the equation. Estimator related 
risks, typically carried by the SPV, contractors, lenders, and investors are threefold: 
construction costs, construction time, and future revenues from the project can be over- or 
underestimated.  
Investors and lenders along with other stakeholders in PF, typically make decisions based on a 
process of carefully weighting the risks and returns described in previous chapters. For this 
they use frameworks and models that have been developed to support the decision-making 
process (Hampl & Wüstenhagen, 2013). However, the use of models does not guarantee 
objective decision making - inputs decision makers put into the models are often far from 
accurate when risk or uncertainty are involved in the decision. Kahneman and Tversky (1982) 
state that in situations of uncertainty, decision makers more frequently apply heuristics and 
fall prey to cognitive biases in their decision-making-process.  
Heuristics and cognitive bias can lead decision makers on both the lender and the investor 
side to under- and overvalue risks and rewards. According to Hampl and Wüstenhagen (2013) 
the situational perception of risks and rewards, not actual or objective statistically weighted 
risks and rewards, can become significant barriers to investment. Thus, an important 
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challenge for individual lenders and investors in making decisions in the context of PF is to 
overcome own unconscious biases, specifically those related to the perception of risks and 
rewards like unrealistic optimism. Companies involved in infrastructure PF lending and 
investing activities in turn face the challenge to provide an institutional environment that 
prevents biased decision making. To examine and possibly explain these influencing factors 
on both individual and company level a theoretical framework must be established. 
4.1.1 Practical relevance 
Estimator related risks can cause project failure (Flyvbjerg et al., 2014). Thus, it is vital to 
create awareness of this risk. As a first step it is important to highlight that also project 
outsiders such as investors and lenders can be subject to this risk category. Further, it is 
relevant to identify what causes estimator related risks in this industry, to provide possible 
counter measures. It might be small changes that make PF in infrastructure projects more 
profitable, and given the need to finance a growing amount of large infrastructure projects 
through PK, these can have a considerable impact on the pending financing gap. Thus, this 
work is highlight relevant. 
The implementation of public and corporate projects as PF can optimize public and corporate 
spending, if high costs of setting up the SPV are outweighed by the benefits of it i.e. 
efficiency savings through risk transfer to parties that can best carry them (Irimia-Diéguez et 
al., 2014). When assessing which organizational structure (private or public project 
ownership; project, corporate/public, or asset finance) is applicable for a certain project, the 
benefit of PF i.e. concrete savings due to the risk transfer is often hard to grasp. For most risk 
categories insights about who can best bear the risk exist in previous literature. However, 
while the typical allocation of estimator related risk was analyzed in chapter 3, it is not yet 
clear which stakeholder can best bear this risk. By shedding light on differences in unrealistic 
optimism between stakeholder groups such as public and private investors as well as lenders 
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in this sector, this dissertation provides a guideline to both the transfer of risk and reward 
assessment to groups less subject to estimator related risks and to learn best practices form 
each other.  
Further, when involving private sector companies, it is important to know what type of 
companies to involve. Companies can also be generally better or worse in carrying estimator 
related risk. To identify a pattern that allows to predict which kind of companies provide an 
institutional setting that fuels decision maker unrealistic optimism, characteristics of 
companies that tend to be above average and below average unrealistically optimistic need to 
be identified. These characteristics can further show companies what they can do to prevent 
bias rather than fuel them. 
4.1.2 Theoretical relevance 
Optimism bias, the focus of this work, is a well-researched topic in behavioral finance. 
However, it has not yet been studied in the context of infrastructure PF, with a focus on credit 
assessment and investment decisions, as the Table 9 highlights on the next page.  
Applying the learning of behavioral finance to this new context, this work is the only one that 
develops a causal model (RQ2) that differentiates between personal factors, organizational 
factors, and other bias/heuristics as enhancing/diminishing factors of individual unrealistic 
optimism in this specific industry, and tests the model empirically with the relevant decision 
makers. 
Until now research has been done that focusses on lenders unrealistic optimism in 
infrastructure PF credit allocation. However, this work is not only a contribution to close the 
wide gap in examining lenders biases in risk and reward assessment of large infrastructure 
projects. It also compares lenders to investors regarding their unrealistic optimism in risk and 
reward assessment (RQ3) to identify stakeholder group specific biases and enable learning 
from industry specific best practice.  
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Further, already 15 years ago Durand (2003) demanded: “The possibility that organizations 
might also condition forecasting ability needs to be investigated” (Durand, 2003, p. 821). 
However, despite the number of articles published on risk management since, Müllner (2017) 
called for focusing on this aspect with regard to PF last year. This stresses the importance to 
not only focus on individual decision makers but also on companies. No comparable work on 
infrastructure projects exists as can be seen in Table 9. Therefore, this work will also provide 
a company perspective (RQ4). 
  
Table 9: Selected previous studies on unrealistic optimism from behavioral finance literature 
 
 
 Industry focus    Decision situation 
Empirical 
test w. Drivers of unrealistic optimism of the individual 
Drivers of company unrealistic 
optimism 
 Author 
Large 
Projects 
Infrastructure 
sector PF 
Credit 
assessment 
Investment 
decision 
industry 
decision 
makers 
Personal 
factors 
Organizational 
factors 
Other 
Bias Heuristics 
Institutional 
factors 
Organizational 
factors 
Bias 
This paper x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Stingl and Geraldi (2017)  x             
Flyvbjerg et al. (2014) x x            
Shepperd, Klein, Waters, and Weinstein (2013)           x x    
Vaaler and McNamara (2011)      x    x      
Flyvbjerg et al. (2009) x x       x x    
Vaaler and McNamara (2004)    x       x   
Durand (2003)    x       x  x 
Lovallo and Kahneman (2003) x    x         
Baker and Nofsinger (2002)     x         
Heaton (2002) x    x         
McNamara, Moon, and Bromiley (2002)    x       x  x 
Shepperd, Carroll, Grace, and Terry (2002)         x x    
Helweg-Larsen and Shepperd (2001)       x x      
McNamara and Vaaler (2000)    x       x x  
McNamara and Bromiley (1997)    x       x   
Shepperd, Fernandez, and Ouellette (1996)        x      
Weinstein (1980)       x       
  
4.2 Goal and approach  
The goal of this section is to develop a theoretical framework that can serve as a basis to 
answer the three research questions displayed in the figure below. 
Figure 9: Overview of research questions 
 
The theoretical framework for RQ2 is tackled in two steps. First a review of the behavioral 
finance literature is conducted to create a theoretical causal bias model, including all biases 
applicable in the project financing of infrastructure projects, as well as relevant influencing 
factors. Second, comments from five of the eight experts interviewed for the previous chapter 
of this study are used to adapt and simplify the framework, to tackle only the most relevant 
biases and heuristics28.  
To provide the theoretical framework for answering RQ3, a review of the behavioral finance 
literature is conducted to create hypotheses concerning differences between lenders and 
investors on dimensions of the causal bias model tested in the previous part. If lenders are 
identified as a stakeholder group being less affected by estimator related risk it would mean 
that PF in fact has an advantage over public or corporate finance since by involving lenders 
                                                 
28 The other three experts did not make explicit statements about previous biases they had. 
Source: Adapted from Hampl and Wüstenhagen (2012)
Project finance stakeholder specific decision-making process
Perceived risk
Perceived return
Financial 
decision
Cognitive 
aspects
/
/
Risks
Rewards
RQ2: How do personal and company factors influence heuristics and unconscious biases of 
infrastructure PF decision stakeholders and how do these heuristics and unconscious biases 
influence the perception of risks and rewards, in this study subsumed under “unrealistic 
optimism”?
RQ3: Are certain stakeholders less biased than other stakeholders and are therefore better 
equipped to assess risks of large European infrastructure projects? Can personal or company 
related factors be identified to drive differences between lenders and investors and made 
accessible for best practice learning?
RQ4: What are the characteristics of companies that are less unrealistically optimistic than 
others?  
73 
 
 
not only a monitoring partner is gained, but estimator related risks would be controlled by a 
stakeholder that can manage it better (contracting theory, resource based view of the firm).  
To provide a theoretical framework for RQ4, possible factors that can be characteristics for 
unrealistic optimistic companies are researched from literature. In addition, findings from the 
individual level are examined regarding transferability to company level. 
4.3 Status quo relevant literature 
In the following the terminology of (1) cognitive aspects, perceived risks, and decision 
making in infrastructure PF is presented. Then, (2) an overview of the relevant literature 
streams is given and gaps are highlighted. Finally, (3) the theoretical foundation of causal 
biases on infrastructure projects is provided.  
4.3.1 Terminology - cognitive aspects, perceived risks, and decision making in infrastructure PF 
As can be seen in Figure 10, lenders and investors make financial decisions in which they 
weigh the risks described in chapter 3. Cognitive aspects influence the perception of risks in 
decisions under uncertainty (Kahneman & Tversky, 1974). One important cognitive aspect is 
unrealistic optimism, also described as estimator related risk in chapter 3. 
Figure 10: Unrealistic optimism in PF can lead to over- and underevaluating risks/rewards 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Hampl and Wüstenhagen (2012)
Project finance stakeholder specific decision-making process
Perceived risk
Perceived return
Financial 
decision
Cognitive 
aspects
/
/
Risks
Rewards
Estimator related risk i.e. 
unrealistic optimism 
Personal factors e.g. 
knowledge
Company related factors e.g. 
incentive system
Underlying biases/heuristics 
e.g. overconfidence
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In the following (1) the relevant decision situation for lenders and investor will be highlighted 
in which cognitive aspects and perceived risks play a role. This is followed by (2) a definition 
of what exactly cognitive aspects and perceived risk mean in terms of decision making. 
4.3.1.1 Infrastructure PF decision situations of lenders and investors  
In PF many decisions i.e. “the most proper assessment among the alternatives“ (Özen, 2016, 
p. 1744) need to be taken by lenders and investors. After an initial decision to invest in a 
project or grant a project company a loan, a continuous cycle of new decisions follows until 
the project is complete. In the following a brief description of (1) lenders and (2) investors 
decision situations is presented that was derived from expert interviews as well as relevant 
literature in order to show the extend of uncertainty involved and the room for cognitive 
aspects in the decision-making process. 
“Risk assessments of commercial borrowers are critical decisions for banks since they 
determine approval of new loans, renewal of existing lines of credit, the interest rate charged, 
which section of the bank manages the loans, and the level of loan loss reserves that will 
maintain it” (McNamara & Bromiley, 1997, p. 1066). Thus, the initial decision of lenders in a 
PF situation is if they, mostly in conglomerates, should grant a specific project company a 
loan, and if yes, to which conditions. Early in the development of a project, developers will 
typically contact lead arranging banks to provide letters of intent. However, many banks issue 
these letters without going through a normal credit approval procedure. For the actual credit 
approval procedure, the decision situation this dissertation focusses on, these banks typically 
have two departments dealing with credits: the market department and the risk department. 
The market department will look at due diligence documents attached to the proposal e.g. 
legal, environmental, financial, technical due diligence that are made by a third party. “Here, 
due diligence is specifically understood as an evaluation of the costs and benefits deriving 
from investing in a given project, and especially whether the estimated costs and benefits for 
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that project are likely to materialize” (Flyvbjerg, 2013, p. 762). Values from these due 
diligences as well as qualitative factors such as the location of the project are used in complex 
cash flow models, including a sensitivity analysis with at least three cases (normal case, client 
case, base case). For the different cases factors such as the debt service cover ratio are 
measured29. Using a bank specific model, a rating is made, including quantitative and 
qualitative factors30. The rating grade will then determine if the loan is viable and which 
financing conditions such as interest rate, duration, and amount apply. Typically banks rather 
focus on avoiding credit losses than rating borrowers non-creditworthy (Rad, 2017). Normally 
sensitivities and all factors put into the model are controlled by employees of the risk side. 
Results from this review are then discussed with the lender responsible for the model from the 
market side, to arrive at a result agreeable to both. Especially qualitative factors are often 
rather subjective and need to be agreed on by the risk department. In the end, granting a loan 
is a group decision taken by teams and normally even several banks together based on 
perceived risks and rewards of a project, involving top managers for high loan amounts (Rad, 
2017). However, the decision of each individual involved is important as all subsequent 
decisions may underlie anchoring effects31. Further there are interdependencies between 
individual decision bias and bias in group decision making (Kerr, Kramer, & MacCoun, 
1996). Therefore, it makes sense to look at the decision situation of the individual lender. 
The initial decision of investors is if they should invest into a specific project company. 
Usually the developer of a project contacts the investor with a project proposal. The developer 
presents the potential value and the concept of the deal to get a budget for a due diligence. 
After reviewing the initial proposal which has a high degree of uncertainty concerning e.g. 
involved stakeholders, the investor might grant an initial budget to develop the business plans, 
                                                 
29 Depending on the kind of project this typically must be larger than 1,3. 
30 Confidence in project overall, location, and cost control management quality. 
31 According to Zaiane (2015) the tendency to rely too heavily on a piece of information such as a proposed 
decision of a college when making decisions.  
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the execution model, and the contracting strategy further, as well as to engage third parties to 
conduct due diligences. After reviewing final plans for the project including which contestants 
are awarded the construction, supplier, and operation contracts the investment decision is 
made based on perceived risks and rewards using frameworks and models that include 
subjective as well as objective factors (Hampl & Wüstenhagen, 2013). Typically, uncertainty 
is still quite high, because at that stage contracts might be planned but not awarded yet. After 
the initial decision to invest in a project, more decisions involving uncertainty follow e.g. the 
decision if additional capital should be invested when needed. However, focus in this 
dissertation is the initial decision to invest into a project, as this provides the foundation for 
the decisions to follow. 
4.3.1.2 Cognitive aspects, perceived risks, and decision making  
Classical finance theory and classical decision theory assume that decision makers are risk 
adverse and rational, thriving to maximize profit. Rational decision making by investors 
means that investors always update their believes correctly (Bayes’ law) and based on their 
believes make the optimal choice (expected utility theory) (Barberis & Thaler, 2003). At the 
same time that the Bayes’ law and the expected utility theory were published, other authors 
questioned, if this is really the case in reality (Baker & Nofsinger, 2002; Barberis & Huang, 
2001; Barberis & Thaler, 2003; Heaton, 2002). 
In behavioral finance32 it is acknowledged that not actual risks play a role in decision making, 
but rather perceived risks. A perceived risk is the subjective judgement the decision maker 
makes about the severity, likelihood, and other characteristics of the risk. The study of 
perceived risks, coming primarily from the field of natural hazards and greenfield 
                                                 
32 According to Constantin and Popovici (2010), the modern theory of behavioral finance differs from classical 
finance theory as it focuses on various aspects of decision making such as psychological bias and does not only 
assume rationality and profit maximization as premise.   
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technologies, has however also been used by Hampl and Wüstenhagen (2013) to describe 
investors decision making in the context of infrastructure projects. Already Lichtenstein and 
Fischhoff (1977) acknowledged that the quality of peoples’ perceived risk judgements limits 
the quality of sophisticated risk assessment techniques such as cost benefit analysis. One 
theory that explains why perceived risks might differ from actual risks, is the psychological 
approach of heuristics and cognitive biases i.e. systematic deviations from rationality in 
individual decision making. As illustrated in Figure 10, heuristics and cognitive biases can 
lead decision makers to under- or overvalue risks and rewards. Subjective risk perception, 
which can be negatively or positively skewed, then directly mediates decision making on 
individual and team level (Houghton, Simon, Aquino, & Goldberg, 2000).  
Many different cognitive biases and heuristics are known to influence risk perception and 
decision making. Most them can be explained by a variety of different psychological theories 
e.g. cumulative prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1992) or expected utility theory 
(Bernoulli, 1954). In addition to specific theories, most psychological biases can be explained 
by heuristic simplification like affective short-circuiting, and self-deception (Hirshleifer, 
2015). Heuristics are short cuts e.g. rules of thumb people use consciously or unconsciously in 
order to simplify their decision making in specific situations (Hirshleifer, 2015). The study of 
cognitive biases and heuristics together with understanding underlying theories can be used to 
explain a certain decision in a certain situation (Mitroi, 2014). 
4.3.2 Literature overview of cognitive aspects and perceived risk in PF decisions 
After explaining the terminology, in the following a brief literature overview is presented to 
highlight gaps and the current status quo. Four literature streams are relevant regarding 
cognitive aspects, perceived risk, and decision making in PF: (1) literature about behavioral 
decision making in projects, (2) PF literature in general as described in chapter 2, (3) literature 
about factors affecting risk assessment, and (4) literature about behavioral decision making 
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concerning bias management. Table 10 below gives a brief overview of main journals, 
relevant reviews, and perspectives. 
Table 10: Overview of relevant literature streams 
Literature stream Most relevant Journal Latest review 
Relevant aspects for 
research question Other aspects covered 
Behavioral decision 
making in projects 
International Journal of Project 
Management, Project 
Management Journal 
Stingl and 
Geraldi (2017)  
Reductionist school of 
thought (cognitive limitation-
errors) 
Pluralist school of thought 
(political behavior) and 
contextualist school of 
thought (social and 
organizational sense making) 
PF International Journal of Project 
Management 
Müllner (2017) Management research 
perspective 
International business 
perspective and financial 
research perspective 
Factors affecting 
risk assessment 
Academy of Management 
Journal 
Vaaler and 
McNamara 
(2011) 
Individual decision maker 
effects on risk assessment 
(especially behavioral 
decision making in credit risk 
assessment) and 
organizational effects on risk 
assessment 
Competitive effects on risk 
assessment 
Behavioral decision-
making bias 
management 
various Montibeller and 
Winterfeldt 
(2015) 
Methods to prevent bias:  
influencing the individual 
decision-making process 
Methods to prevent bias: 
debiasing individuals and 
accounting for bias 
Although the megaprojects literature also mentions estimator related risks in the risk typology 
of Baloi and Price (2003), this literature stream will be neglected in this review, as risk 
typologies do not provide a relevant contribution in the light of the research questions at hand.  
In the following a more detailed review of the relevant four streams is provided. 
4.3.2.1 Literature about behavioral decision making in projects 
In the light of the three research questions, the relevant substream this research focuses on is 
the reductionist school of thought. This stream analyzes deviations from rational decisions 
that stem from biases and mistakes, the causes of these deviations, and the impact these 
deviations have (Stingl & Geraldi, 2017). As mentioned in chapter 4.3.1.2, the decision-
making process of individuals changes if risk or uncertainty are involved in the decision, 
providing room for biases and heuristics (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). Detailed research on 
cognitive biases such as unrealistic optimism exists, but empirical tests were conducted 
mostly with students e.g. (Houghton et al., 2000; Shepperd et al., 1996; Weinstein, 1980), and 
not industry relevant decision makers such as lenders and investors. Thus, findings must be 
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tested in specific decision situations such as PF to show is findings are fully transferable to 
these decision situations. 
As shown in Table 10, the other two substreams are not regarded in this work as they are not 
commensurable with the reductionist school of though. The pluralist school of thought for 
instance deals with deviations from rational decisions due to political behavior, while the 
contextualist school of thought focusses on social and organizational sense making (Stingl 
& Geraldi, 2017). 
4.3.2.2 PF literature 
An overview of the PF literature stream was already given in chapter 2. As presented in Table 
10, out of the three existent substreams in this field, only the management substream that 
deals with psychological fallacies of managers including cognitive limitations, political 
behavior, and deception, covers aspects relevant for the three research questions in this 
chapter. As this dissertation takes the reductionist view, only findings concerning cognitive 
limitations such as unrealistic optimism are relevant for the research questions at hand, 
political behavior and deception are neglected. Within this substream cognitive limitations 
were mentioned, but not empirically tested with the relevant decision makers. The term 
“psychological fallacies of managers” in this literature stream stands currently only for PF 
project planners and project owners. No study was conducted on psychological fallacies of PF 
lenders. The importance of broadening the focus from only planners and sponsors also to 
lenders is underlined by Müllner (2017), who states regarding PF: “Future IB and 
Management research need to address the important role of the liabilities side as strategic 
complement to equity based strategies” (Müllner, 2017, p. 127). Further, previous literature in 
the field has not shown who can bear estimator related risks best, and how to control these 
risks. Müllner (2017) also states: "IB should put more emphasis on important firm-specific 
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advantages in terms of risk management and finance" (Müllner, 2017, p. 126). This stresses 
the importance to not only focus on individual decision makers but also on companies. 
4.3.2.3 Literature about factors affecting risk assessment 
With a focus on individual and organizational effects of risk assessment, biases on company 
level and institutional characteristics were covered as influencing factors on risk assessment 
by researchers. Competitive effects on risks assessment were also researched but are 
disregarded in the following, as they do not aid in answering the research questions at hand. 
Regarding organizational effects of risk assessment research has concluded that cognitive 
biases e.g. organizational illusion of control can occur on company level (Durand, 2003). 
Some institutional processes such as standardization of decision processes were found to lead 
to less biased risk assessment (McNamara & Bromiley, 1997). However, other actions taken 
by companies e.g. tournaments as incentive lead to an increase in biases (McNamara et al., 
2002), hinting that institutions are not fully aware of the impact they can have on their 
employees’ biases. Overall, literature shows that the institutional environment does affect the 
risk assessment of individuals and entire institutions, however institutions are often unaware 
of the exact institutional environment they need to create to allow for best possible risk 
assessment. Although this problem has been described in previous literature, up to now no 
company model of factors influencing risk assessment on company level was created.  
Addressing the individual effects on risk assessment, the table below shows clearly that no 
study was conducted with PF lending officers focusing on the PF credit decision situation. 
There have been studies testing behavioral biases on commercial loan officers, however PF 
provides a completely different decision situation than commercial bank loans to companies 
or private people especially with regard to risk and uncertainty. McNamara and Bromiley 
(1997) state "Further research should address additional cognitive and organizational effects 
in additional business environments" (McNamara & Bromiley, 1997, p. 1085).  
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Table 11: Overview of previous studies with lending officers 
Author Methodology Finding 
McNamara and 
Bromiley (1997) 
Interviews with commercial lending officers in large US banks 
and analysis of lending decisions at one bank 
Industry excitement triggers under-
assessment of risks 
Sutcliffe and 
McNamara (2001) 
Analysis of 900 borrower risk rating decisions through 
interviews with commercial lending officers at large US banks 
Decision standardization increases 
likelihood of risk rating errors 
McNamara et al. 
(2002) 
Analysis of risk and return data from 386 annual borrower 
evaluations made in community banking devision of an US 
bank 
Escalation of commitment leas 
lenders to underassess risks in 
defaulting loans 
Wilson (2016) Interviews and focus group discussion with 35 loan officers in 
four branches of one bank 
Gender of loan applicant or lender 
does no influence the lending 
decision 
Filling this gap is important, as highlighted by Vaaler and McNamara (2011), that called 
already 7 years ago for research on: “how behavioral and political model factors can affect 
prudential credit assessment… Future research should seek a broader understanding of their 
[risk assessing companies] expertise and vulnerability to bias” (Vaaler & McNamara, 2011, 
p. 32). 
4.3.2.4 Bias management literature 
Recent literature focusing on how companies can prevent biased decision making, i.e. how 
estimator related risks can be controlled, identified three levers: influencing individual 
decision making, debiasing individuals, and accounting for biases in decisions. 
A company’s institutional structure can influence an individual’s decision-making process for 
instance by incentive systems (McNamara & Bromiley, 1997), feedback systems (Shepperd et 
al., 1996), and standardized decision processes (McNamara & Bromiley, 1997), as well as 
team composition (Montibeller & Winterfeldt, 2015). However, often the influence of these 
institutional pillars is not completely known and unintended consequences are possible 
(McNamara & Bromiley, 1997). Some researchers have even found that processes installed to 
prevent biases, fuel biased decision making instead (McNamara et al., 2002). Often also 
certain elements of institutional processes decrease a bias, but other elements unintendingly 
increase it e.g. while incentive systems are said to in general reduce biases, tournaments as 
tool to incentivize employees may lead to biased decision making (Heaton, 2002). Therefore, 
82 
 
 
more research in this field is needed, in order to provide more knowledge and avoid 
unintended effects. 
The other two methods (debiasing individuals and accounting for bias in decisions) are not 
relevant to answer RQ2, RQ3, and RQ4. However, since they show additional tools 
companies can make use of to reduce the influence of biases on decision making in their 
company, these methods are important to derive practical implications. Thus, important 
findings are presented briefly in the following, without elaborating on gaps.  
Debiasing individuals is one way to prevent biased decision making (Clemen & Lichtendahl, 
2002; Montibeller & Winterfeldt, 2015). Different debiasing techniques exist e.g. training, 
framing, and explicit warning/instructions (Montibeller & Winterfeldt, 2015). Training is the 
most prominent debiasing technique, although there are mixed empirical results on the impact 
of training on cognitive biases (Arkes, 1991; Clemen & Lichtendahl, 2002). Through training 
decision makers can understand the psychological processes underlying their biases 
(Schoemaker & Tetlock, 2016) and can therefore work on consciously avoiding it. 
Specifically, on the overconfidence bias it is reported that lectures on investor psychology 
with relevant examples helped to debias overconfidence (Kaustia & Perttula, 2009). However, 
training does not manage to eliminate biases completely (Clemen & Lichtendahl, 2002). 
Especially for biased experts a better calibration can be achieved by framing assessment 
questions in terms of relative frequencies (Clemen & Lichtendahl, 2002). Warning people and 
giving them specific instructions to avoid specific biases can also help to reduce these biases 
(Arkes, 1991). Explicit warnings did for instance reduce the better-than-average facet of 
overconfidence in an experiment (Kaustia & Perttula, 2009). However, when tested for 
overconfidence in general and especially the facet miscalibration, this technique did not yield 
overarching positive results (Kaustia & Perttula, 2009; Plous, 1995).  
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A final method to control biases is to perform ex-post debiasing by adjusting for possible 
biases trough e.g. a Bayesian calibration model based on past performance data (Clemen 
& Lichtendahl, 2002). For this the individual expert's specific biases tendency needs to be 
known and thus this method requires as much historic decision data as possible (Clemen 
& Lichtendahl, 2002).  
4.3.3 Cognitive biases and infrastructure projects – theoretical foundation 
Based on the existing literature on PF (4.3.2.1), behavioral decision making in projects 
(4.3.2.2), factors affecting risk assessment (4.3.2.3), and bias management (4.3.2.4), in the 
following a summary of the status quo on cognitive biasese in the context of infrastructure 
projects is presented. 
It is important to note that the decision-making process of individuals changes if risk or 
uncertainty are involved in the decision, heuristics and cognitive biases are applied more 
frequently (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982).  
Large infrastructure construction projects are highly complex and underlie high uncertainty 
(Meyer, 2016) – future cash flows as well as exact construction cost are not easy to determine 
accurately up front (Asiedu et al., 2017). So, it is no surprise that researchers found evidence 
of cognitive biases in different stages of infrastructure project decision making. Cognitive 
biases exist for instance in planning and reporting on the side of the project planners (typically 
project sponsors) and managers (Flyvbjerg et al., 2009, 2014). 
To focus the literature review on industry relevant biases, the expert interviews conducted on 
estimator related risks as described in chapter 3 were analyzed with the CIT. Relevant 
statements can be found in the Appendix. Overall three specific cognitive biases were 
identified to be most relevant in infrastructure project financing: unrealistic optimism, 
representative heuristic, and overconfidence. Unrealistic optimism was seen by nearly all 
stakeholders in retrospect concerning future cash flows of projects, e.g. concerning the use of 
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toll roads or the traffic of a commercial harbor. Especially lenders voiced the concern that 
project developers are extremely unrealistically optimistic. Several lenders said that in 
hindsight they realize having been victims of the representative heuristics. When an 
infrastructure PF credit defaulted in a certain industry, geography, or with a certain project 
sponsor, lenders often generalized that experience and were extremely pessimistic about new 
credits of that kind. It did not play a role whether they themselves made this negative 
experience, or whether they just heard about it from colleagues or in the media. Nearly all 
experts seemed overconfident about their individual ability to assess risks and learn from past 
mistakes.  
In the following recent literature from the three literature streams behavioral decision making 
in projects, PF, and factors affecting risk assessment is presented concerning (1) unrealistic 
optimism, (2) representative heuristic, and (3) overconfidence. The biases are defined in 
detail, consequences of the biases are named, the fields in which the biases were identified are 
pointed out, and occurrence in the field of infrastructure projects is discussed. Finally, 
comments for further research are included for each bias if applicable and moderating factors 
are named. 
4.3.3.1 Unrealistic optimism 
Weinstein (1980) focused on the fact that people are often not objective when predicting 
future events and coined the term unrealistic optimism33. This cognitive phenomenon has been 
demonstrated by researchers in various countries (Shepperd et al., 2013) and in various 
fields34. Optimistic bias, over optimism, delusional optimism, and unrealistic optimism 
(Shepperd et al., 2013) are used to describe the phenomenon that reflects the difference 
                                                 
33 His paper “unrealistic optimism about future life events” has been cited 4573 times as of January 2017. 
34 However, it should be mentioned that A. J. L. Harris and Hahn (2011) raise questions about the existence of 
the unrealistic optimism bias in reality, because according to the authors, evidence is overstated in most previous 
studies. Shepperd et al. (2002) investigate these allegations in detail and refute the statement that unrealistic 
optimism is merely “a methodological artifact of the sample“, compare Shepperd et al. (2002, p. 75). 
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between personal and target risk and reward estimates (Helweg-Larsen & Shepperd, 2001). 
Recent literature calls for a more precise definition of the phenomenon unrealistic optimism35 
as it can occur in four different forms: absolute36 at individual level, absolute at group level, 
comparative37 at individual level, and comparative at group level (Shepperd et al., 2013). So 
far comparative optimism at group level seems to be the most commonly used method 
(Helweg-Larsen & Shepperd, 2001; Shepperd et al., 2002; Shepperd et al., 2013; Weinstein, 
1980). Thus, in the following when referring to unrealistic optimism, the kind that is 
comparative at group level is referred to. It is important to note that this definition of 
optimism includes only the non-intentional deviations from reality38. 
 Shepperd et al. (2013) define this unrealistic optimism as: “a favorable difference 
between the risk estimate a person makes for him- or herself and the risk estimate suggested 
by a relevant, objective standard […] It may reflect a distortion in personal risk estimates, a 
distortion in the perceived risk of the comparison target, or both” (Shepperd et al., 2013, 
p. 396). In an infrastructure project this situation can mean that the decision maker believes 
that a project is less affected by a certain risk than comparable projects. This kind of 
unrealistic optimism is explained by two theories: the downward comparison theory (the 
                                                 
35 Shepperd et al. (2013) state that researchers are not only not consistent with the terminology they use to 
describe the phenomenon of unrealistic optimism but they also falsely deduct that different terms stand for the 
same construct and different measurement approaches yield the same result. 
36 Absolute unrealistic optimism is present when a single risk prediction is lower (or reward prediction higher) 
than an objective representation of that risk, compare Shepperd et al. (2013). 
37 Comparative unrealistic optimism is present if the risk prediction made for oneself is lower (or reward 
prediction higher) than the prediction how this risk is for another comparable person or group, compare Shepperd 
et al. (2013). 
38 Conscious deviations such as deception by e.g. intentionally reporting overly optimistic estimates is not part of 
this phenomenon. On the contrary to unrealistic optimism, unrealistic pessimism can also occur, compare 
McKenna (1993). Some authors question if unrealistic pessimism is exactly on the same dimension as unrealistic 
optimism, and if people do not rather move between optimism and realism, compare Shepperd et al. (2002). 
However, for convenience sake unrealistic pessimism is often assumed to be exact the opposite of unrealistic 
optimism, compare Shepperd et al. (2002). When unrealistic pessimism occurs, the likelihood of rewards is 
under- and the likelihood of losses is overvalued. This leads to a systematically wrong allocation of probabilities 
and can cause irrational decisions, compare Flyvbjerg et al. (2014); Böttcher and Blattner (2013). The bias has 
even been documented in practice: the World Bank  (2006) stated that in hindsight their decision makers refused 
to finance projects because they were too pessimistic about rewards linked to e.g. economic growth rates. 
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decision maker compares himself with a disadvantaged group) and the self-enhancement 
theory (the decision maker has an enhanced perception of himself) (McKenna, 1993). 
The consequences of unrealistic optimism have been discussed by several researchers39. 
Unrealistic optimism leads to a systematically wrong allocation of probabilities and can lead 
to irrational decisions (Böttcher & Blattner, 2013; Flyvbjerg et al., 2014). Unrealistic 
optimism may cause unnecessary risk taking and insufficient preparation for problems 
(Shepperd et al., 2016). However, there are also positive effects of unrealistic optimism - 
according to Shepperd et al. (2013) unrealistic optimism may cause greater goal persistence, 
positive affect, and hope.  
In the field of infrastructure projects developers and managers have been shown to be 
unrealistically optimistic about their projects and thus create proposals that are frequently 
viewed as too optimistic by lenders (Flyvbjerg et al., 2014). Lovallo and Kahneman (2003) 
believe that project failures are not caused by rational decisions having gone wrong, but by 
flawed decision making based on delusional optimism. Often unrealistic optimism is already 
deeply rooted within the project sponsors and developers in the planning phase of a project - 
source of this unrealistically optimistic project planning are honest mistakes, delusion, and 
even deception (Flyvbjerg et al., 2014). Delusion refers to the use of biases – whereas 
deception and mistakes will be ignored as possible causes of unrealistic optimism in the 
following, as they are not commensurable with the reductionist school of thought. What 
consequences of unrealistic optimism are reported for stakeholders in the infrastructure 
finance industry? Unrealistic optimism can lead investors in general to invest in negative net 
present value projects (Heaton, 2002). Baker and Nofsinger (2002) state that unrealistic 
optimism causes investors to do less critical analysis. 
                                                 
39 However, very few researchers have been able to prove these consequences. According to Shepperd, Pogge, 
and Howell  (2016) less than 10% of the relevant studies include results on consequences of unrealistic 
optimism. Therefore there is no clear agreement whether decision makers that are in general affected by 
unrealistic optimism, always make optimistic predictions, compare Krizan and Windschitl (2007). 
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Various studies have focused on identifying moderators for unrealistic optimism40 to 
understand why this phenomenon occurs. These moderators can be clustered into three broad 
groups: affective states, heuristics and cognitive biases, and event related factors.  
 A number of studies have shown that affective states such as mood, depression, and 
state and trait anxiety affect unrealistic optimism (Helweg-Larsen & Shepperd, 2001). Further 
there are two affective state mediated factors that can be linked to stakeholder groups, 
proximity to feedback and accountability. Helweg-Larsen and Shepperd (2001) mention that 
people show less unrealistic optimism when feedback is proximal. Other affective state 
mediated variables such as event severity are not discussed in the following because previous 
literature reports inconsistent effects (Helweg-Larsen & Shepperd, 2001).  
 As a second enhancing/diminishing factor for unrealistic optimism, heuristics and 
cognitive biases were identified in previous literature. Shepperd et al. (2013) mention 
representative heuristics as cause for unrealistic optimism and the factors prior experience 
with negative events and comparison with close others that are proven to reduce the use of 
representative heuristics and thus unrealistic optimism. Further unrealistic optimism is caused 
when people overestimate their personal control of the events (Böttcher & Blattner, 2013; 
Shepperd et al., 2002; Weinstein, 1980). Other heuristics and cognitive biases that were 
named as potential causes for unrealistic optimism are person-positivity bias and 
underestimating other’s control.  
 The third group of moderators relates to the event, for which the risk and reward 
prediction is made. Unrealistic optimism occurs less for uncontrollable (Helweg-Larsen 
& Shepperd, 2001) and for very rare negative events (Shepperd et al., 2013).  
                                                 
40 Shepperd et al.  (2013) argue that it is false to assume that moderators of one form of unrealistic optimism are 
also moderators of other forms of unrealistic optimism. Therefore, in the following only those moderators will be 
named, that have been identified for comparative unrealistic optimism at group level.   
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4.3.3.2 Representative heuristic  
A heuristic is a cognitive process that simplifies decision making and is used especially when 
the decision maker is faced with high uncertainty (Özen, 2016). The representative heuristic is 
the tendency to judge probability based on misleading associations with seemingly similar 
events (Barberis & Thaler, 2003) i.e. to generalize41. When using the representative heuristic 
choices are weighted carefully according to their disadvantages and advantages (Özen, 2016). 
Similar events, often from past experience (Özen, 2016), are judged based on essential 
characteristics in order to provide information for the decision process (Bar-Hillel, 1980). 
Other characteristics as obvious as statistical information may be ignored in order to highlight 
the similarities between the events (Özen, 2016). The representative heuristic has two main 
facets - namely the base rate neglect and the sample size neglect (Barberis & Thaler, 2003). 
Base rate neglect is when decision makers being presented with base rate information ignore 
the base rate and make judgements that violate objective probability (Barberis & Thaler, 
2003). Sample size neglect is when decision makers ignore the facts that variation is more 
likely in smaller samples, thus small samples are less representative (Barberis & Thaler, 
2003). The use of heuristics such as the representative heuristic simplifies decision making 
but causes biases when they are not used efficiently (Özen, 2016). Bar-Hillel (1980) states: 
“There seems to be little argument with the general contention that probability judgments are 
biased by representativeness” (Bar-Hillel, 1980, p. 579). The use of representative heuristic 
has been shown for estimating the likelihood of a future event (Bar-Hillel, 1974).  
Regarding infrastructure projects no recent literature could be identified that includes the 
representative heuristic. However, in expert interviews with two lenders pessimism and a 
reluctance to provide a loan was mentioned for projects that were in a similar industry or 
geography as projects that defaulted in the past. Based on these findings representative 
                                                 
41 Appropriate generalizations i.e. associations with similar events are not included in the definition of the 
heuristic. 
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heuristic is tested in this study as a heuristic using a negative event/outcome as stereotype and 
thus predicting a more negative future than applicable. 
What causes experts to use the representative heuristic? Loss aversion distorts the perception 
of past gains and losses, thus it can increase the use of the representative heuristics (Böttcher 
& Blattner, 2013).  
4.3.3.3 Overconfidence bias 
Overconfident decision makers think their judgement is more accurate than it actually is 
(Baker & Nofsinger, 2002; Hirshleifer, 2015). Vetter et al. (2011) define the concept in the 
following way: “Overconfidence is any behavior based on systematically incorrect 
assessments of one’s knowledge and skills as well as the actual ability to control future 
events” (Vetter et al., 2011, p. 3). 
Researchers have offered many different explanations of the phenomenon. According to 
Klayman, Soll, González-Vallejo, and Barlas (1999) “It is unlikely that any single mechanism 
can explain all types of confidence judgments” (Klayman et al., 1999, p. 244). As (1) 
miscalibration, (2) illusion of control, and (3) the above average effect are the most 
investigated facets of overconfidence in literature, compare Deaves, Lüders, and Luo (2009), 
the following parts will focus on these. 
 Some researchers see biases in information processing and effects of unbiased 
judgmental error as explanations of overconfidence (Klayman et al., 1999). As information 
processing bias miscalibration is often named42- the tendency to overestimate one’s own 
knowledge preciseness (Klayman et al., 1999). Miscalibration is present when a person cannot 
assess the amount of mistakes he or she makes (Vetter et al., 2011). This feature of 
overconfidence is based on the fact that people’s judgement about the knowledge they have is 
                                                 
42 The same phenomena is called illusion of knowledge by Baker and Nofsinger (2002) and over precision by 
Barberis and Thaler  (2003). 
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typically overestimated i.e. people think they have more and better information available than 
they have (Klayman et al., 1999). 
 According to Baker and Nofsinger (2002) the phenomenon of overconfidence is 
grounded in the illusion of control43. Decision makers underlie the illusion of control when 
they believe they have more influence on the outcome of the project than they actually have 
(McKenna, 1993; Vetter et al., 2011). This phenomenon can occur even when the events are 
determined purely by chance.  
 According to Barberis and Thaler (2003) overconfidence bias is formed also by 
overplacement, also called the above average effect by Vetter et al. (2011). The better-than-
average effect aspect of overconfidence stands for the tendency of some people to believe that 
their abilities and knowledge are above average when they are not (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). 
Kruger and Dunning (1999) explain this by the fact that the metacognitive skills that 
incompetent decision makers lack also prevent them to see their own incompetence.  
Appropriate confidence is needed to make decisions that are not too risky and to know when 
advice and more information is needed (Soll & Klayman, 2004). According to Vetter et al. 
(2011) the three above described facets of overconfidence cause people to overestimate their 
abilities and thus take unrealistically optimistic performance estimates. These estimates can 
cause excessively risky decisions that lead to entrepreneurial and project failure (Vetter et al., 
2011). Additionally, overconfidence inhibits from learning and improving the decision 
process (Böttcher & Blattner, 2013). Rather success is recalled than a failure and people may 
not search for more information for their decision (Böttcher & Blattner, 2013).  
Overconfidence is named frequently in the relevant literature for various decision situations 
and various kinds of decision makers (Böttcher, Blattner 2013) e.g. managers were found to 
                                                 
43 The same phenomena is called overestimation by Barberis and Thaler (2003). Other authors see illusion of 
control and overconfidence as different biases e.g. Houghton et al. (2000).   
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be overconfident about their company’s future performance and bankers were found to be 
overconfident about future stock performance. In decision situations in which uncertainty is 
very high, such as complex infrastructure projects, Hirshleifer (2015) finds that 
overconfidence tends to be stronger.  
An important moderator of overconfidence is task difficulty – overconfidence increases with 
the difficulty of the decision task (Klayman et al., 1999). However, independent of the task 
itself overconfidence varies between different individuals (Vetter et al., 2011). Here three 
different groups of moderators have been identified: cognitive, motivational, and knowledge 
related (Vetter et al., 2011), with knowledge related factors as main influence (McKenzie, 
Liersch, & Yaniv, 2008). As subtypes, subjective knowledge, objective knowledge, and 
experienced based knowledge have been identified in relevant literature (Carlson, Vincent, 
Hardesty, & Bearden, 2009). These moderators will be defined and described in detail in 
chapter 4.4.4. 
4.4. Development of a causal bias model for decision making in infrastructure PF 
As discussed above in PF the perception of risks and projected future cash flows plays an 
important role. Heuristics and biases are often involved in these perceptions and can result in 
biased decision making (Böttcher & Blattner, 2013). To answer the research question 
displayed in Figure 11, this chapter is dedicated to creating a theoretical causal bias model.  
Figure 11: Unrealistic optimism in PF can lead to over- and underevaluating risks/rewards 
 Source: Adapted from Hampl and Wüstenhagen (2012)
Project finance stakeholder specific decision-making process
Perceived risk
Perceived return
Financial 
decision
Cognitive 
aspects
/
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Risks
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RQ2: How do personal and company factors influence heuristics and unconscious biases of 
infrastructure PF decision stakeholders and how do these heuristics and unconscious biases 
influence the perception of risks and rewards, in this study subsumed under “unrealistic 
optimism”?
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4.4.1 Unrealistic optimism 
As mentioned in chapter 4.3.3.1, unrealistic optimism in an infrastructure PF decision means 
that the decision maker believes that the infrastructure project at hand is less affected by a 
certain risk than comparable projects. In previous literature unrealistic optimism in the field of 
infrastructure projects’ developers and managers is well documented by Flyvbjerg et al. 
(2014) and Lovallo and Kahneman (2003). Not only project managers fall victim to this bias, 
even the World Bank (2006), that is involved in PF, stated in a report from 2006: “From time-
to-time, the Bank reviewed the quality of its cost-benefit analysis[…]. Past reviews indicated 
the presence of an “optimism bias” in the estimated rates of return on infrastructure projects, 
resulting (on average) in a difference of 5-10 percentage points between ex-ante and ex-post 
rates of return” (World Bank, 2006, pp. 17–18). The UK Treasury even officially demanded 
ministries to develop methods to avoid unrealistic optimism in projects (Flyvbjerg, 2006). 
Based on these observations, the following hypothesis can be formulated: 
Hypothesis 1: Decision makers in European infrastructure PF are unrealistically optimistic 
4.4.2 Influencing factors of unrealistic optimism 
Out of the above-named influencing factor groups those that are included in the model will be 
discussed in the following.  
 Affective state factors and event related factors in general are neglected in this model 
since they are dependent on the specific situation in which the decision maker processes the 
decision and are not likely to explain the behavior of a group of stakeholders44. However, 
affect state mediated factors that can be linked to stakeholder groups are included: (1) 
incentive system distinctiveness and (2) feedback culture distinctiveness. Both these factors 
are company related factors, i.e. ways how a company can influence unrealistic optimism of 
                                                 
44 Although in very specific situations whole groups can be influenced by mood e.g. mood after terror attack.  
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the individual. As second explanations for unrealistic optimism, (3) representative heuristic, 
(4) overconfidence bias, and (5) subjective knowledge will be tested45. 
Incentive systems make decision makers accountable for the outcome of their decision. In 
decisions with high accountability for the outcome, decision making is often less biased as 
decision makers are more motivated to think critically and make accurate choices (Tetlock & 
Kim, 1987). This presumably leads to a decrease in unrealistic optimism (Shepperd et al., 
1996)46. Thus, the following hypothesis can be formulated:   
Hypothesis 2a: The higher the incentive system distinctiveness the lower the level of 
unrealistic optimism  
Shepperd et al. (1996) state: “There is reason to believe that individuals will abandon their 
optimism and may even become pessimistic in anticipation of self-relevant feedback” 
(Shepperd et al., 1996, p. 844). One reason for this might be that people want to avoid own 
disappointment when their outcomes fall short behind their predictions (Shepperd et al., 
1996). Helweg-Larsen and Shepperd (2001) explain this phenomenon by stating that feedback 
leads to greater conservatism in personal predictions in order to avoid one’s prediction to be 
challenged. Shepperd and McNulty (2002) even give a complementing explanation: 
unexpected good outcomes feel even better and bad outcomes feel even worse than when 
expected. Krizan and Windschitl (2007) state: „people become unduly pessimistic about a 
desirable outcome as a way of protecting themselves from severe disappointment if the 
outcome fails to materialize” (Krizan & Windschitl, 2007, p. 111). Thus, the following 
hypothesis can be formulated:   
                                                 
45 Other heuristics and cognitive biases that were named less prominent in recent literature are neglected such as 
person-positivity bias and egocentric thinking, compare Shepperd et al. (2013).   
46 However not all incentive mechanisms eliminate irrational decision making, as for instance tournaments may 
favor irrational decision makers, compare Heaton (2002). 
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Hypothesis 2b: The more distinct the feedback culture in a company the lower the level of 
unrealistic optimism  
Several researchers believe that the use of the representative heuristic is one of the key factors 
which influences unrealistic optimism of decision makers (Shepperd et al., 2002; Weinstein, 
1980). According to Weinstein (1980) when estimating the exposure to a risk or reward 
compared to that of another project/person, often the self-chosen comparison target is a 
stereotype that does not represent the objective statistical average target and thus the entire 
comparison is faulty. According to Baker and Nofsinger (2002) past failures often lead to low 
unrealistic optimism (Baker & Nofsinger, 2002). Therefore, the following hypothesis can be 
formulated:    
Hypothesis 2c: The higher the usage of representative heuristic the lower the level of 
unrealistic optimism  
In general overconfidence has been associated with unrealistic optimism (Houghton et al., 
2000) in specific especially the overconfidence facets miscalibration and illusion of control. 
Miscalibration was shown to have a positive effect, Meyer (2016) found that the more 
miscalibrated decision makers were, the more unrealistically optimistic they were as well. 
Along with several other researchers e.g. Shepperd et al. (2002) and Weinstein (1980), 
demonstrate that people tend to be more optimistic about future events that they believe they 
can control. Confirming this opinion, Böttcher and Blattner (2013) state that the 
overconfidence facet illusion of control and unrealistic optimism often go hand in hand, 
causing decision makers to be blinded for possible negative outcomes47. As stated above 
decision makers underlie the illusion of control when they believe they have more influence 
                                                 
47 However it is important to note that most existing research indicating that overconfidence precipitates 
unrealistic optimism uses correlational data and thus “the comparative control illusion lacks empirical support as 
an explanation for comparative optimism”, compare Shepperd et al. (2002). 
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on the outcome of the project than they actually have (Vetter et al., 2011) even when the 
events are determined purely by chance such as lotteries or dice games. People tend to 
overestimate the control they themselves have in avoiding negative outcomes and securing 
positive ones, but they do not do so for others (Shepperd et al., 2002). The third facet of 
overconfidence, the better-than-average effect was shown to have no direct influence on 
unrealistic optimism (Meyer, 2016).  Thus, regarding the in this effort examined facets of 
overconfidence bias, the following hypothesis can be formulated: 
Hypothesis 2d: The higher the level of miscalibration and illusion of control the higher the 
level of unrealistic optimism; the better-than-average effect has no significant influence on 
unrealistic optimism 
Subjective knowledge “[…] reflects what we think we know […]” (Carlson et al. 2009, p. 
864). This might be knowledge that decision makers objectively have or have not. Vetter et al. 
(2011) defines subjective knowledge as: ”subjects’ self-assessments of their knowledge in 
comparison to their peers” (Vetter et al., 2011, p. 5). It can be argued that subjective 
knowledge does not only have an indirect effect on unrealistic optimism through 
overconfidence, but also a direct effect. People with unrealistic optimism tend to have less 
knowledge about their risks but are not aware that - “individuals categorized as unrealistically 
optimistic […] were generally at higher risk yet believed they were at lower risk and worried 
less about their risk suggesting defensive processing of the information” (Radcliffe & Klein, 
2002, p. 844).  On this account, the following hypothesis can be formulated: 
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Hypothesis 2e: The higher the level of subjective knowledge the higher the level of unrealistic 
optimism regarding risks 
4.4.3 Influencing factors of representative heuristic 
As influencing factor of the representative heuristic loss aversion has been identified in recent 
literature, which itself is grounded in (1) negative past experience and (2) regret (Barberis 
& Huang, 2001; Böttcher & Blattner, 2013; Kahneman & Tversky, 1974). 
Loss aversion describes the bias in which people are more sensitive to losses than to gains 
(Barberis & Huang, 2001) and thus weigh losses heavier than gains in a decision making 
involving probability (Kahneman & Tversky, 1974). These losses could be either failures on 
the current project or on previous projects. Due to the fact that loss aversion distorts the 
perception of past gains and losses, it can increase the use of representative heuristic (Böttcher 
& Blattner, 2013). According to evidence of Barberis and Huang (2001), the degree of loss 
aversion is influenced by prior gains and losses – if people loose then they are even more 
sensitive to future losses than before. Therefore, also negative experience can be seen to 
directly influence the use of representative heuristics. Consequently, the following hypothesis 
can be formulated:   
Hypothesis 3a: The higher the amount of negative experiences the higher the level of 
representative heuristics 
Regret is an outcome from a decision that influences upcoming decisions (Dietrich, 2010). 
Often regret is associated with blaming oneself for a seemingly wrong decision (Zeelenberg, 
Van Dijk, Manstead, & Van der Pligt, 2000). Böttcher and Blattner (2013) see regret about 
past decisions as phenomenon that increases loss aversion, as regret always amplifies the 
personal experience one has with losses. As described above, due to the fact that loss aversion 
increases the use of representative heuristics (Böttcher & Blattner, 2013), this phenomenon 
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can be seen to directly influence the use of representative heuristics. Thus, the following 
hypothesis can be formulated:  
Hypothesis 3b: The higher the level of regret the higher the level of representative heuristic 
4.4.4 Influencing factors of overconfidence 
Influence of overconfidence on decision makers seems to vary depending on the various kinds 
of knowledge of the decision maker (Carlson et al., 2009; McKenzie et al., 2008; Vetter et al., 
2011). As influencing factors of overconfidence (1) subjective knowledge, (2) objective 
knowledge, and (3) experienced based knowledge have been identified in recent literature. 
Vetter et al. (2011) state: “An in-depth investigation of three types of knowledge, namely 
experienced, objective and subjective knowledge, reveals that different types of knowledge can 
have contrasting effects on overconfidence” (Vetter et al., 2011, p. 1). Further for the male 
gender overconfidence seems to occur more often than for the female gender (Soll 
& Klayman, 2004). 
Several researchers concluded that subjective knowledge is positively related to 
overconfidence (Carlson et al., 2009; Vetter et al., 2011). According to Carlson et al. (2009) 
decision makers who consider to have superior knowledge also consider to have superior 
control (illusion of control). Vetter et al. (2011) offer as supplementing explanation that 
decision makers with high subjective knowledge often are victims of illusion of control 
because they are unlikely to consult others in their decision making and base their decision 
only on self-assessed knowledge. Therefore, the following hypothesis can be formulated: 
Hypothesis 4a: The higher the level of subjective knowledge the higher the level of the 
illusion of control facet of overconfidence  
Objective knowledge is the actual knowledge a decision maker has and can use for his 
decision-making process (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). According to Vetter et al. (2011) 
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decision makers with a very low level of objective knowledge typically are overconfident and 
overestimate their performance in terms of the above-average effect facet of overconfidence. 
The higher the objective knowledge, the lower the overconfidence – it even goes so far that 
decision makers with very high objective knowledge often underestimate their abilities (Vetter 
et al., 2011). Thus, the following hypothesis can be formulated: 
Hypothesis 4b: The higher the level of objective knowledge the lower the level of better-than-
average facet of overconfidence 
Experienced based knowledge is knowledge used in an actual decision process that was 
gained based on past experiences (Meyer, 2016). Vetter et al. (2011) demonstrated that 
decision makers with high experienced knowledge overestimated the relevance of their past 
knowledge and thus tend to show high miscalibration. However, this effect is not generally 
described. According to Boyson (2003) decision makers take less risk over time. This is 
consistent with the finding of Vetter et al. (2011) that specific types of experienced knowledge 
lead to lower overconfidence levels. Because of diverging findings in literature, the following 
hypothesis is going to be tested: 
Hypothesis 4c: the higher the level of experience based knowledge the lower the level of the 
miscalibration facet of overconfidence 
4.4.5 Synthesis of causal model of individual decision maker unrealistic optimism 
The model in the following summarizes the causal model hypothesized above. Company 
related factors, personal factors, as well as an underlying bias/heuristic are hypothesized to act 
as enhancing/diminishing factors of unrealistic optimism in European infrastructure PF.  
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Figure 12: Hypothesized causal model of individual decision maker unrealistic optimism in infrastructure PF   
 
4.5. Development of hypotheses about differences in unrealistic optimism  
between lenders and investors on individual level  
In the chapter 4.4 a causal model of PF decision maker unrealistic optimism was developed 
for the European infrastructure PF industry. However, the question remains, if all stakeholder 
groups involved in PF decision making in European infrastructure projects are equally 
unrealistically optimistic. In the following hypotheses are developed concerning (1) 
differences in unrealistic optimism and (2) drivers of the difference in unrealistic optimism. 
4.5.1 Differences in unrealistic optimism 
Baker and Nofsinger (2002) state that unrealistic optimism causes investors to do less critical 
analysis. Several authors in the field of project management have called out investors i.e. 
project sponsors as being too optimistic (Baker & Nofsinger, 2002; Daniel & Hirshleifer, 
2015; Flyvbjerg, 2009, 2014). Even the World Bank (2006), that is involved in PF often as 
equity investor, stated that in hindsight the presence of unrealistic optimism in financing 
decisions became apparent (World Bank, 2006).  
 Flyvbjerg (2013) argues that unrealistic optimism in projects can be best avoided by 
taking an outside view. Lenders are often involved in infrastructure projects much later than 
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investors, and thus can provide this view by taking a different angle at valuing the project. 
However, by taking an outside view, lenders are not automatically neutral in their risk 
assessment. Although they follow quite standardized decision processes, human judgement 
still plays a large role in risk assessment (McNamara & Bromiley, 1997), allowing room for 
biases (Vaaler & McNamara, 2011). At the same time, lenders rather have the tendency to 
concentrate on avoiding defaulting loans, rather than focusing on maximizing the banks profit 
opportunities i.e. loan volume (Öhman & Lundberg, 2015). Thus, especially senior lenders are 
rather pessimistic i.e. have low unrealistic optimism (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002). From this the 
following hypothesis can be drawn:  
Hypothesis 5: Due to their role in PF, lenders are on individual level less unrealistically 
optimistic than investors  
4.5.2 Drivers of the difference in unrealistic optimism 
If a difference in unrealistic optimism exists, this difference might be explainable by the 
causal model put forward in chapter 4.4 of this work. Namely (1) company factors such as 
feedback and incentive system distinctiveness, (2) the personal factors subjective, objective, 
and experience based knowledge, as well as (3) overconfidence bias and representative 
heuristics could explain why a difference exists. 
Due to the bank specific leverage and the public focus the recent financial crisis put on banks’ 
incentive systems, it can be assumed that lenders in infrastructure project financing have more 
distinctive incentive systems that investors. Incentive systems serve to address the classical 
principal agent problem and align shareholder interests with those of the managers and 
decision makers (Cai, Cherny, & Milbourn, 2010). “A majority of financial institutions’ 
profits come from borrowing money from depositors or institutional creditors and then 
lending it out at a higher rate” (Cai et al., 2010, p. 4). Banks typically have a high debt-to-
equity ratio, in order to fulfill their role as financial intermediator (Efing, Hau, Kampkötter, & 
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Steinbrecher, 2015). Due to this specific situation “the problem of compensation providing 
executives with incentives to take on higher risks in the interest of shareholders is worse in the 
banking world” (Cai et al., 2010, p. 4). Efing et al. (2015) also conclude: “The issue of optimal 
incentive pay is particularly relevant for banks because of their high leverage” (Efing et al., 
2015, p. 126). In addition to this, after the financial crisis, policies such as Basel II were 
designed that focus on the incentives of executive and nonexecutive lenders (Phelan & 
Clement, 2009). 
Regarding the feedback system, there is no previous literature which indicates, that there 
should be a difference between institutions that act as lenders and those that act as investors. 
McNamara and Bromiley (1997) state, that decision makers in commercial lending 
automatically receive feedback on their decisions. However, the same should hold for 
investors, as they constantly track the value of their investments and monitor value losses 
closely. Thus, the following hypotheses can be formulated:  
Hypothesis 6a: Lenders have a more distinct incentive system than investors 
Hypothesis 6b: The feedback culture of lenders and investors are equally distinct 
There is no previous literature that indicates, that there should be a difference in subjective, 
objective, or experienced based knowledge between institutions that act as lenders and those 
that act as investors. Thus, the following hypothesis can be formulated:  
Hypothesis 7: Lenders and investors have equal levels of subjective, objective, and 
experienced based knowledge  
In decision situations in which uncertainty is very high, such as large infrastructure projects, 
Hirshleifer (2015) finds that overconfidence tends to be stronger. This applies both for lenders 
and investors in infrastructure PF, and overconfidence has in fact been observed both among 
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lenders (Heath & Read, 2014) and investors (Daniel & Hirshleifer, 2015) in other sectors. As 
stated above, there is no indication, that drivers of overconfidence, namely subjective and 
experienced based knowledge, differ between lenders and investors. The same argumentation 
should hold for representative heuristic, as also this should mainly depend on the level of 
uncertainty in the decision situation. Therefore, the following hypothesis can be drawn:  
Hypothesis 8: Lenders and investors have a similar amount of overconfidence and use the 
representative heuristic equally much 
4.6. Development of company characteristic model of unrealistic optimism  
After developing theoretical models and hypothesis to provide the foundation for answering 
RQ2 and RQ3, in the following the theoretical foundation for RQ4 will be provided.48 To 
answer this research question hypotheses are developed about the characteristics of companies 
that are less unrealistically optimistic than others. In terms of the characteristics the focus will 
be placed on (1) institutional structure, (2) overconfidence on company level, and (3) 
objective company characteristics. 
4.6.1 Institutional structure 
In chapter 4.4 it is hypothesized that companies can put systems into place that reduce the 
danger of assessing risks regarding future revenues unrealistically optimistic. This claim can 
be supported by previous research (Durand, 2003; McNamara & Bromiley, 1997). According 
to Durand (2003): “organizational context is a major factor influencing a firm’s estimation 
capability” (Durand, 2003, p. 822). (1) Feedback and incentive systems are examples of 
institutional structures that provide the organizational context. As additional institutional 
structure characteristics (2) subjective knowledge on team level and (3) team diversity will be 
discussed in the following. 
                                                 
48 What are the characteristics of companies that are less unrealistically optimistic than others? 
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In chapter 4.4 it is hypothesized that individual decision makers with a distinctive feedback 
system in their company are less likely to be unrealistically optimistic. Feedback is an 
important element of debiasing individuals, according to Arkes (1991) a distinctive feedback 
culture improves the decision makers accuracy-confidence calibration. In terms of company 
unrealistic optimism, a similar effect as on individual level is thinkable. Therefore, it should 
be tested on company level if feedback culture distinctiveness is a characteristic that 
distinguishes above average unrealistically optimistic companies from those that are below 
average unrealistically optimistic.  
Also hypothesized in chapter 4.4 is that individual decision makers with a distinctive 
incentive system in their company are less likely to be unrealistically optimistic. In terms of 
company unrealistic optimism, a similar effect is thinkable. It should be thus tested on 
company level if incentive system distinctiveness is a characteristic that distinguishes 
companies regarding their unrealistic optimism.    
Another aspect indicated by previous research e.g. Vetter et al. (2011) and hypothesized in 
chapter 4.4 is that individual decision makers with high subjective knowledge often are 
victims of illusion of control. One possible explanation for this finding is that these people are 
unlikely to consult others in their decision making process and base their decision only on 
self-assessed knowledge (Vetter et al., 2011). In terms of company subjective knowledge, a 
similar effect is thinkable – companies should be less likely to involve outside experts, if there 
is a companywide understanding that they have high knowledge. Therefore, it should be tested 
on company level if subjective knowledge characterizes overconfident companies and 
therefore has an indirect effect on unrealistic optimism.  
In general teams are better forecasters than individuals (Schoemaker & Tetlock, 2016). Using 
“multiple experts with alternative points of view” is named as an useful debiasing technique 
against unrealistic optimism (Montibeller & Winterfeldt, 2015, p. 1235). Why is this so? In a 
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team the information storage capacity, the so called mental model, is much larger than in 
individuals if knowledge is heterogeneous and is shared within the team (Houghton et al., 
2000; Kerr et al., 1996). Also, calibration of groups is better if high and low estimates from 
different individuals are combined into a single confidence interval (Plous, 1995). But can 
teams also effect the decision making of the individual? Team settings provide the 
environment in which individuals make their decisions. The group polarization literature 
states that individual opinions are polarized in homogenous groups (Schulz-Hardt, Frey, 
Lüthgens, & Moscovici, 2000). Houghton et al. (2000) propose that further research is needed 
on the effect of team heterogeneity on bias at the team level "future studies on the effects of 
these characteristics [team characteristics] on biases may help resolve some of these 
contradictions" (Houghton et al., 2000, p. 347). In terms of heterogeneity or diversity of 
teams there are several different aspects: sex diversity, age diversity, cultural diversity, and 
academic/work experience diversity. Consequently, it should be tested on company level if 
team diversity is a characteristic that distinguishes above average unrealistically optimistic 
companies from those that are below average unrealistically optimistic. 
4.6.2 Overconfidence on company level 
Another hypothesis made in chapter 4.4 was that being unrealistically optimistic concerning 
costs and time overruns is influenced by different facets of the overconfidence bias. 
Overconfidence has been shown to exist on company level (Durand, 2003), which makes it 
even more likely, that a similar effect can be seen on company level as on individual level. 
More detailed, (1) illusion of control and (2) miscalibration should be analyzed as potential 
characteristics that indicate the level of unrealistic optimism on company level, as they are 
hypothesized to have an effect on unrealistic optimism individual level. The above-average 
effect is hypothesized to have no effect in chapter 4.4, therefore it can be disregarded as 
relevant company characteristic concerning unrealistic optimism. 
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The hypothesis made in chapter 4.4 for illusion of control on individual level in large 
infrastructure projects was already suggested by Durand (2003) on company level for the 
manufacturing industry: “Organizational illusion of control increases positive forecast bias” 
(Durand, 2003, p. 825). This adds to the importance of testing the illusion of control facet of 
overconfidence on company level as characteristic of unrealistically optimistic companies. 
In chapter 4.4 it is further hypothesized that miscalibration of individuals has an impact on 
unrealistic optimism. Given that illusion control exists on individual and on company level 
(Durand, 2003), this variable should be tested as relevant company characteristic as well.  
4.6.3 Objective company characteristics 
Objective company characteristics such as (1) age and (2) size were reported to have an 
impact on risk assessment (Durand, 2003; McNamara & Vaaler, 2000; Ucbasaran, Westhead, 
Wright, & Flores, 2010) and should therefore be included in the set of characteristics to be 
tested. 
Ucbasaran et al. (2010) found that entrepreneurs who have no experiences in business failure 
are significantly more unrealistically optimistic. On company level it could mean that older 
companies, who have thus also more experience are more likely to have witnessed project 
failures and thus should be less unrealistically optimistic. Therefore, this variable should be 
tested on company level as characteristic that distinguished companies on their unrealistic 
optimism.  
For the manufacturing industry Durand (2003) found that larger companies are more 
unrealistically optimistic because they believe they are subject to illusion of control. 
Therefore, this variable should be tested as well as company characteristic in the field of the 
infrastructure PF industry.  
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4.6.4 Synthesis of hypothesized predictive model 
As can be seen in the model below, objective company characteristics, institutional structure 
and company overconfidence are hypothesized to indicate the extent to which a company 
overall is unrealistically optimistic. 
Figure 13: Hypothesized predictive model of company unrealistic optimism in infrastructure PF 
 
4.7 Synthesis of proposed causal model, hypotheses, and predictive model 
In order to answer RQ2, RQ3, and RQ4 models and hypotheses were developed as a first step. 
For the decision making of the individual (RQ249) a causal unrealistic optimism model is 
hypothesized in chapter 4.4, showing how company related factors (feedback culture 
distinctiveness and incentive system distinctiveness), personal factors (negative experience, 
regret, objective knowledge, subjective knowledge, and experience based knowledge), the 
overconfidence bias, and representative heuristic influence unrealistic optimism.  
                                                 
49 How do personal and company factors influence heuristics and unconscious biases of infrastructure PF 
decision stakeholders and how do these heuristics and unconscious biases influence the perception of risks and 
rewards, in this study subsumed under “unrealistic optimism”?  
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Further it is hypothesized in chapter 4.5 that due to their role in PF, lenders are on individual 
level less unrealistically optimistic than investors (RQ350). This difference is hypothesized to 
be grounded in differences in the incentive system distinctiveness. All other causal drivers of 
unrealistic optimism are believed to be the same for the different stakeholder groups.  
In chapter 4.6, objective company characteristics, institutional structure, and company 
overconfidence are hypothesized to indicate the extent to which a company overall is 
unrealistically optimistic (RQ451). 
                                                 
50 Are certain stakeholders less biased than other stakeholders and are therefore better equipped to assess risks of 
large European infrastructure projects? Can personal or company related factors be identified to drive differences 
between lenders and investors and made accessible for best practice learning? 
51 What are the characteristics of companies that are less unrealistically optimistic than others? 
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5. Empirical test of developed causal model, hypotheses, and predictive 
model  
The hypothesized causal model, hypotheses, and the hypothesized predictive model need to be 
tested. In the following it is described (1) how biases, influencing factors, and causality are 
measured. Further (2) the population of interest and the (3) sample are described. Then results 
of empirical tests of the (4) causal model of individual decision maker unrealistic optimism, 
(5) hypotheses about differences between stakeholders, and (6) predictive model on company 
unrealistic optimism are presented. 
5.1 Methods and their previous use in literature 
In the following it is elaborated how (1) biases and influencing factors are measured in the 
survey and how high quality of data is ensured. Then it is elaborated how (2) causality in the 
model is measured, (3) differences between stakeholder groups are measured, (4) differences 
between companies are measured, and (5) how a predictive model can be built on company 
level. 
5.1.1 Measuring biases and identified enhancing/diminishing factors in a survey 
As mentioned in chapter 1.3, biases are commonly not tested in real life project decisions but 
rather in laboratory like decision situations with relevant decision makers. The approach used 
for (1) unrealistic optimism, (2) representative heuristics, and (3) overconfidence in this effort 
relies on previous literature and is elaborated in the subsequent paragraphs. 
Unrealistic optimism, in the comparative form at group level (which is the focus in this study), 
is commonly measured in interviews or a survey (Shepperd et al., 2013). There are various 
direct and indirect methods for assessing comparative optimism at group level in a survey. At 
present, contradicting opinions are found whether the direct or the indirect survey method 
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captures unrealistic optimism more accurately52. After weighing advantages and 
disadvantages carefully, the indirect method was chosen for this study. 
 The indirect survey method asks participants to provide an estimate of their own risk 
of experiencing an event, in this study e.g. a cost overrun of an infrastructure construction 
project. In a separate question the participant is asked how likely (on a Likert scale e.g. from 1 
to 7) it is for peers to experience the same event (Helweg-Larsen & Shepperd, 2001). 
Unrealistic optimism is present when for possible negative outcomes such as a project cost 
overrun the difference between the assessments for peers and for self is negative – the greater 
the difference the more visible is the bias present. 
 It is common to distinguish between optimism regarding risk and optimism regarding 
opportunities (Meyer, 2016). In the field of infrastructure finance, estimator related risks can 
be divided into those regarding project cost/completion time, and those regarding future 
revenues, as was described in chapter 3. Cost is however often seen as the most visible 
criterion of a project’s success (Ogunsemi & Jagboro, 2006). Therefore, using the indirect 
method four different aspects of unrealistic optimism are measured in this survey. For risks, 
unrealistic optimism regarding risk of construction time/cost overrun and less revenues in the 
future than expected is measured separately. For opportunities, unrealistic optimism regarding 
chance of early/within budget completion and more revenues in the future than expected is 
measured separately. 
Reacting to critique of the comparative unrealistic optimism at group level the 
recommendations of Shepperd et al. (2013) are considered in the survey.  First, the 
comparison group is described as precise as possible in the survey by stating "other decision 
                                                 
52 According to Helweg-Larsen and Shepperd  (2001) the direct method might produce greater bias than the 
indirect method, however the direct method is easier to understand for survey participants, requires fewer items, 
and takes less response time. The indirect method on the other hand allows researchers to identify how 
moderators affect the optimism, compare Helweg-Larsen and Shepperd (2001). Further Shepperd et al.  (2013) 
recommend the use of the indirect method, because it allows to see if either the own risk is relatively low or the 
risk of the comparison group is estimated comparatively high. 
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makers (lenders and investors) involved in infrastructure PF in Europe", as it is vital that the 
participants understand exactly which group they are supposed to compare themselves to.  
Second, two different kinds of scales are used (Likert and percentage scale) as each type of 
scale entails different disadvantages and advantages53. Unrealistic optimism regarding risk of 
construction time and cost overrun and unrealistic optimism regarding chance of early and 
within budget completion are measured with a percentage scale, unrealistic optimism 
regarding risk of lower than expected future revenues and chance of higher than expected 
future revenues are measured with a 7-point Likert scale. 
In order to test for representative heuristic some research tests for base rate neglect and 
sample size separately (Barberis & Thaler, 2003; Kahneman & Tversky, 1974), others test 
directly for the occurrence of the representative heuristic (Zaiane, 2015). To limit the number 
of items in the survey the direct test is to be used with the question Zaiane (2015) developed. 
To test for overconfidence the three facets illusion of control, miscalibration, and better-than-
average effect need to be measured. 
In order to measure illusion of control, a similar method to that of Vetter et al. (2011) 
is used. Participants are asked four questions, derived from previous overconfidence studies 
and slightly adapted in wording to the domain of infrastructure PF. Answers are measured on 
a 7-point Likert scale. To arrive at a single measure for this facet of overconfidence, the 
answers are averaged across the four questions.  
It is common to test for miscalibration by conducting a calibration study (Vetter et al., 
2011). Calibration studies are “conducted to measure how well participants are aware of 
what they do not know exactly” (Vetter et al., 2011, p. 8). A calibration study entails first 
letting survey participants answer several knowledge questions in their domain, then letting 
                                                 
53 The Likert scale “can create a range restriction, but is less susceptible to innumeracy problems”, compare 
Shepperd et al. (2013, p. 407). The 0-100% scale does not provide range restrictions, however it is reported that 
participants sometimes have problems with this scale due to poor numerical skills, compare Shepperd et al. 
(2013). Thus, one set of questions is asked for each of the two scale types. 
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participants estimate the confidence interval of being right, and finally measuring the 
difference between their estimate and their performance (Vetter et al., 2011). All three steps 
are elaborated in the following. Knowledge is tested by five questions54 from the domain of 
PF55 with a single numerical estimate56 answer for each question (Vetter et al., 2011) e.g. 
“What % amount of PF loans 2016 in EMEA was for projects in the power sector?”. The 
questions were derived from discussions with PF experts. Objectively correct answers were 
derived from the PFI report 2016 and 2017 (Project Finance International, 2017). While 
answering single estimate knowledge questions, the participants have to provide an estimate 
of how sure they are that their answer is right (Klayman et al., 1999; Vetter et al., 2011). A 
common method for this is asking for a confidence range judgement i.e. asking participants to 
provide an interval for each knowledge question, with which they are 90% sure that it will 
contain the right response (Vetter et al., 2011). Finally, the so called hit rate is measured to 
determine how accurate the estimation of the participants was i.e. how often their intervals 
included the right answer (McKenzie et al., 2008). If one of the interval boundaries equals the 
objective correct answer it is counted as a hit. The hit rate then represents reverse 
miscalibration – a low hit rate means the participant is highly miscalibrated. To analyze 
results concerning the hit rate further, also the interval size i.e. the average size of the 90% 
confidence intervals chosen, as well as the interval mistake are measured, as suggested by 
Vetter et al. (2011) and Meyer (2016). The interval mistake is the average distance of the 
interval midpoint and the objectively correct answer (Meyer, 2016; Vetter et al., 2011). 
                                                 
54 Although Klayman et al.  (1999) remarks that it is common to ask 20 to 100 questions, the number of 
questions should be limited to increase the likelihood of achieving a sufficient number of participants. Other 
researchers propose that  “five questions is a sufficient number to get a reliable classification of participants 
based on their degree of miscalibration”, compare Vetter et al. (2011, p. 8). 
55 Instead of choosing an investor and a lender related domain, as Klayman et al.  (1999) state that: ”It is possible 
that larger and more homogeneous sets of questions are less prone to biased information processing”, compare 
Klayman et al. (1999, p. 221). 
56 Another approach is to use two choice questions, compare Klayman et al. (1999), such as “Which kind of 
projects typically run more over budget a) greenfield, b) brownfield”. According to Klayman et al.  (1999), 
questions with a single numerical answer elicit typically larger bias then two-choice questions, thus this study 
will use questions with a single numerical answer. 
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For the better-than-average effect the method used by of Kruger and Dunning (1999) 
and Vetter et al. (2011) is applied. Participants are asked to compare themselves with their 
peers on the performance of the five knowledge questions. This value is then compared to the 
actual performance in the knowledge questions derived in the calibration method described 
above (actual interval errors). 
In the following it is explained how latent independent variables besides the bias are 
measured: (1) incentive system distinctiveness, (2) feedback culture distinctiveness, (3) 
negative experience, (4) regret, (5) subjective knowledge, (6) objective knowledge, and (7) 
experience based knowledge. 
To measure how distinctive the incentive system is, Meyer (2016) poses four questions 
concerning the level of accountability for own decisions and the dependence of own 
compensation, own career path, and success of the company from project success. These exact 
questions are used in this survey. Results from the questions are measured on a 7-point Likert 
scale. To arrive at a single measure an average is taken across the questions.  
In order to test how distinctive feedback culture is, Meyer (2016) poses five questions – also 
here these exact questions are used in this survey, testing how fast feedback from colleagues 
and superiors is delivered, how important feedback from colleagues and superiors is for the 
decision maker, and how important feedback is within the company culture. Results from the 
five questions are measured on a 7-point Likert scale. To arrive at a single measure, an 
average is taken across the five questions. 
The existence of a previous negative experience is tested by asking participants if they 
themselves or a peer had a negative experience (related to their stake in the project e.g. credit 
default for lenders, loss of equity value for investors, project delay for project sponsors) in a 
project they were involved in. The two aspects are each measured on a 7-point Likert scale 
and to arrive at a single measure an average across the two is taken. 
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To measure regret the direct approach is taken, asking respondents if and how much they 
regret a previous decision in the domain of project financing. This is measured on a 7-point 
Likert scale. 
In order to test subjective knowledge the approach suggested by Meyer (2016) is used, asking 
participants to evaluate their own domain related skills, performance, and success compared 
to that of their peers. Results from the questions are measured on a 7-point Likert scale and to 
arrive at a single measure an average is taken. 
The approach suggested by Vetter et al. (2011) is used to assess objective knowledge, using 
the interval error from the calibration study. The interval error is the difference between the 
interval’s midpoint and the true value (Vetter et al., 2011). 
To quantify the experienced based knowledge of a person, again the approach suggested by 
Vetter et al. (2011) is used. Vetter et al. (2011) ask participants about the years of total work 
experience, work experience they have in the specific industry the study is focused on, work 
experience in the relevant task, and their experience with responsibility in that specific task. 
Finally the hierarchy level is measured as an additional indicator of experienced based 
knowledge (Vetter et al., 2011).  
As control variables on the personal level age and gender of the participants was asked for in 
the survey. On company level company age, size, headquarter location, as well as team 
diversity were chosen as control variables. Objective company characteristics (company age, 
company size, headquarter location) are determined through web research and measured as of 
the 31st of June 2017. Through asking participants for their approximate company size, age, 
and the headquarter location, as well as given them the chance to provide their company name 
voluntarily, objective company characteristics can be assigned to participants. Team diversity 
is most often measured in terms of sex, age, ethnicity, education, functional background, and 
several other attributes. In the survey team diversity was tested in terms of the most 
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mentioned aspects from other studies (Jackson, Joshi, & Erhardt, 2003). Therefore, it was 
inquired how diverse the team the individuals are working in is regarding age, culture, 
academic background, and job experience. The aspects are each measured on a 7-point Likert 
Scale. Further the percentage of males in the team is inquired. All five aspects are 
standardized on individual level, to account for the different scales, then the average is taken. 
To ensure high data quality, possible response biases were considered when creating the 
survey: (1) tendency towards the mean, (2) social desirability, and (3) question order effects. 
  By changing the wording of a 7-point Likert’s scale's end points from completely 
agree/completely disagree to agree/disagree, the tendency toward the mean i.e. when 
respondents generally avoid extreme judgments, was counteracted against. 
 Social desirability is the tendency to answer a question in a way that it does not violate 
any social expectations. To avoid this, instructions were provided in the questionnaire 
stressing the scientific importance of honest answers and assurance of complete anonymity. 
 Question order effects are response biases that are due to a question's position within 
the questionnaire. A strategy to reduce ordering effects is the permutation of the order of 
questions and answers (McKenzie et al., 2008) Therefore, whenever possible participants 
were presented with the questions in a random order. 
5.1.2 Measuring the causality in the model of decision maker unrealistic optimism 
Ringle (2004) states that although strictly speaking causality can only be tested by 
observations57, causal models can however be estimated by either a covariance structural 
analysis or the partial least squares-analysis. Since these methods are new, applicability is not 
yet proven. Therefore, in this study a regression is used to measure the causality in the model 
                                                 
57 Using an experimental design with random assignment of participants to the systematically manipulated 
experimental conditions while holding all potential disturbing variables constant is the only scientific way to 
"prove" causality. 
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developed in chapter 4.4 (RQ258). Using a regression allows to measure both independent and 
dependent variables at the same time and derive the causal relationship by logical 
considerations59.  
5.1.3 Measuring the differences between investors and lenders 
To answer RQ360 and test the hypotheses developed in chapter 4.5, participants of the survey 
were asked which stakeholder group they belonged to, with the alternatives private investor, 
public investor, credit sales, credit risk, and other. In a first step, all stakeholders that selected 
“other” needed to be assigned to the relevant group. Seven stakeholders selected “other” as 
category and offered a description, what “other” meant. According to either this description or 
the information provided on the company these stakeholders worked for, they were assigned 
to the relevant stakeholder group. The assignment resulted in the following stakeholder 
groups: lenders n = 67 (credit risk management n = 16, credit sales n = 51), investors n = 35 
(public investors n = 7, private investors n = 28). 
To test Hypothesis 561, independent-samples t-tests and Mann-Whitney U tests were 
performed between lenders and investors on the three different facets of unrealistic optimism 
for which causal drivers are identified. To explain the results on Hypothesis 5, one-way 
Anovas and Kruskal-Wallis tests were performed on the sub-stakeholder groups private 
investor, public investor, credit sales, and credit risk.  
                                                 
58 How do personal and company factors influence heuristics and unconscious bias of infrastructure PF decision 
stakeholders and how do these heuristics and unconscious bias influence the perception of risks and rewards, in 
this study subsumed under “unrealistic optimism”?  
59 Many authors therefore use a correlative approach. However, Vetter et al.  (2011) demand from further 
research “more sophisticated statistical tests should be conducted to analyze not only relationships but also the 
causality between the knowledge and overconfidence variables”, compare Vetter et al. (2011, p. 14). 
60 Are certain stakeholders less biased than other stakeholders and are therefore better equipped to assess risks of 
large European infrastructure projects? Can personal or company related factors be identified to drive differences 
between lenders and investors and made accessible for best practice learning? 
61 Due to their role in PF, lenders are on individual level less unrealistically optimistic than investors. 
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Hypothesis 662, 763, and 864 were tested with independent-samples t-tests and Mann-Whitney 
U tests. To explain the results on Hypothesis 6 and 7 additional correlation analyses with sub-
questions on feedback and incentive system were performed to examine the stakeholder group 
difference also on subcomponents of the incentive and feedback system.  
5.1.4 Building a predictive model of company unrealistic optimism 
The characteristics of companies in terms of three classes of factors (objective company 
characteristics, company overconfidence, and institutional structure) are compared through the 
analysis of variance to identify factors that distinguish companies with above average from 
companies with average and below average levels of unrealistic optimism. Thus, unrealistic 
optimism on company level is used as a dichotomous dependent variable (above/below 
average unrealistic optimism), defined on company level.  
The analysis of company characteristics proposed in chapter 4.6 (RQ465) is performed using 
data from the survey presented above, complemented with company specific data. 
How to measure relevant variables such as aspects of institutional structure (feedback culture 
distinctiveness, incentive system distinctiveness, and subjective knowledge), and 
overconfidence bias (miscalibration, subjective knowledge, and illusion of control) on 
individual level was elaborated in chapter 5.1.1. To get a company's average for these 
variables, an average of the individual employees was taken66. The use of subjective employee 
data might raise concerns – however, previous research has concluded that when asking 
employees not for their personal but rather a general company estimate, the use of subjective 
                                                 
62 Lenders have a more distinct incentive system than investors, the feedback culture of lenders and investors is 
equally distinct. 
63 Lenders and investors have equal levels of subjective, objective, and experienced based knowledge. 
64 Lenders and investors have a similar amount of overconfidence and use the representative heuristic equally 
much. 
65 What are the characteristics of companies that are less unrealistically optimistic than others? 
66 It is worth mentioning that Houghton et al. (2000) recommend not to aggregate individual data but to collect 
data directly from team. Out of practical reasons, it was however decided to go with the aggregation method also 
used by other authors in this field such as McNamara and Bromiley (1997). 
117 
 
 
data is useful for the study of strategic issues (Durand, 2003). While Durand (2003) proposes 
to interview one person per company (CEO), it was decided to exclude all companies from the 
sample where only one individual took part in the survey to account for self-selection bias of 
respondents. 
A limited number of predictors that fulfill the criteria put forward by Nassimbeni (2001) is 
selected (adequate level of significance, no close correlation). Having limited the relevant 
factors, the predictive model is created based on the results of the company comparison 
regarding unrealistic optimism. Goal of the predictive model is to identify which 
characteristics best predict the tendency of a company to be unrealistically optimistic.  
5.2 Population of interest 
The population of interest are (1) lenders, (2) private investors, and (3) public investors active 
in PF decision making in Europe. Relevant decision makers were identified over LinkedIn. 
Those decision makers were chosen whose profile on LinkedIn showed that they were 
currently working in the relevant department of the identified banks and whose business E-
Mail addresses were found online or contact could be established through LinkedIn. 
To identify the relevant population of lenders those banks were targeted that were included in 
the Project Finance International Top 100 ranking 2016 (Project Finance International, 2017), 
had a lead-arranging role in at least one European infrastructure PF deal with debt >75 million 
in 2016, and performed at least 5 PF deals in 2016. This yielded an overall lender population 
of 472 bankers from 45 companies.  
To identify the relevant population for private investors those companies were targeted that 
were included in the 2016 Infrastructure Investor Top 50 ranking (Wang, 2016), have invested 
in infrastructure in Europe, and have participated in PF deals in the past. This yielded an 
overall private investor population of 374 investors from 37 companies.  
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To identify the relevant population for public investors those public departments/institutions 
were targeted that were member of the International Project Finance Association in 2016 and 
that focused on energy and transport/infrastructure, as these are the biggest fields of public 
infrastructure PF projects in Europe as reported in chapter 2.2. This yielded an overall public 
investor population of 45 officials from 11 European public departments/institutions. 
5.3 Description of sample 
The total response rate of the survey is 16.3%, overall 9,8% answered the survey completely. 
This response rate is typical for online survey with E-Mail invitation (Fan & Yan, 2010; Saleh 
& Bista, 2017).  
Before analyzing the data, further quality checks were performed. Of the participants that 
aborted, only the data of those that answered the survey section about unrealistic optimism 
(80% of survey) were used in the analysis, resulting in 102 participants67. It was analyzed if 
any of the participants needed extremely short or extremely long time to answer the survey. 
There are no extreme outliers as reported by visual inspection of boxplots and all completed 
the survey in a time that is realistic. Data entries that were illogical e.g. years of experience of 
taking PF decisions longer than years of experience in PF were corrected by using LinkedIn 
profiles as reference. Missing data entries were imputed with the mean as this is a common 
practice68 (Zhang, 2016). 
The sample distribution over stakeholder groups is not even – therefore the sample is not 
entirely representative of the overall population. The lender and public investor response rate 
                                                 
67 n = 43 were excluded due to early abortion of survey, of which n = 3 did not answer a single question, the rest 
aborted at the following questions: n = 3 at question checking for appropriateness of participants for study, n = 5 
at question about the person’s work experience, n = 6 at question about team characteristics, n = 6 at question 
about incentive system distinctiveness, n =1 at question about feedback culture, n = 8 at question about prior 
project experience, n = 10 at question about the person’s performance, n = 2 at question about illusion of control. 
68 For the following number of participants, data was imputed: representative heuristics n = 2, illusion of control 
n = 2, better-than-average self-assessment n = 14, objective knowledge n = 17, unrealistic optimism risk self 
regarding construction cost and time overrun n = 1, unrealistic optimism risk colleague regarding construction 
cost and time overrun n = 1, unrealistic optimism reward colleague regarding construction cost and time overrun 
n = 1. 
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is about 20%, the private investor response rate 10%. However, there are explanations for the 
comparatively low response rate of private investors. In response to the survey invitation, 
several private investors mentioned that answering survey is against their company policy. 
Further, private investors in the infrastructure field tend to be less specialized on PF, so the 
population contacted might not be entirely exact.  
Table 12: Overview of study participation 
 
  
People contacted People responded   
 
 
Company E-Mail LinkedIn Total 
Complete 
responses Aborted Total 
Brutto response 
rate, percent 
Netto response 
rate, percent 
Lender  45 419 53 472 67 34 101 21.4 14.2 
Private investor  37 345 29 374 16 18 34 9.1 4.3 
Public investor  11 38 7 45 4 6 10 22.2 8.9 
Total  93 802 89 891 87 58 145 16.3 9.8 
           
The analysis of participants that responded to the survey showed that those that aborted the 
survey are not different in contact method (LinkedIn vs. E-Mail), country, or language. The 
number of reminders and the time of participation (T-test of first 51 vs. second 51 answers) 
did not have an influence on the main constructs analyzed69. 
5.4 Test of the causal model of individual decision maker unrealistic optimism 
As described in chapter 2, there is an infrastructure finance gap that needs to be closed in 
Europe. Implementing projects with PF can help to optimize spending und thus contribute to 
close this gap if efficiency gains achieved are higher than the costs of PF. An important 
challenge for lenders and investors in making decisions in the context of infrastructure PF is 
to overcome own biases, as these can lead to perceived risks which differ dramatically from 
actual risks. While there is some literature on biases in the decision making of project 
                                                 
69 For all four facets of unrealistic optimism there is a violation of the normality assumption as reported by the 
Sharpio-Wilk test p < 0.05. Therefore, the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test was run to determine if there 
were differences between the first 51 and last 51 responses. Distributions of optimism variables for first 51 
responses and last 51 responses are similar, as assessed by visual inspection. Median optimism variables are not 
statistically significantly different. 
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planners, no research in the field of infrastructure PF focusses of the decision situation of 
lenders. 
The goal is therefore to answer the research question displayed in Figure 15 below. To answer 
this, a review of the behavioral finance literature was conducted in chapter 4 to create a 
theoretical causal bias model, including all biases applicable to large infrastructure projects 
implemented with PF, as well as relevant influencing factors. 
Figure 14: Unrealistic optimism in PF can lead to over- and underevaluating risks and rewards 
 
In the following, (1) the results of the empirical testing of the model are presented and (2) 
implications for theory and practice discussed.  
5.4.1 Results causal model of individual decision maker unrealistic optimism 
In the following first results regarding (1) unrealistic optimism (H1) as such are presented, 
followed by (2) the results regarding the hypothesized causal relationships (H2-4). 
5.4.1.1 Analysis of unrealistic optimism in infrastructure PF 
To find out if decision making behavior is biased by unrealistic optimism, participants were 
asked to indicate how large the likelihood of experiencing certain events was compared to the 
likelihood for colleagues. Overall there is clear evidence for unrealistic optimism in the 
sample. The risk of a cost/time escalation, as well as the risk of receiving smaller revenues 
than expected is regarded as much smaller than the chance of lower construction cost/less 
construction time, as well as higher revenues. This is consistent with other findings in the 
Source: Adapted from Hampl and Wüstenhagen (2012)
Project finance stakeholder specific decision-making process
Perceived risk
Perceived return
Financial 
decision
Cognitive 
aspects
/
/
Risks
Rewards
RQ2: How do personal and company factors influence heuristics and unconscious biases of 
infrastructure PF decision stakeholders and how do these heuristics and unconscious biases 
influence the perception of risks and rewards, in this study subsumed under “unrealistic 
optimism”?
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literature which state that people see positive events as more likely than negative events 
(Sharot, Riccardi, Raio, & Phelps, 2007). 
Results show that on average decision makers estimate the probability that one of the projects 
they are responsible for right now will face massive time and cost overruns in the future at 
19.29%. The same risk is seen at 23.16% for colleagues. So, the risk of construction time and 
cost overrun is estimated 3.86% higher for colleagues (paired t(101) = -3.047, p = 0.003).  
Results show that decision makers estimate the probability that one of the projects they are 
responsible for right now will deliver less revenues in the future than they estimated on 
average at 3.43 on a 7-point Likert scale. The same risk is seen at 3.53 for colleagues. So, the 
risk of lower than expected future revenues is estimated 0.25 points higher for colleagues 
(paired t(101) = -3.089, p = 0.003). 
Results show that decision makers estimate the probability that one of the projects they are 
responsible for right now will exceed all their expectations by delivering the project faster and 
less expensive on average at 30.7%. The same probability is seen at 31.77% for colleagues. 
So, the chance of faster and less expensive delivery is estimated 1.12% higher for colleagues 
(paired t(101) = -1.289, n.s.70). 
Results show that decision makers estimate the probability that one of the projects they are 
responsible for right now will exceed all their expectations by having higher future revenues 
on average at 3.63 on a 7-point Likert scale. The same probability is seen at 3.53 for 
colleagues. So, the chance of higher than expected future revenues is estimated 0.098 points 
lower for colleagues (paired t(101) = 1.055, n.s.71). 
                                                 
70 p = 0.200. 
71 p = 0.294. 
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5.4.1.2 Analysis of causal relationships  
In the following the results of the regressions are presented that test the hypothesized causal 
relationships for (1) unrealistic optimism regarding chance of early and within budget 
completion, (2) unrealistic optimism regarding chance of higher than expected future 
revenues, (3) unrealistic optimism regarding risk of construction time and cost overrun, and 
(4) unrealistic optimism regarding risk of lower than expected future revenues.   
As a second step, results for the regression on the underlying overconfidence bias is 
presented72.  
First, a multiple regression was run to predict unrealistic optimism regarding chance of early 
and within budget completion from feedback distinctiveness, incentive distinctiveness, better-
than-average self-assessment, miscalibration, illusion of control, and representative heuristic. 
The control variables age, gender, company age, company size, and team diversity were 
omitted as they did not correlate with unrealistic optimism regarding chance of early and 
within budget completion as can be seen in Table 27 in the Appendix. The control variable 
country was also omitted as no significant differences could be found between the different 
countries on the dependent variable73. Prerequisites for using the multiple linear regression 
method are fulfilled74. The multiple regression model does not statistically significantly 
                                                 
72 The results of the representative heuristic are not presented, as this does not influence unrealistic optimism. 
73 Due to violation of normality assumption the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test was performed. Distributions 
of unrealistic optimism regarding chance of early and within budget completion are not entirely similar for the 
different countries, as assessed by visual inspection of a boxplot. Scores are not statistically significantly 
different between the different countries, χ2(11) = 12.170, p = 0.351. 
74 There is linearity as assessed by partial regression plots and a plot of studentized residuals against the 
predicted values. Independence of residuals is also given, as assessed by a Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.660. 
There is homoscedasticity, as assessed by visual inspection of a plot of studentized residuals versus 
unstandardized predicted values. No evidence of multicollinearity is visible, as assessed by tolerance values 
greater than 0.1. The assumption of normality is met, as assessed by a Q-Q Plot. However, there are three 
outliers and three studentized deleted residuals greater than ±3 standard deviations. These outliers have unusual 
but possible values, so they were kept in the analysis. Looking at unusual points, two risky leverage values > 0.2 
became apparent, however no data needed to be removed from analysis as Cook's distance value is not above 1 
for any of these values. 
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predict unrealistic optimism regarding chance of early and within budget completion, F(6, 95) 
= 0.139, p = 0.991. 
Second, a linear multiple regression75 was run to predict unrealistic optimism regarding 
chance of higher than expected future revenues from feedback distinctiveness, incentive 
distinctiveness, better-than-average self-assessment, miscalibration, illusion of control, 
representative heuristic, and experienced based knowledge. The control variables age, gender, 
company age, company size, and team diversity were omitted again as they did not correlate 
with unrealistic optimism regarding chance of higher than expected future revenues, as can be 
seen in Table 28 in the Appendix. The control variable country was also omitted as no 
significant differences could be found between the different countries on the dependent 
variable76. Overall, prerequisites for using the multiple linear regression method are fulfilled77. 
The multiple regression model statistically significantly predicts unrealistic optimism 
regarding chance of higher than expected future revenues, F(6, 95) = 2.833, p = 0.014. R2 for 
the overall model was 15.20% with an adjusted R2 of 9.8%, a below small size effect 
according to Cohen (1988). Only the variable feedback culture distinctiveness adds 
statistically significantly to the prediction, p < 0.050. Regression coefficients and standard 
errors can be found in Table 13. 
                                                 
75 There is the much-debated question if scale variables can be approximated as continuous variables and used in 
a multiple linear regression, or if an ordinal regression needs to be run instead. In this work scales with >12 items 
are treated as continuous (unrealistic optimism regarding future revenues e.g. has 13 possible values: -6-+6), 
therefore a multiple linear regression can be used.   
76 Due to violation of normality assumption the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test was performed. Distributions 
of unrealistic optimism regarding chance of early and within budget completion are not entirely similar for the 
different countries, as assessed by visual inspection of a boxplot. Scores are not statistically significantly 
different between the different countries, χ2(11) = 15.760, p = 0.150. 
77 There is linearity as assessed by partial regression plots and a plot of studentized residuals against the 
predicted values. Independence of residuals is also given, as assessed by a Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.665. 
There is homoscedasticity, as assessed by visual inspection of a plot of studentized residuals versus 
unstandardized predicted values. No evidence of multicollinearity is visible, as assessed by tolerance values 
greater than 0.1. The assumption of normality is met, as assessed by a Q-Q Plot. However, there is one 
studentized deleted residual greater than ±3 standard deviations. This outlier has an unusual but possible value, 
so it was kept in the analysis. Looking at unusual points, two risky leverage values >0.2 became apparent, 
however no data needed to be removed from analysis as Cook's distance value is not above 1 for any of these 
values. 
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Table 13: Summary of multiple regression analysis on unrealistic optimism regarding chance of higher than expected future 
revenues 
 Variable B SEB ß 
Intercept  1.132 0.925  
Feedback culture distinctiveness  -0.267 0.117 -0.240* 
Incentive system distinctiveness -0.023 0.090 -0.026 
Hit rate (reverse miscalibration)  -0.368 0.349 -0.104 
Illusion of control -0.142 0.105 -0.131 
Better-than-average effect -0.009 0.005 -0.180 
Representative heuristic -0.212 0.216 -0.093 
 Note: *p < 0.050; B = unstandardized regression coefficient, SEB = standardized error of coefficient, ß = standardized coefficient  
Third, a multiple regression was run to predict unrealistic optimism regarding risk of 
construction time and cost overrun from feedback distinctiveness, incentive distinctiveness, 
better-than-average self-assessment, miscalibration, illusion of control, representative 
heuristic, and subjective knowledge. The control variables again were omitted as they did not 
correlate with unrealistic optimism regarding risk of construction time and cost overrun as can 
be seen in Table 25 in the Appendix. Prerequisites for using the multiple linear regression 
method are fulfilled78. The control variable country was also omitted as no significant 
differences could be found between the different countries on the dependent variable79. The 
multiple regression model statistically significantly predicts unrealistic optimism regarding 
risk of construction time and cost overrun, F(7, 94) = 2.160, p = 0.045. R2 for the overall 
model is 13.9% with an adjusted R2 of 7.4%, an effect that does not even classify as small 
according to Cohen (1988). Two variables add statistically significantly to the prediction, p < 
0.050, hit rate (reverse miscalibration) and illusion of control. The effect size of hit rate is, 
                                                 
78 There is linearity as assessed by partial regression plots and a plot of studentized residuals against the 
predicted values. Independence of residuals is given, as assessed by a Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.634. There is 
homoscedasticity, as assessed by visual inspection of a plot of studentized residuals versus unstandardized 
predicted values. No evidence of multicollinearity is visible, as assessed by tolerance values greater than 0.1. The 
assumption of normality is met, as assessed by a Q-Q Plot. However, there are four outliers detected by 
standardized residuals and by studentized deleted residuals greater than ±3 standard deviations. All outliers have 
unusual but possible values, so they were kept in the analysis. Looking at unusual points, two risky leverage 
values > 0.2 became apparent, however no data needed to be removed from analysis as Cook's distance value is 
not above 1 for any of these values. 
79 Due to violation of normality assumption the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test was performed. Distributions 
of unrealistic optimism regarding chance of early and within budget completion are not entirely similar for the 
different countries, as assessed by visual inspection of a boxplot. Scores are not statistically significantly 
different between the different countries, χ2(11) = 10.775, p = 0.462. 
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however, nearly three times as big as the effect size of illusion of control. Regression 
coefficients and standard errors can be found in Table 14 below. 
Table 14: Summary of multiple regression analysis on unrealistic optimism regarding risk of construction time and cost 
overrun 
 Variable B  SEB  ß 
Intercept -14.977  13.485   
Feedback culture distinctiveness    -0.873  1.615  -0.058  
Incentive system distinctiveness -0.724  1.256  -0.059 
Hit rate (reverse miscalibration)  11.851  4.816  -0.244* 
Illusion of control -4.196  1.468  -0.284* 
Better-than-average effect -0.024  0.073  -0.036 
Representative heuristic -0.334  2.989  -0.011 
Subjective knowledge -1.133  1.370  -0.083 
 Note: *p < 0.050; B = unstandardized regression coefficient, SEB = standardized error of coefficient, ß = standardized coefficient  
Fourth, a multiple linear regression was run to predict unrealistic optimism regarding risk of 
lower than expected future revenues from feedback culture distinctiveness, incentive system 
distinctiveness, better-than-average self-assessment, hit rate, illusion of control, representative 
heuristic, and subjective knowledge. The control variables were again omitted as they did not 
correlate with unrealistic optimism regarding risk of lower than expected future revenues as 
can be seen in Table 26 in the Appendix. The control variable country was also omitted as a 
significant difference could only be found between decision makers in Germany and France, 
but not between any other of the 12 countries included in the sample80. Prerequisites for using 
the multiple linear regression method are fulfilled81. The multiple regression model 
                                                 
80 Due to violation of normality assumption the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test was performed for all 
countries with more than two participants. Distributions of unrealistic optimism regarding chance of early and 
within budget completion are not entirely similar for the different countries, as assessed by visual inspection of a 
boxplot. Scores are statistically significantly different between the different countries, χ2(11) = 23.870, p = 
0.013. Pairwise comparisons were performed using the Dunn (1964) procedure with a Bonferroni correction for 
multiple comparisons. Adjusted p-values are presented. Values are mean ranks unless otherwise stated. This post 
hoc analysis revealed statistically significant differences in unrealistic optimism scores between Germany 
(80.00) and France (38.64) (p =0 .043), but not between any other group combination including the countries 
Australia, Canada, England, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, USA, South Africa. 
81 There is linearity as assessed by partial regression plots and a plot of studentized residuals against the 
predicted values. Independence of residuals is given, as assessed by a Durbin-Watson statistic of 2.317. There is 
homoscedasticity, as assessed by visual inspection of a plot of studentized residuals versus unstandardized 
predicted values. No evidence of multicollinearity is visible, as assessed by tolerance values greater than 0.1. The 
assumption of normality is met, as assessed by a Q-Q Plot. However, there is one outlier detected by studentized 
deleted residuals greater than ±3 standard deviations. This outlier has an unusual but possible value, so it was 
kept in the analysis. Looking at unusual points, four risky leverage values > 0.2 became apparent, however no 
data needed to be removed from analysis as Cook's distance value is not above 1 for any of these.  
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statistically significantly predicts unrealistic optimism regarding risk of lower than expected 
future revenues, F(7, 94) = 3.402, p = 0.003. R2 for the overall model is 20.2% with an 
adjusted R2 of 14.3%, a small size effect according to Cohen (1988). Two variables add 
statistically significantly to the prediction, p < 0.050 incentive distinctiveness and subjective 
knowledge, with a similar effect size. Regression coefficients and standard errors can be 
found in Table 15. 
Table 15: Summary of multiple regression analysis on unrealistic optimism regarding risk of lower than expected future 
revenues 
 Variable B SEB  ß 
Intercept -1.513 0.812   
Feedback culture distinctiveness  -0.152 0.097  -0.160  
Incentive system distinctiveness -0.273 0.076  -0.357* 
Hit rate (reverse miscalibration)  -0.259 0.290  -0.085 
Illusion of control -0.172 0.088  -0.186 
Better-than-average effect -0.002 0.004  -0.039 
Representative heuristic -0.016 0.180  -0.008 
Subjective Knowledge -0.235 0.083  -0.274* 
 Note: *p < 0.050; B = unstandardized regression coefficient, SEB = standardized error of coefficient, ß = standardized coefficient  
Of the underlying overconfidence bias with its three facets and the representative heuristic, 
only the two overconfidence facets miscalibration and illusion of control were identified as 
enhancing/diminishing factors of unrealistic optimism. Therefore, in the following results on 
enhancing/diminishing factors of (1) miscalibration and (2) illusion of control will be 
presented. 
A cumulative odds ordinal logistic regression with proportional odds was run to determine the 
effect of experienced knowledge on miscalibration. The control variables were omitted as they 
did not correlate with miscalibration as can be seen in Table 29 in the Appendix. Prerequisites 
for using the ordinal logistic regression method are fulfilled82. The final model statistically 
significantly predicts the dependent variable over and above the intercept-only model, χ2(6) = 
                                                 
82 There are proportional odds, as assessed by a full likelihood ratio test comparing the fitted model to a model 
with varying location parameters, χ2(24) = 29.062, p = 0.218. The deviance goodness-of-fit test indicates that the 
model is a good fit to the observed data, χ2(489) = 295.335, p = 1.000, but because of continuous independent 
variables in the equation, many covariate patterns (83%) are missing and thus, many cells have a zero frequency. 
Therefore, the overall goodness-of-fit statistics needs to be treated with suspicion.   
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13.176, p < 0.040. An increase in PF job experience (expressed in years) is associated with an 
increase in hit rate (decrease in miscalibration), with an odds ratio of 0.875, p < 0.050. An 
increase in PF job experience in decision making (expressed in years) is associated with a 
decrease in hit rate (increase in miscalibration), with an odds ratio of 1.157, p < 0.050. As 
suggested by Vetter et al. (2011) a correlation between interval mistake, interval size and 
experienced knowledge was performed in a second step, as can be seen in Table 16. This 
showed that an increase in job experience, as well as PF job experience significantly reduces 
the interval mistake. Further, decision makers with more job experience and PF job 
experience are less insecure and chose smaller intervals. 
Table 16: Pearson’s correlations for interval mistake and interval size 
 Variable 
Interval 
mistake Interval size Hierarchy level 
Years job 
experience 
Years PF job 
experience 
Interval size -83   - -  
Hierarchy level -0.012 -0.108    
Years job experience  -0.252* -0.235* -0.527* -  
Years PF job experience -0.202* -0.198* -0.513* -0.754*  
Years PF decision responsibility -0.181 -0.150 -0.497* -0.717* -0.845* 
Note: *p < 0.050      
A multiple regression was run to predict illusion of control from subjective knowledge. 
Control variables were omitted as they did not correlate with illusion of control as can be seen 
in Table 30 in the Appendix. Prerequisites for using the multiple linear regression method are 
fulfilled84. The multiple regression model statistically significantly predicts illusion of 
control, F(1, 100) = 4.269, p = 0.041. R2 for the overall model is 4.1% with an adjusted R2 of 
3.1%, a below small size effect according to Cohen (1988). The independent variable adds 
                                                 
83 Relationship not linear, therefore Pearson’s correlation not possible. 
84 There is linearity as assessed by partial regression plot and a plot of studentized residuals against the predicted 
values. Independence of residuals is given, as assessed by a Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.490. There is 
homoscedasticity, as assessed by visual inspection of a plot of studentized residuals versus unstandardized 
predicted values. No evidence of multicollinearity is visible, as assessed by tolerance values greater than 0.1. The 
assumption of normality is met, as assessed by a Q-Q Plot. There is one studentized deleted residual greater than 
±3 standard deviations. This outlier was inspected, however it was concluded that it has an unusual but possible 
value, so it was kept in the analysis. There is no value with leverage values > 0.2 or Cook's distance above 1. 
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statistically significantly to the prediction, p < 0.050, regression coefficients and standard 
errors can be found in Table 17 below. 
Table 17: Summary of multiple regression analysis on illusion of control 
 Variable B SEB ß 
Intercept 3.646 0.469  
Subjective knowledge 0.187 0.090 0.202* 
 Note: *p < 0.050; B = unstandardized regression coefficient, SEB = standardized error of coefficient, ß = standardized coefficient  
5.4.2. Discussion causal model of individual decision maker unrealistic optimism 
The use of PF can be way to close the financing gap large infrastructure projects face if the 
assumption holds that the risk transfer from public institutions and corporates to PF 
stakeholders leads to a more efficient project delivery. Although this notion is commonly 
taken for granted, so far research has not sufficiently explored, whether the transfer of 
estimator related risks, namely unrealistic optimism to lenders and investors, really does lead 
to a more realistic assessment of risks or not. Instead, the assumed positive effect from risk 
transferring, has been based on findings from both behavioral economics and studies in other 
industries. Yet it reasonably has not been proven. Especially in times of increasing uncertainty 
in infrastructure projects due to changing user needs and disruptive technologies (Woetzel et 
al., 2017) that should lead to higher probability of bias in decision making, investigating if the 
transfer of estimator related risks provides advantages, however, is vital.  
The goal of this study is therefore to close this gap by answering RQ2: How do personal and 
company factors influence heuristics and unconscious bias of infrastructure PF decision 
stakeholders and how do these heuristics and unconscious bias influence the perception of 
risks and rewards, in this study subsumed under “unrealistic optimism”? To answer this 
research question, a theoretical causal bias model was created from literature, limited to the 
most important aspects through open interviews, and tested using multiple linear and ordinal 
regressions with a dataset collected through a survey with relevant stakeholders. 
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Major findings from the causal model were that overall unrealistic optimism exists in 
infrastructure PF. Furthermore, a number of direct and indirect factors that lead to this 
unrealistic optimism in decision making were identified as can be seen in the figure below. 
Accordingly, directly influencing factors are subjective knowledge on a personal and 
feedback culture/incentive system effectivity on a company level. Additionally, unrealistic 
optimism was influenced by overconfidence bias, which itself was driven by subjective 
knowledge and reduced by experienced based knowledge, both factors on the personal level.  
Figure 15: Resulting causal model 
  
The results of this study are highly relevant considering the current discussion as usually 
researchers have argued that the involvement of an outside view, i.e. lenders and investors, 
gives an important advantage regarding the assessment of revenue and risks of large and 
complex infrastructure projects (Flyvbjerg, 2013). In light of the findings from the model, 
however, this assumed advantage must be questioned – at least in relation to unrealistic 
optimism and the resulting perceptions of risks and rewards. Furthermore, by not only 
demonstrating that unrealistic optimism exists among PF decision makers, but also identifying 
direct and indirect factors that lead to this bias, this research study provides a better 
understanding – both to researchers as to practitioners – of how to influence unrealistic 
optimism. The knowledge gained about causal drivers of unrealistic optimism can be used by 
Personal factors
Company related factors Bias Factorxxx
Unrealistic optimism 
▪ Overestimating chance 
of higher than expected 
future revenues
▪ Underestimating risk of 
lower than expected 
future revenues
▪ Underestimating risks of 
construction time and 
cost overrun
Overconfidence  
bias
▪ Illusion of 
control
▪ Miscalibration
Incentive system 
distinctiveness
Feedback culture 
distinctiveness
Subjective knowledge
Experience based 
knowledge
H2a (-)*
H2b (-)*
H2d (+)*
H4a (+)*
H4c (-)*1
The bigger the bigger(+)
The bigger the smaller(-)
Source: Own illustration
H0
H2d (+)*
H2e (+)*
Statistically significant values are marked with *, level of significance p= 0.05
1 significance of effect has to be seen with caution
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decision makers as a basis to establish a more realistic risk assessment; the unrealistic 
optimism therefore is not an unchangeable characteristic of stakeholders but one that can be 
influenced and thus reduced.  
The table below provide an overview of the results of testing the hypotheses put forward. 
These will be discussed in more detail in the following.   
Table 18: Relevant results causal bias model for decision making in infrastructure PF 
 Hypothesis  
  Confirmation H1 as lenders/investors in PF are overall unrealistically optimistic 
Company 
related 
factors 
 Confirmation H2a as incentive system distinctiveness reduces unrealistic optimism (regarding risk of lower than 
expected future revenues) 
 Confirmation H2b as feedback culture distinctiveness reduces unrealistic optimism (regarding chance of higher 
than expected future revenues) 
Bias and 
heuristics 
 Rejection H2c as representative heuristics has no effect on unrealistic optimism 
 Partly confirmation H2d: the overconfidence facet miscalibration reduces unrealistic overconfidence, the illusion 
of control facet increases unrealistic optimism, and the better-than-average effect has no impact on 
overconfidence (unrealistic optimism regarding risk of construction time and cost overrun) 
Personal 
factors 
 Confirmation H2e as subjective knowledge increases unrealistic optimism (regarding risk of lower than expected 
future revenues) 
 H3a, H3b: Hypothesis not tested as H1c was not confirmed 
 Confirmation H4a: Subjective knowledge increases overconfidence (illusion of control) 
 H4b: Hypothesis not tested as like shown in H1d, the better-than-average effect has no significant influence on 
unrealistic optimism   
 Partly confirmation H4c as PF job experience reduces miscalibration, however PF decision making job experience 
increases miscalibration 
 
A major result of this study is that not only project insiders but also people with an outside 
view on projects like PF decision makers are subject to unrealistic optimism in the 
infrastructure project industry, and thus subconsciously add estimator related risks to the 
equation. This result is both surprising and expectable at the same time. Advocates of PF will 
find it surprising, having reasoned that PF provides a benefit also regarding risk assessment. 
Critics on the other hand will have expected support for their belief that implementing 
projects with PF creates no advantage overall. With the scientific data for this specific field 
now available due to the survey conducted for this study, the applicability of unrealistic 
optimism in the infrastructure industry could be proven. However, it must be kept in mind that 
estimator related risks concern only the unconscious decision process. It is still possible that 
lenders and investors provide better risk assessment than project insiders such as project 
planners due to their higher motivation to control risks. 
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Taking a closer look at the specific industry in focus, the overall unrealistic optimism of 
lenders and investors is not surprising as literature has reported this bias for developers in this 
industry before (Flyvbjerg et al., 2009), and as institutions such as the World Bank have 
committed to experiencing this bias within their institution (World Bank, 2006). The theorem 
of Kahneman and Tversky (1982) states that if faced with uncertainty decision makers are 
more likely to fall prey to cognitive biases in their decision-making process. The fact that 
lenders and investors in European infrastructure PF are overall unrealistically optimistic 
seems therefore likely specific to the infrastructure industry, that is characterized with high 
uncertainties, especially in the field of PF. At this moment speculative, but nevertheless 
possible, a conclusion might be that decision makers that are uncommonly optimistic are 
attracted by the infrastructure field with its high uncertainty, for instance because they are 
subject to illusion-of-control and therefore believe they can control the uncertainty and risk 
involved in this industry.   
Besides industrial characteristics two alternative explanations stand out. First, since the 
focus of this study is European infrastructure PF decision makers, it is possible that the overall 
unrealistic optimism in general is driven by Western culture. In previous studies, authors 
reported that people from Western cultures are more likely subject to unrealistic optimism 
than people from Eastern cultures, namely Japan (Chang, Asakawa, & Sanna, 2001; Rose, 
Endo, Windschitl, & Suls, 2008). Second, it is also possible that not all stakeholders are 
similarly unrealistically optimistic, but that e.g. the low unrealistic optimism of the lenders 
was outweighed by the high unrealistic optimism of investors. This will be tested in the next 
chapter of this work. 
The finding that PF stakeholders are optimistic is important, as it shows that not only 
planners and project managers, but also the decision makers that evaluate the project at a later 
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stage are unrealistically optimistic85. Thus, PF does not per se mean that outsiders assess 
projects and the involved risks objectively. For an infrastructure project this can mean that 
there is a systematically wrong allocation of risk probabilities (Böttcher & Blattner, 2013; 
Flyvbjerg et al., 2014) as well as late response to warning signs when a project is already 
running (Haji-Kazemi, Andersen, & Klakegg, 2015; Meyer, 2016). Thus, an efficient risk 
transfer cannot be guaranteed. This puts the argumentation that PF does not only relieve the 
public budgets but also minimizes risks by involving outsiders with additional expertise into 
perspective. Potentially the relieve of the public budget might be acquired through transferring 
risks to parties that underestimate them unconsciously. However, as pointed out above it is 
possible that lenders and investors provide a more realistic risk assessment due to their higher 
motivation to control risks. Further, involving PF decision makers might also lead to a more 
realistic assessment as their different perspective can might lead to a more realistic discussion 
if risks with project insiders such as project planners. 
Furthermore, the potential positive effects of unrealistic optimism should not be 
neglected. According to Shepperd et al. (2013) these are greater goal persistence, positive 
affect, and hope. To which amount and in which stages of a project these effects influence risk 
and reward perception is to be investigated. Future research should therefore focus on both the 
negative and positive effects of unrealistic optimism in infrastructure. 
This study identified several factors directly or indirectly influencing the described unrealistic 
optimism. This is important because knowledge about influencing factors is an important 
means to reduce the bias, thus to control estimator related risks. From the causal model it can 
be derived that there is no driver that influences all different facets of unrealistic optimism on 
individual level. Instead, (1) company factors (incentive and feedback culture distinctiveness), 
                                                 
85 However, as planners were not tested in this study, it is possible that lenders and investors are less extreme 
in their unrealistic optimism. 
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(2) other biases (overconfidence), and (3) personal factors (subjective knowledge) are found 
to influence different aspects of unrealistic optimism. 
It is especially interesting and unexpected to see that the two company factors feedback and 
incentive system diminish only the facet of unrealistic optimism regarding the risk of lower 
than expected future revenues of projects, but not the risk of costs and time overruns. This is 
surprising because based on existing literature, incentive systems as well as feedback systems 
should affect both the revenue and the cost/time assessment. According to Tetlock and Kim 
(1987), for example, distinctive incentive systems should make decision making less biased in 
general as decision makers are more motivated to think critically and to make accurate 
choices. Regarding feedback systems, general decision accuracy has been found to relate to 
more distinct feedback systems as it leads to people subconsciously trying to avoid own 
disappointment when their outcomes fall short behind their predictions (Shepperd et al., 
1996).  
Potentially this overall curious finding can be explained by the important role of future 
revenues in the infrastructure PF industry. Revenues have a high impact on overall NPV of a 
project and often determine the success of an investment, as they in contrary to construction 
time and costs occur over a long period of time. At the same time revenues of infrastructure 
projects are often uncertain and dependent on individual politician’s decisions. Thus, it may 
be that within this industry the focus of feedback and incentive systems lies more on revenues 
than on construction time and costs.  
A different explanation might be that depending on contracting, rewards and risks 
might have a lesser impact on stakeholders than revenues. An alternative explanation could be 
that decision makers’ construction cost/time and revenue assessments respond differently to 
feedback and incentive systems. Whether any of this is the case in infrastructure projects 
remains to be evaluated. 
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The finding overall indicates that unrealistic optimism is not strictly rooted within the 
individual decision maker but can be influenced by institutions and companies through the 
institutional environment the decision makers is in.  
An additionally unexpected finding of this study is that the representative heuristic does in 
fact not influence unrealistic optimism in infrastructure PF. This goes against previous 
research focused on other industries, which indicates that the use of the representative 
heuristic is one of the key factors which leads decision makers to unrealistic optimism 
(Shepperd et al., 2002; Weinstein, 1980). According to Weinstein (1980), when estimating the 
exposure to a risk or reward compared to that of another project/person, often, the self-chosen 
comparison target is a stereotype that does not represent the objective statistical average target 
resulting in a faulty comparison that can cause high or low unrealistic optimism.  
Furthermore, in expert interviews performed exploratively prior to the survey, the 
representative heuristic was named by all interview partners as a possible subconscious 
influential factor for their decisions. Despite the theoretical and practical seeming relevance, 
however, in this study neither the suspected negative nor an - unexpected - positive 
impingement on unrealistic optimism could be detected.  
A possible explanation for this divergent finding is that due to the unique characteristic 
of each individual large infrastructure project and the different stakeholders involved in each 
project, decision makers do not compare projects to past failures and therefore do not fall prey 
to representative heuristic. Alternatively, taking the awareness of the interview partners 
towards representative heuristic into account, another possible explanation for its missing 
impact on decisions could be that being aware of this problem or being trained in handling 
this heuristic prevents being trapped in it (Kaustia & Perttula, 2009). Third, one should be 
careful not to let representative heuristic itself transfer findings from e.g. the Weinstein study 
to fields that are not comparable.  
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While the representative heuristic does not have any impact on unrealistic optimism in this 
study, unrealistic optimism concerning costs and time overruns, on the other hand, is impacted 
by different facets of the overconfidence bias. Specifically, the facets illusion of control as an 
enhancing factor and miscalibration as a diminishing factor influence the level of unrealistic 
optimism. However, the overconfidence bias relates only to the assessment of risks and not 
rewards, and only to construction cost/time and not to revenues. This can be explained by the 
higher uncertainty of construction costs and completion time, compared to revenue, of 
infrastructure projects stemming from complicated stakeholder interfaces in the construction 
phase. This higher uncertainty increases the probability of falling prey to biases (Kahneman 
& Tversky). An alternative explanation is that there is simply more room for biases regarding 
cost and time overrun in the construction phase, as due diligences used in the project 
evaluation often focus more on the revenue side. 
Focusing on the facets of overconfidence, only illusion of control is identified in this study as 
factor that enhances unrealistic optimism. The enhancing influence of illusion of control is 
underlined by previous research, e.g. Shepperd et al. (2002). Already in 1980, Weinstein 
demonstrated that people tend to be more optimistic about future events that they believe they 
can control.  
The second facet of overconfidence, the better-than-average effect, does not have any 
effect on unrealistic optimism in this study. This was also expected, as this replicates recent 
findings (Meyer, 2016). 
Contrary to what Meyer (2016) found for the real estate industry, however, in this 
study miscalibration has a diminishing effect on unrealistic optimism, with a three times 
stronger effect on unrealistic optimism than illusion of control. This is a surprising finding 
that calls for further examination, as it implies that decision makers that expressed unjustified 
certainty in the accuracy of their estimations are less unrealistically optimistic, while those 
that place justified certainty in the accuracy of their prediction are more prone to unrealistic 
136 
 
 
optimism. With the lack of further information, explanations can only be speculative. 
Presuming that inaccuracy in estimations is followed by negative feedback, one can imagine 
that those decision makers, who were inaccurate in their estimations previously, might be 
more careful when assessing risks and thus tend to be less unrealistically optimistic. This 
remains to be examined.    
Besides company related factors there are two personal factors, subjective and experienced 
based knowledge, that were identified to have an influence on unrealistic optimism in the 
infrastructure industry. Experienced based knowledge has an indirect diminishing effect on 
optimism due to its effect on overconfidence. This is consistent with the finding of Vetter et 
al. (2011), who describe that experienced knowledge leads to lower overconfidence levels. 
The finding that subjective knowledge is directly related to overconfidence and unrealistic 
optimism is also consistent with what several researchers concluded (Carlson et al., 2009; 
Vetter et al., 2011). Vetter et al. (2011) explain that decision makers with high subjective 
knowledge often are victims of illusion of control because they are unlikely to consult others 
in their decision making and base their decision only on self-assessed knowledge. The same 
explanation should hold for the relationship of subjective knowledge and unrealistic 
optimism.  
In the following the (1) theoretical and (2) practical contributions are presented, (3) 
limitations are named, and finally (4) a brief outlook is given. 
5.4.2.1 Theoretical contributions 
This work tests the applicability of hypotheses derived from existing literature to a new field 
of industry and to new stakeholder groups that have not be examined before. By testing 
hypotheses that were previously tested in different decision situations, the findings of this 
study not only represent a practical-relevant application, but also a robustness check of 
previous theory. Specifically, the study adds to current discussions within the field of (1) 
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literature about behavioral decision making in projects, (2) PF literature in general, and (3) 
literature about behavioral decision making concerning bias management. The more detailed 
contribution per literature stream is summarized in the following. 
The literature concerned with the reductionist school of thought about behavioral decision 
making in projects, presented in chapter 4.3.2.1, analyses deviations from rational decisions 
that stem from bias. While studies in this field have brought about many interesting insights 
on what kind of different biases represent a deviation from the rational decision maker, these 
biases have mostly been tested empirically with students and not industry relevant decision 
makers such as lenders and investors. Thus, an important gap to close within this literature 
stream, has been to test the applicability and generalizability of findings from previous 
research to a different decision situation. This study represents a first attempt at closing this 
gap by demonstrating that indeed behavioral finance models can be applied to infrastructure 
PF decision making, yet need modifications. Causal connections between both company and 
personal factors, and unrealistic optimism that were found in other industries apply also in the 
field of large infrastructure PF. Furthermore, knowledge types known to influence facets of 
overconfidence for IT projects do also hold for infrastructure projects, such that this finding 
seems to be generalizable. However, a major modification to previous models seems to be the 
relatedness of other biases and heuristics to unrealistic optimism. Especially the influence of 
the representative heuristic on unrealistic optimism seems to differ by industry and is not 
transferable without questioning. Further, an additional contribution can be made in terms of 
measuring unrealistic optimism. In certain decision situations unrealistic optimism has several 
different facets that need to be examined individually. While previous literature sometimes 
distinguishes only between the facets regarding rewards and risks, in infrastructure project 
finance decision situations these also need to be distinguished between cost 
overrun/construction time and revenues. So instead of the commonly used two facets, in this 
decision situation there are four relevant facets of unrealistic optimism. These facets are 
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driven by different factors in terms of incentive system distinctiveness, feedback culture 
distinctiveness, illusion of control, and subjective knowledge. This more distinctive way of 
measuring unrealistic optimism highlights the potential problem that previous findings about 
unrealistic optimism cannot necessarily be applied to different facets of this bias that exist in 
different decision situations. 
This paper also adds to PF literature in general, presented in 2.1.2.1, by contributing to both, 
the finance and management literature stream in this research area. Specifically, this study 
opens the discussion about the mitigation of estimator related risks, that has been missing so 
far. While previous research that concerns itself with the potential upsides and downsides of 
PF mentions lenders with regard to risk mitigation, specifically the mitigation of estimator 
related risk has not received any attention up to this date. A main contribution to both these 
substreams is the result that not only planners and project managers but also the decision 
makers that evaluate the project at a later stage are unrealistically optimistic. That means that 
not only project insiders, but also people with an outside view on projects, e.g. like PF 
decision makers, are subject to unrealistic optimism and thus subconsciously add estimator 
related risks to the equation. These results are highly relevant as currently Flyvbjerg (2013) 
argues that the involvement of an outside view i.e. lenders and investors, gives an important 
advantage regarding the assessment of revenue and risks of large and complex infrastructure 
projects. The results put this argumentation that PF minimizes risks by involving outsiders 
with additional expertise into perspective. However, it is possible that outsiders, even though 
they are subject to biases, provide more realistic project risk assessments than insiders due to 
their higher motivation to control risks and their complementing perspective.   
Finally, findings contribute to the bias management literature. As highlighted in chapter 
4.3.2.4, the influence of institutional factors on biases of individuals is not completely known 
and unintended outcomes are possible. Applying the learning of behavioral finance to this 
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new context, this work currently represents the only one that develops a causal model (RQ2) 
that differentiates between personal factors, organizational factors, and other biases/heuristics 
as enhancing/diminishing factors of individual unrealistic optimism. Feedback culture and 
incentive system distinctiveness both showed to have a diminishing effect on unrealistic 
optimism, indicating that management can influence decision making of the individual. 
5.4.2.2 Practical contributions 
Lessons learned from the findings are that it is indeed an important challenge for lenders and 
investors to overcome own biases when making decisions in the context of PF.  
The identification of factors that enhance/diminish unrealistic optimism can serve to create 
awareness in companies and individuals that are likely to be victim of unrealistic optimism in 
high uncertainty decisions. The finding that stakeholders in European infrastructure PF are 
unrealistically optimistic relativizes the anticipation that by using PF automatically a more 
realistic assessment of risk and rewards also in large infrastructure projects is generated. 
Together with the identification of several causal driving/reducing factors of unrealistic 
optimism there are now two main streams of practical contributions. 
For the assessment which organizational structure (private, public, or PPP project 
ownership; project, corporate/public, or asset finance) is applicable for a certain project, it is 
important to know that sharing estimator related risks with lenders and investors does not 
diminish the risks automatically.  
Further by shedding light on the estimator related risks that exist among lenders and 
investors in this sector, this work lays the foundation to controlling this risk. At the same time 
the identification of factors that enhance/diminish unrealistic optimism with these 
stakeholders, provides first measures both on a personal and a systemic level to control the 
risk. 
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Companies should be aware of the phenomenon unrealistic optimism in the assessment of 
risks and rewards and of its causal drivers and reducers, and address them in their debiasing 
workshops. Further companies need to be careful to recruit and staff people with high 
subjective based knowledge on projects, where the correct assessment of risks and rewards is 
vital. Companies should install distinctive feedback and incentive systems, as well as ensure 
that each project team has at least one experienced decision maker from the industry when it 
comes to assessing risks and rewards. Additionally, companies should be aware that a big data 
environment can drive subjective knowledge. Finally, until its non-influence in large 
infrastructural projects is causally examined companies should not completely neglect 
representative heuristic as decision bias. 
5.4.2.3 Limits  
Limitations of the model, measuring model, and data captured are explained in the following. 
However, the positive aspects of the chosen study design should compensate for these 
limitations. The study uses appropriate industry specific decision makers from different 
stakeholder groups, and the approach as well as survey questions are based on best practice 
from previous research. 
This model of unrealistic optimism has naturally limits as a complete theory of behavioral 
finance in PF decision making. Due to the design of the study, the influence of the unrealistic 
optimism on the actual decision making is for example not captured. However, this has 
already been shown in previous studies, e.g. by Heaton (2002) and Baker and Nofsinger 
(2002), who state that the decision making is less critical and can lead to wrong decisions. 
Important other factors to be weighted in, but left out in the model due to the focus on the 
reductionist view, are factors such as asymmetric information. 
Each measurement approach has its limitations. The most important points are summarized in 
the following. Only a limited number of questions was used to increase the participant group 
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by reducing the expected time needed to participate. However, questions were used from best 
practice of previous studies in this field. Further, participants consciously participated in the 
study, thus their awareness might have reduced the unconscious bias measured. Nevertheless, 
causal effects should still be the same.  
Further, due to the limited sample size of 102 participants, the number of variables for the 
regressions needed to be limited. With a larger sample size, it would have been thinkable to 
include additional control variables. Further it is thinkable that only unrealistically optimistic 
people answered the survey and those that are not optimistic did not. However due to the 
representativeness of the sample regarding other factors this seems unlikely.  
 5.4.2.4 Outlook 
Considering that up to now research in behavioral finance regarding unrealistic optimism 
covers either its occurrence with a focus on industries/decision situations or its drivers without 
taking into view the special features of different industries, the field of what remains to be 
done is wide. At the same time the capital flow is enormous and needs to be put on safer 
grounds. Therefore, further investigation in this area is highly important. 
The generalizability of two hypotheses put forward in the discussion above should be 
examined. In chapter 5.4.2.1 it was proposed that the infrastructure industry might attract 
unrealistically optimistic decision makers. If a cross industry comparison could prove this, it 
might be beneficial to involve real industry outsiders into projects. Further the proposition that 
more experienced decision makers are better decision makers regarding unrealistic optimism, 
put forward in chapter 5.4.2.1, should be tested. In addition to testing the two hypotheses, an 
investigation of the cultural influence on unrealistic optimism might be extremely helpful for 
companies in the process of teambuilding, since teams nowadays can be multicultural.  
Moreover, the influence of company factors on unrealistic optimism should be investigated 
further. It became apparent that it might be possible for companies to put systems into place 
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that reduce estimator related risks regarding future revenues. It should therefore be tested if 
companies with more distinct feedback and incentive systems should overall have more 
realistic decision makers. Further, since recruiting and company specific aspects might differ 
between industries and companies, it should be investigated if there are differences in 
unrealistic optimism and its drivers for different stakeholder groups such as investors and 
lenders.  
In addition to this, the representative heuristic has no relevance for the risk and reward 
assessment in this study. If this can be confirmed for other decision situations, a closer look 
should be taken into the reasons for it. Is the kind of investigated industry with its singularities 
the reason for this finding? Or do companies already effectively tackle this problem by 
debiasing decision makers?  
In terms of applicability it should be tested if the model developed in this study is applicable 
for other stakeholders in infrastructure PF, e.g. developers, planners, and consultants. Another 
question is if the model is also applicable in other geographies, other industries, and other 
decision situations. Finally, it should be tested how a relevant model would look like on team 
level. An elaboration of the model would for instance be a closer look at both the positive and 
negative aspects of unrealistic optimism, which could be helpful to get better idea of the 
overall effect estimator related risks have in PF in this special industry.  
5.5. Testing difference in unrealistic optimism between lenders and investors 
In chapter 4.4 a causal model of PF decision maker unrealistic optimism was developed. 
However, the question remains if all stakeholder groups are equally unrealistically optimistic. 
If lenders are identified as stakeholder group less affected by estimator related risk, it would 
mean that PF in fact had an advantage over public or corporate finance since by involving 
lenders not only a monitoring partner is gained, but estimator related risks would be controlled 
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by a stakeholder that can manage it better (contracting theory, resource based view of the 
firm). 
In chapter 4.5 hypotheses were developed concerning differences in unrealistic optimism and 
drivers of the difference in unrealistic optimism, answering RQ2: Are certain stakeholders less 
biased than other stakeholders and are therefore better equipped to assess risks of large 
European infrastructure projects? Can personal or company related factors be identified to 
drive differences between lenders and investors and made accessible for best practice 
learning? 
In the following, using the data from the causal model Anovas were performed to compare 
whether the different stakeholder groups are significantly different on “unrealistic optimism“. 
Also, an analysis of variance was performed for the enhancing and diminishing factors in the 
causal model to show what causes the difference between the groups. 
5.5.1 Results difference in unrealistic optimism between lenders and investors 
Overall the results indicate no significant difference between lenders and investors on 
unrealistic optimism regarding risk of construction time and cost overrun, as well as 
unrealistic optimism regarding risk of lower than expected future revenue. However, lenders 
seem to be more affected than investors by unrealistic optimism regarding chance of higher 
than expected future revenues.86 In the following, detailed results for all three facets of 
unrealistic optimism and their enhancing/diminishing factors are presented: (1) unrealistic 
optimism regarding risk of construction time and cost overrun (2) unrealistic optimism 
regarding risk of lower than expected future revenue, and (3) unrealistic optimism regarding 
chance of higher than expected future revenues.  
First, focus is on the causal relationship highlighted in Figure 16.  
                                                 
86 Unrealistic optimism regarding chance of higher than expected future revenues was not tested as no drivers 
were identified in the causal model. 
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Figure 16: Focus on unrealistic optimism regarding risk of construction time and cost overrun 
 
An independent-samples t-test was run to determine if there are differences in unrealistic 
optimism regarding risk of construction time and cost overrun between lenders and investors.  
Prerequisites are only partly fulfilled. There are outliers in the data, as assessed by inspection 
of a boxplot, however these resulted from the calculation of the variable87. As measurement 
error and data entry error can be ruled out, outliers are genuinely unusual values that should 
not be excluded. Scores for each stakeholder group are not normally distributed, as assessed 
by Shapiro-Wilk's test (p < 0.050) and kurtosis/skewness z-scores not within ± 3.2988. As 
independent-samples t-tests are robust towards violation of normality, further prerequisites 
were tested. There is homogeneity of variances, as assessed by the Levene's test for equality 
of variances (p = 0.386). Data is presented as mean ± standard deviation. As mentioned in 
chapter 4, unrealistic optimism regarding risk of time and cost overrun for individuals 
themselves and colleagues is measured on a percentage scale, resulting in a scale from -99 to 
99 for the bias. The test shows that lenders seem to be more unrealistically optimistic (4.21 ± 
14.34) than investors (3.24 ± 9.66) regarding risk of construction time and cost overrun, the 
                                                 
87 The variable was calculated by subtracting the risk for the survey participant from the risk the participant 
allocated to colleagues. No extreme outliers are present in these variables. 
88 This can potentially result in biased significance of the test. However, both distributions were skewed in a 
similar manner (both positively skewed), reducing the severity of this risk. The critical value of 3.29 is 
recommended by Tabachnick and Fidell  (2007). 
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difference of 0.97 is however not significant (95% CI, -4.28 to 6.23), t(100) = -0.367, p = 
0.714.  
Because of the violation of the normality assumption in the t-test, the non-parametric 
Mann-Whitney U test was run complimentary. Prerequisites for this test are fulfilled. 
Distributions of unrealistic optimism regarding risk of construction time and cost overrun for 
lenders and investors are similar, as assessed by visual inspection. Median unrealistic 
optimism regarding risk of construction time and cost overrun for lenders (0) and investors (0) 
is not statistically significantly different, U = 1211.500, z = 0.077, p = 0.939.  
To explain results, group comparisons were performed on sub-stakeholder level. A 
one-way Anova was conducted to determine if there are differences between credit risk 
management (n = 16), credit sales (n = 51), public investors (n = 7), and private investors (n = 
28). Prerequisites are only partly fulfilled. There are outliers, as assessed by inspection of a 
boxplot, however, as for the previous tests it was concluded that these data points were 
genuinely unusual but possible values that should not be excluded. The data is also not 
normally distributed for each group, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk’s test (p <  0.05) and 
kurtosis/skewness z-scores not within ± 3.29, however, the one-way Anova is reported to be 
robust against violations of this assumption (Laerd Statistics, 2017). There is homogeneity of 
variances, as assessed by Levene's test of homogeneity of variances (p = 0.304). The test 
shows a tendency of the lender subgroups credit risk management (3.3 ± 6.8) and credit sales 
(4.6 ± 15.9) to be more unrealistically optimistic regarding risk of construction time and cost 
overrun than private investors (2.3 ± 8.1). Most unrealistically optimistic in this study are 
public investors (5.7 ± 15.1). However, the difference between these stakeholder groups is not 
statistically significant, F(3,98) = 0.249, p = 0.862. Reason for this can be the small sample 
size in the different groups. 
Because of the violation of the normality assumption in the one-way Anova, the non-
parametric Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted complimentary to confirm the results. 
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Distributions of unrealistic optimism regarding risk of construction time and cost overrun are 
not entirely similar for the four groups, as assessed by visual inspection of a boxplot. Scores 
are not statistically significantly different between the different stakeholder groups, χ2(3) = 
0.114, p = 0.990.  
Despite there being no statistically relevant difference on unrealistic optimism regarding risk 
of construction time and cost overrun, it was further analyzed if there were differences in the 
enhancing/diminishing factors (1) illusion of control and (2) miscalibration. The aim of this 
was to identify if the stakeholders can learn from each other on these dimensions.  
As illusion of control is an enhancing factor of unrealistic optimism regarding risk of 
construction time and cost overrun, an independent-samples t-test was run to determine if 
there were differences in illusion of control between lenders and investors (measured on a 7-
point Likert Scale). Prerequisites for this analysis are partly fulfilled. There are no extreme 
outliers in the data, as assessed by inspection of a boxplot. Illusion of control scores are 
normally distributed for investors, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test (p > 0.050), but not for 
lenders. Skewness z-scores for lenders are within ± 3.29, however kurtosis z-scores are 3.66 
and violate normality. There is homogeneity of variances, as assessed by Levene's test for 
equality of variances (p = 0.136). Illusion of control for lenders (4.56 ±0.97) is lower than for 
investors (4.68 ± 0.64), however, the difference of -0.12 is not significant (95% CI, -0.48 to 
0.23), t(100) = -0.689, p = 0.493.  
Because of the violation normality assumption in the t-test, a Mann-Whitney U test 
was run. Distributions of illusion of control for lenders and investors are similar, as assessed 
by visual inspection. Median illusion of control for lenders (4.50) and investors (4.59) is not 
statistically significantly different, U = 1306.000, z = 0.724, p = 0.469. 
As enhancing factor of illusion of control, differences in subjective knowledge were also 
investigated. Both normality assumption as reported by Sharpio-Wilk’s test p < 0.050 and 
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kurtosis z-scores for lenders not within ± 3.29, as well as equality of variance assumption as 
reported by Welch’s test are violated. Therefore, a Mann-Whitney U test was run to determine 
if there are differences in subjective knowledge between lenders and investors. Distributions 
of subjective knowledge for lenders and investors are similar, as assessed by visual inspection. 
Median subjective knowledge scores for lenders (5.00) and investors (5.33) are not 
statistically significantly different, U = 1308.500, z = 0.747, p = 0.455. 
As miscalibration is the second enhancing factor of unrealistic optimism regarding risk of 
construction time and cost overrun, an independent-samples t-test was run to determine if 
there are differences in hit rate (reverse miscalibration, measured on a scale from 0 to 1) 
between lenders and investors. Prerequisites for this analysis are fulfilled89. Hit rate for 
lenders (0.35 ± 0.26) is lower than for investors (0.39 ± 0.26), the difference of -0.04 is 
however not significant (95% CI, -0.15 to 0.06), t(100) = -0.804, p = 0.423.  
As driver of miscalibration differences in experienced based knowledge were investigated 
using an independent-samples t-test. Prerequisites for this analysis are fulfilled90. Experience 
based knowledge for lenders (-0.01 ± 0.80) shows to be lower than for investors (0.02 ± 0.95), 
the difference of -0.03 is however not significant (95% CI, -0.38 to 0.32), t(100) = -0.179, p = 
0.858. 
After showing that there are no significant differences between stakeholders in unrealistic 
optimism regarding risk of construction time and cost overrun and it’s enhancing/diminishing 
factors, now focus is placed on unrealistic optimism regarding risk of lower than expected 
future revenue, as highlighted in Figure 17. 
                                                 
89 There are no outliers in the data, as assessed by inspection of a boxplot. Hit rate scores are normally distributed 
as assessed by skewness/kurtosis z-scores within ± 3.29. There is homogeneity of variances, as assessed by 
Levene's test for equality of variances (p = 0.620). 
90 There are no outliers in the data, as assessed by inspection of a boxplot. Experience based knowledge scores 
are normally distributed as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test (p > 0.050). There is homogeneity of variances, as 
assessed by Levene's test for equality of variances (p = 0.261). 
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Figure 17: Focus on unrealistic optimism regarding risk of lower than expected future revenue 
 
A Mann-Whitney U test was run to compare lenders and investors on unrealistic optimism 
regarding risk of lower than expected future revenues91 (measured on an ordinal scale from -6 
to +6). Distributions of unrealistic optimism regarding risk of lower than expected future 
revenues for lenders and investors are similar, as assessed by visual inspection. Median 
unrealistic optimism regarding risk of lower than expected future revenues for lenders (0) and 
investors (0) is not statistically significantly different, U = 1370.500, z = 1.445, p = 0.146. 
Because only medians could be compared, further analysis using a Kruskal-Wallis test 
was conducted on sub-stakeholder level. Again, distributions of unrealistic optimism 
regarding risk of lower than expected future revenues are not entirely similar for the four 
groups, as assessed by visual inspection of a boxplot. Furthermore, scores are not statistically 
significantly different between the different stakeholder groups, χ2(3) = 4.554, p = 0.208.  
Despite there being no difference in unrealistic optimism regarding risk of lower than 
expected future revenues, it was further analyzed if there are differences in incentive system 
distinctiveness. Already tested above, there is no significant difference between lenders and 
investors on subjective knowledge, which was found not only to be a driver of the illusion of 
                                                 
91 A parametric test was not possible due to violation of normality assumption as reported by Sharpio-Wilk’s test 
p < 0.050 and kurtosis/skewness z-scores not within ± 3.29, as well as the violation of equality of variances as 
reported by Welch’s test. 
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control facet of the overconfidence bias but also drives the risk of underestimating lower than 
expected future revenues directly.  
An independent-samples t-test was run to determine if there are differences in incentive 
system distinctiveness (measured on a 7-point Likert Scale) between lenders and investors. 
Prerequisites for this analysis are fulfilled92. The incentive system of lenders (4.38 ± 0.96) 
seems to be less distinct than that of investors (4.97 ± 1.11), the difference of -0.58 is 
significant (95% CI, -1.00 to -0.17), t(100) = -2.801, p = 0.006.  
Because of the significant difference in the incentive system between the stakeholders, 
while at the same time there is no difference in unrealistic optimism regarding risk of lower 
than expected future revenues, two further analyses were performed. It was first analyzed 
which dimensions of incentive system are different between the two stakeholder groups. 
Second it was analyzed which dimensions of incentive system correlate with unrealistic 
optimism regarding risk of lower than expected future revenues. 
An independent-samples t-test was run to determine if there are differences in 
incentive system components (measured on a 7-point Likert Scale) between lenders and 
investors. Prerequisites are fulfilled93. The incentive system success of company of lenders is 
less distinct (4.40 ± 1.54) than that of investors (5.49 ± 1.37), the difference of 1.09 is 
significant (95% CI, 0.48 to 169), t(100) = 3.566, p = 0.001. The incentive system 
accountability of lenders (5.02 ± 1.18) seems to be less distinct than that of investors (5.08 ± 
1.62), however, the difference of -0.07 is not significant (95% CI, -0.49 to 0.62), t(100) = 
0.235, p = 0.814. The incentive system compensation of lenders seems to be less distinct (3.88 
                                                 
92 There were no extreme outliers in the data, as assessed by inspection of a boxplot. Incentive system 
distinctiveness scores for each stakeholder group were normally distributed, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test 
(p > 0.050). There was homogeneity of variances, as assessed by Levene's test for equality of variances (p = 
0.161). 
93 All four dimensions compensation, career path, success of company, and accountability violate the normality 
assumption, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test (p > 0.050) however not by kurtosis/skewness z-scores. There is 
homogeneity of variances, as assessed by Levene's test for equality of variances (p > 0.050). 
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± 1.68) than that of investors (4.51 ± 1.92), however, the difference of 0.64 is not significant 
(95% CI, -0.12 to 1.39), t(100) = 1.680, p = 0.084. The incentive system career path of lenders 
seems to be less distinct (4.23 ± 1.40) than that of investors (4.78 ± 1.75), however, the 
difference of 0.55 is not significant (95% CI, -0.07 to 1.18), t(100) = 1.749, p = 0.083.  
With only success of company differentiating significantly between the stakeholder 
groups, it was further analyzed which dimension correlated most with unrealistic optimism 
regarding risk of lower than expected future revenues. A Pearson’s correlation test was 
performed that showed that only career path and accountability that are not significantly 
different between lenders and investors, correlate with unrealistic optimism regarding risk of 
lower than expected future revenues. However, correlation is only small according to Cohen 
(1988). Results can be found in the table below.  
Table 19: Pearson’s correlations for unrealistic optimism regarding risk of lower than expected future revenues and 
incentive system dimensions 
 Variable 
Unrealistic 
optimism risks 
of future 
revenues Compensation Career path 
Success of 
company 
Compensation -0.108   - - 
Career path -0.197* -0.589*   
Success of company  -0.086 -0.227* -0.253* - 
Accountability -0.238* -0.236* -0.138 -0.056 
Note: *p < 0.050     
 
Finally, in the following focus is placed on determining if there are differences in the causal 
relationship of the third facet of unrealistic optimism, as highlighted in Figure 18. 
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Figure 18: Unrealistic optimism regarding chance of higher than expected future revenues 
 
An independent-samples t-test was run to determine if there are differences in unrealistic 
optimism regarding chance of higher than expected future revenues (measured on an ordinal 
scale from -6 to +6) between lenders and investors. Prerequisites for this analysis are partly 
fulfilled. There are outliers in the data, as assessed by inspection of a boxplot. As 
measurement error and data entry error could be ruled out, it was decided not to exclude these 
outliers. Scores for each stakeholder group are not normally distributed, as assessed by 
Shapiro-Wilk's test (p < 0.050) and kurtosis/skewness z-scores not within ± 3.2994. However, 
as the independent-samples t-test is somewhat robust against violations of normality further 
prerequisites are tested. There is homogeneity of variances, as assessed by Levene's test for 
equality of variances (p = 0.691). Lenders are more unrealistically optimistic regarding chance 
of higher than expected future revenues (0.25 ± 0.87) than investors (-0,16 ± 1.01), the 
difference of 0.48 being significant (95% CI, 0.03 to 0.79), t(100) = -2.149, p = 0.034. 
Because of the violation of the normality assumption in the independent-samples t-test 
with distributions skewed in a different manner, the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test was 
run complimentary. Prerequisites for this test are fulfilled. Distributions of unrealistic 
optimism regarding chance of higher than expected future revenues for lenders and investors 
                                                 
94 Both distributions are skewed in a different manner (lenders positively skewed, investors negatively skewed), 
increasing the risk of a biased significance level. 
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are similar, as assessed by visual inspection. Median unrealistic optimism regarding chance of 
higher than expected future revenues for lenders (0) and investors (0) is not statistically 
significantly different, U = 1058.500, z = -1.198 p = 0.231. 
To explain results, group comparisons were performed on sub-stakeholder level. A 
one-way Anova was conducted to determine if there are differences in unrealistic optimism 
regarding chance of higher than expected future revenues between credit risk management (n 
= 16), credit sales (n = 51), public investors (n = 7), and private investors (n = 28). There are 
outliers, as assessed by boxplot, however these points are possible values and thus kept in the 
sample. The data is not normally distributed for each group, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk’s 
test (p < 0.050) and kurtosis/skewness z-scores; but there is homogeneity of variances, as 
assessed by Levene's test of homogeneity of variances (p = 0.291). Scores decrease from 
lenders to investors, with credit risk management (0.31 ± 0.87), credit sales (0.25 ± 0.87), 
public investors (-0.14 ± 0.38), and private investors (-0.25 ± 1.11), but the differences 
between these sub-stakeholder groups is not statistically significant, F(3, 98) = 2.272, p = 
0.085. 
Because of the violation normality assumption in the one-way Anova, the non-
parametric Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to confirm the results. Distributions of 
unrealistic optimism regarding chance of higher than expected future revenue are not entirely 
similar for the four groups, as assessed by visual inspection of a boxplot. The scores for 
unrealistic optimism regarding chance of higher than expected future revenues are not 
statistically significantly different between the different stakeholder groups, χ2(3) = 3.629, p = 
0.304.  
As feedback culture distinctiveness is a diminishing factor of unrealistic optimism regarding 
chance of higher than expected future revenues, an independent-samples t-test was run to 
determine if there are differences in feedback culture distinctiveness (dimensions measured on 
a 7-point Likert Scale) between lenders and investors. Prerequisites for this analysis are 
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fulfilled95. The feedback system of lenders proves to be less distinctive (5.29 ± 0.89) than that 
of investors (5.69 ± 0.68), the difference of -0.40 is significant (95% CI, -0.74 to -
0.06), t(100) = -2.357, p = 0.020.  
Due to this surprising result, comparisons on the individual dimensions of feedback 
culture distinctiveness were run. The two dimensions feedback importance colleagues and 
feedback importance superiors violate the normality assumption, as assessed by Shapiro-
Wilk's test (p < 0.050) and kurtosis/skewness z-scores not within ± 3.29. Due to differences in 
sample size the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test was run. Distributions of compensation 
for lenders and investors are not similar for feedback importance colleagues and feedback 
importance superiors, and feedback culture company. Feedback importance superiors scores 
for lenders (mean rank = 52.02) and investors (mean rank = 50.58) is not statistically 
significantly different, U = 1168.500, z = -0.250, p = 0.802. However, feedback importance 
colleagues scores for lenders (mean rank = 47.22) and investors (mean rank = 58.01) are 
statistically significantly different, U = 1480.500, z = 2.019, p = 0.043.  
The three dimensions feedback speed colleagues, feedback speed superiors, and 
feedback culture company are normally distributed as assessed by skewness/kurtosis z-scores 
within ± 3.29. Therefore, an independent-samples t-test was run to determine if there are 
differences in these feedback system components between lenders and investors. Prerequisites 
are fulfilled. The feedback culture company of lenders proves to be less distinct (5.18 ± 1.46) 
than that of investors (6.08 ± 0.98), the difference of 0.90 is significant (95% CI, 0.41 to 
1.38), t(100) = 3.699, p = 0.000. The feedback speed colleagues of lenders seems to be less 
distinct (4.94 ± 1.44) than that of investors (5.32 ± 1.03), however, the difference of 0.39 is 
not significant (95% CI, -0.15 to 0.92), t(100) = 1.438, p = 0.154. Also the feedback speed 
                                                 
95 There are no extreme outliers in the data, as assessed by inspection of a boxplot. Feedback distinctiveness 
scores for investors are normally distributed, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test (p > 0.050), for lenders the 
Sharpio-Wilk’s test is violated, but kurtosis/skewness z-scores are within ± 3.29, thus normality is given. There 
is homogeneity of variances, as assessed by Levene's test for equality of variances (p = 0.294). 
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superiors of lenders seems to be less distinct (4.82 ± 1.38) than that of investors (5.03 ± 1.24), 
the difference of 0.21 is again not significant (95% CI, -0.33 to 0.76), t(100) = 0.773, p = 
0.441.  
With only feedback importance colleagues and feedback culture company 
differentiating significantly between the stakeholder groups, it was further analyzed which 
dimension correlated most with unrealistic optimism regarding chance of higher than expected 
future revenues. A Pearson’s correlation test was performed96 that shows that feedback speed 
colleagues and superiors, feedback importance colleagues, and feedback culture in the 
company correlate with unrealistic optimism regarding chance of higher than expected future 
revenues. Results can be found in the table below. However, only feedback speed colleague 
has a moderate correlation with unrealistic optimism regarding the chance of higher than 
expected future revenues. 
Table 20: Pearson’s correlations for unrealistic optimism regarding chance of higher than expected future revenues and 
feedback system dimensions 
5.5.2 Discussion difference in unrealistic optimism between lenders and investors 
As mentioned already in previous chapters, it is out of question that an infrastructure 
investment gap exists in Europe. PF might be a way to close this gap. However, the current 
debate presented in chapter 2 questions if private capital, as it is the case in PF, should be used 
for public infrastructure. Reasons for this are the among others complexity and high cost of 
                                                 
96 The test assumes bivariate normal distribution, is however somewhat robust to deviations from normality, so 
the variables feedback importance colleagues/superiors was also included. A Spearman's rank-order correlation 
gave a nearly identical result. 
 Variable 
Unrealistic 
optimism  
chance 
future 
revenues 
Feedback speed 
colleagues 
Feedback speed 
superiors 
Feedback 
importance 
colleagues 
Feedback 
importance 
superiors 
Feedback speed colleagues -0.301*   -  - 
Feedback speed superiors -0.209* -0.593*    
Feedback importance 
colleagues -0.288* -0.102 -0.127  - 
Feedback importance superiors -0.024 -0.131 -0.222* -0.405* - 
Feedback culture company -0.195*  0.436* -0.383* -0.260* -0.248* 
Note: *p < 0.050      
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PF (Yescombe, 2013) that might not be outweighed by efficiency savings and savings due to 
risk transfer (Hodge & Greve, 2007). The goal of this chapter was to answer RQ3 by 
conducting group comparisons: Are certain stakeholders less biased than other stakeholders 
and are therefore better equipped to assess risks of large European infrastructure projects? Can 
personal or company related factors be identified to drive differences between lenders and 
investors and made accessible for best practice learning? 
Neither for unrealistic optimism regarding risk of construction time and cost overrun nor 
unrealistic optimism regarding risk of lower than expected future revenues statistically 
relevant differences between the stakeholder groups lenders and investors can be found, 
although the incentive system of lenders is less distinct than that of investors when it comes to 
the importance that is placed on “success of company”. However, this study can identify 
lenders as being more unrealistically optimistic than investors in terms of unrealistic optimism 
regarding chance of higher than expected future revenues. Yet, this result needs to be viewed 
with caution due to the violation of the normality assumption in the independent-samples t-
test. Although the significane level might be biased the finding is strengthened by the 
detection of a statistically significant lower feedback importance from colleagues for lenders 
than for investors. At the same time the finding is surprising, as assumptions driven from 
literature pointed to lenders as being more reliable in the assessing of risks and rewards. In the 
following there is a short description of the results concerning the hypotheses put forward:   
 Rejection H5, as lenders and investors as well as sub-stakeholder groups are equally 
unrealistically optimistic regarding risk of construction time and cost overrun, as well as 
risk of lower than expected future revenues, and lenders are even more unrealistically 
optimistic regarding chance of higher than expected future revenues 
 Rejection H6a/H6b, as lenders have a less distinctive feedback and incentive system than 
investors 
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 Confirmation H7, as lenders and investors have equal levels of subjective and experienced 
based knowledge  
 Confirmation H8, as lenders and investors have a similar amount of overconfidence 
(miscalibration and illusion of control) 
As mentioned above, investors have on average more distinct incentive and feedback systems 
than lenders, this difference however mostly exists in aspects of the systems, that do not 
influence unrealistic optimism.   
Why would a lender’s feedback and incentive system be less distinct than that of 
investors regarding large infrastructural projects? A possible explanation is that investors are 
more motivated in the long run to monitor projects as their potential upward benefit of a 
project (Ehlers, 2014) is much larger than the one of lenders. 
The finding that the institutional structure is different for different stakeholder groups 
means that these stakeholder groups can learn from each other. Incentive systems should be 
focused on accountability and career path, while feedback systems should be focused on 
speed, importance placed on colleague’s feedback and the overall feedback culture to 
effectively influence unrealistic optimism. 
Following the hypothesis H4 put forward above, lenders were expected to be less 
unrealistically optimistic than investors. Further, in principle, private investors compared to 
public investors should have a higher motivation to avoid risks and a better way to diversify 
risks if they are properly identified. So, it would be expected that private investors are less 
unrealistically optimistic than public ones. These expectations had to be rejected. Lenders and 
investors are equally unrealistically optimistic regarding risk of construction time and cost 
overrun and regarding risk of lower than expected future revenues, and there is no significant 
difference between private and public investors. For unrealistic optimism regarding risk of 
construction time and cost overrun public investors have the highest average unrealistic 
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optimism, however differences between stakeholders are not significant. This can be 
explained by the lack of significant difference in overconfidence (miscalibration and illusion 
of control) between the stakeholder groups, which drives unrealistic optimism regarding risk 
of construction time and cost overrun. The fact that there is no difference in the facets of 
overconfidence can be explained by the fact that there is no difference in the drivers of 
overconfidence (subjective knowledge and experience based knowledge) between the 
stakeholder groups. So potentially lenders and investors hire similar profile employees and 
thus have employees which are equally likely to be unrealistically optimistic. 
Also concerning unrealistic optimism regarding risk of lower than expected future 
revenues there were no differences between the stakeholder groups. This can be explained by 
a lack of difference in the incentive system dimensions accountability and career path that 
have a diminishing effect on unrealistic optimism regarding risk of lower than expected future 
revenues.  
The finding that there is no significant difference between lenders and investors across 
unrealistic optimism regarding risk of construction time and cost overrun as well as unrealistic 
optimism regarding risk of lower than expected future revenues means that lenders are not 
subject to lower estimator related risks than investors. Lenders can thus generally speaking 
not always fulfill their monitoring role when it comes to assessing project proposals with risk 
assessments of unrealistically optimistic developers and investors. 
Beyond the causal drivers of unrealistic optimism this finding can further be explained 
by the fact that potentially one cannot really differentiate between these two stakeholder 
groups in terms of employees’ education and knowledge. A fluctuation of employees between 
the lending and investing company branches, as well as access to and use of similar training 
systems is possible.      
The finding that there is no significant difference between the investor subgroup public 
investors and the three lender/investor private sector subgroups across unrealistic optimism 
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regarding risk of construction time and cost overrun and across unrealistic optimism regarding 
risk of lower than expected future revenues means that private actors can misjudge risks as 
well as the than public ones. This finding is underlined by Vaaler and McNamara (2004), who 
reject the common hypothesis that experts are generally unbiased in their decision making. 
Although lower estimator related risk can therefore not be weighed in as an advantage when 
considering involving the private sector in a project, higher motivation of the private sector 
might lead to more diligent risk assessment. Further, the private sector capital is needed to 
close the infrastructure finance gap, especially in times of a public debt brake. 
Alternatively, the finding could be explained by the small sample size in the 
stakeholder subgroups. Beyond the causal drivers of unrealistic optimism and the small 
sample size this finding can further be explained by the fact that the infrastructure industry 
differs in many characteristics from other sectors in which lenders and investors work. 
Therefore, the difference that is suggested in literature both between private and public 
investors as well as between lenders and investors simply does not apply in this industry.  
But what makes the infrastructure industry different? As mentioned in chapter 2, 
governments quite often intervene by providing guarantees and other financial support when 
projects run into financial difficulties (Heath & Read, 2014) and thus risks are not fully 
transferred to the private sector, as initially intended. An example of this is the UK 
government providing financial support for the underground PPPs signed in 2003, when these 
ran into financial distress (Shaoul, Stafford, & Stapleton, 2012). Such a course of action runs 
the risk that lenders and investors rely on the government in case of financial distress and 
therefore assess risks less accurate. This would mean that governments should interfere less, if 
they want PF to have the intended effects in the long run.   
Lenders are more unrealistically optimistic regarding chance of higher than expected future 
revenues. Between the subgroups of lenders and investors different severities of unrealistic 
optimism could be found, with public investors being most and private investors least 
159 
 
 
unrealistically optimistic. However, due to the small sample sizes in the subgroups no 
statistical significance could be detected.  
Overall the difference between lenders and investors is clearly driven by the less 
distinct feedback system of lenders in the dimensions feedback importance colleagues and 
feedback culture company.  
This finding means that these dimensions of the feedback system can be used to 
improve assessing risk. Lenders should learn from investors’ best practices to be able to avoid 
assessing rewards too optimistically. The fact that this structural factor can explain the 
stakeholder group difference further means that public sector institutions can in principle 
introduce the same best practice institutional structure as private companies. However, due to 
the specific characteristics of the public sector with civil servant culture and election periods, 
public institutions might have difficulties to implement these institutional structures.  
In the following the (1) theoretical and (2) practical contribution presented, (3) limitations 
named, and finally (4) a brief outlook is given. 
5.5.2.1 Theoretical contributions 
Up to this date, this is the first work that compares infrastructure PF lenders to investors 
regarding their unrealistic optimism in risk and reward assessment to identify stakeholder 
group specific biases and enable learning from industry specific best practice. As mentioned 
in chapter 4, four literature streams are relevant regarding cognitive aspects, perceived risk, 
and decision making in PF: (1) literature about behavioral decision making in projects, (2) PF 
literature in general, (3) literature about factors affecting risk assessment, and (4) literature 
about behavioral decision making concerning bias management. The findings gained from the 
comparison of lenders and investors have important theoretical contributions and fill gaps in 
all but the stream about behavioral decision making. In the following these contributions are 
highlighted per research stream. 
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Previous management literature in the field of PF, as introduced in chapter 2.1.2.2 and 4.3.2.2, 
has not shown who can bear estimator related risks best, and how to control these risks. By 
comparing lenders and investors this dissertation closes the gap and adds to the findings of 
Flyvbjerg (2014) on investor unrealistic optimism in large infrastructure projects by showing 
that not only investors are unrealistically optimistic but also lenders. At the same time, the 
theory of Flyvbjerg (2013) that outsiders get decisions right needs to be questioned. Lenders 
are involved in projects typically later as investors, so they should have more of an outside 
view – still they are not less unrealistically optimistic. 
Further, the findings also contribute to the literature about factors affecting risk assessment. 
This literature stream, as presented in chapter 4.3.2.3, places a focus on individual effects on 
risk assessment, focusing especially on credit risk assessment. However, up to this date no 
study was conducted with PF lending officers and their PF credit decision situation. The 
findings presented above show that PF credit risk assessment, exactly like commercial credit 
assessment, is indeed influenced by biases. While one must be cautious to transfer behavioral 
decision-making findings to new decision situations, the PF credit and commercial credit 
situation seem to be similar in terms of leaving room for unconscious biases.   
The bias management literature focuses on how companies can prevent biased decision 
making, as explained in chapter 4.3.2.4. However, the influence of institutional factors on the 
decision making of the individual remains somewhat a gap in this literature field. By not only 
looking at institutional factors on a general level but measuring them on a very detailed level, 
this work closes the gap concerning the impact incentive and feedback system have on 
decision making involving risk. 
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5.5.2.2 Practical contributions 
This effort enables a better awareness for misjudgments based on seemingly common 
knowledge and reveals means to improve the risk assessment performance on both the 
investor and lender side. 
Companies and public institutions should keep in mind that the assessment of risks and 
rewards can neither be transferred unquestioned to a specific stakeholder group nor to a 
specific subgroup, as all involved groups are subject to estimator related risk. This means that 
also when assessing the monitoring role of lenders and their role as an evaluator of a project’s 
financial viability as an advantage of PF, their potential unrealistic optimism must be kept in 
mind. 
Lenders should, to fulfill their monitoring role, not assume that they are less prone to 
unrealistic optimism. Instead banks should use their institutional environment to reduce bias. 
In terms of the institutional structure lenders can learn from investors with regard to the 
feedback system in the dimensions feedback importance colleagues and feedback culture 
company. Further, they can conduct bias trainings to create more awareness, and account for 
biases to a certain extend in their risk estimates.     
Lessons learned from the findings are further that overall feedback system and incentive 
system distinctiveness have a reducing impact on estimator related risk. In specific, 
companies should increase the speed with which feedback is delivered, the importance their 
employees place on their colleagues’ feedback, as well as the overall feedback culture in the 
company. In terms of the incentive system, companies should place high importance on how 
the success of the individual influences her or his career advancement, as well as on the 
individuals feeling of accountability for her or his actions. 
162 
 
 
The impact an institutional environment has on decision making further highlights the 
importance for public institutions to have a distinctive feedback and incentive system to profit 
from private sector best practices.   
5.5.2.3 Limits  
Besides the limitations of the causal model already named in chapter 5.4.2.3, the model itself 
and the measurement model have certain limitations that are explained in the following.  
Not captured in this causal model are factors besides the feedback and the incentive system 
that might distinguish lenders and investors, e.g. the recruiting process. Further, the influence 
of unrealistic optimism on actual decision making is not measured in the causal model. An 
additional limitation is that the motivation to assess risks and the unrealistic optimism were 
not tested simultaneously, so actual risk assessment quality could not be compared. Finally, it 
can be argued that the model only focuses on the individual decision-making process, while 
e.g. loan decisions often involve group decision making.  
Naturally the measurement approach has its limitations. The stakeholder group was only 
measured at the current point of time. It was not captured if lenders had previously worked as 
investors and via versa. Further only the formal role of the decision makers was tested and not 
if e.g. as investors they had performed “lender like” deals and vice versa.  
The limited sample size of 102 participants, which is unevenly distributed among the different 
stakeholder groups could potentially have influenced significance levels of the tests 
performed.   
5.5.2.4 Outlook 
The significant difference between stakeholders on specific dimensions of the company 
factors feedback culture and incentive system show that it should be worth investigating 
differences on company level additionally to the here examined stakeholder level. The great 
heterogeneity in the stakeholder groups that were the focus of this chapter might come from 
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the fact that every company is different, e.g. companies in the same industry and function can 
be differentiated by their incentive system.  
5.6. Testing company influence on individual decision making  
Companies involved in infrastructure PF lending and investing activities face the challenge to 
provide an institutional environment that prevents biased decision making. To identify a 
pattern that allows to predict which kind of companies provide an institutional setting that 
fuels decision maker unrealistic optimism, it is important to identify characteristics of 
companies that tend to be above average respectively below average unrealistically optimistic. 
These characteristics can further show companies what they can do to prevent biases rather 
than to cause them. Previous research did not touch upon these characteristics, neither in an 
evaluating, a predicting, nor a learning-from-best-practice context. Therefore, goal of this 
section is to answer RQ4: What are the characteristics of companies that are less 
unrealistically optimistic than others? 
To answer this research question, possible characteristics that differentiate biased and non-
biased companies were presented in chapter 4.5. In the following, these characteristics in 
terms of three classes of factors (objective company characteristic, overconfidence, and 
institutional characteristics) are compared through the analysis of variance. Since the focus in 
this chapter lies on the overall performance of companies, in the following it is the companies, 
that will be called unrealistically optimistic or not, knowing that in a literal sense a company 
of course cannot be unrealistically optimistic. Unrealistic optimism on company level is used 
as dichotomous dependent variable (above/below average unrealistic optimism), defined on 
company level (average of at least two employees). A limited number of predictors that show 
an adequate level of significance and are not correlated (Nassimbeni, 2001) is selected. In a 
final step the predictive model is created to identify which characteristics best predict the 
tendency of a company to be unrealistically optimistic. 
164 
 
 
5.6.1 Results company influence on individual decision making 
The comparison of above and below average unrealistic optimistic companies revealed several 
significant differences regarding (1) chance of early and within budget completion, (2) risk of 
construction time and cost overrun, and (3) risk of lower than expected future revenues. These 
will be presented in detail the following.  
Companies with above average unrealistic optimism regarding chance of early and within 
budget completion typically have a less distinct feedback system than those with below 
average unrealistic optimism regarding this facet.  
Companies with above average unrealistic optimism regarding risk of construction time and 
cost overrun typically are younger, smaller, have higher illusion of control on company level 
as well as a more distinct incentive system than those with below average unrealistic 
optimism regarding this facetuns. Companies with above average illusion of control in turn 
have higher subjective knowledge that those with below average illusion of control. Those 
companies with a greater standard deviation of their employees on unrealistic optimism 
regarding risk of construction time and cost overrun typically are younger, smaller and have 
higher illusion of control (and those that have no standard deviation have lower illusion of 
control than those with deviation). 
Companies with above average unrealistic optimism regarding risk of lower than expected 
future revenues typically are younger than those with below average unrealistic optimism 
regarding risk of lower than expected future revenues. 
However, the predictive models for unrealistic optimism regarding chance of early and within 
budget completion, risk of construction time and cost overrun, and risk of lower than expected 
future revenues with above factors were statistically not significant. Most likely this is due to 
the small sample size of N = 17.  
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In the following detailed results of statistical tests concerning first the comparison of above 
and below average optimistic companies followed by the predictive models are provided.  
5.6.1.1 Description of the relevant subsample 
The relevant sample for this chapter was extracted from the sample described in chapter 5.3 of 
this work. 23 individuals had to be removed from the sample of 102, as they did not provide 
their company name and no name could be assigned to them. 26 individuals (lenders n = 16, 
private investors n = 7, public investors n = 3) did not provide their company name, however 
it could be deferred from other information provided in the survey such as stakeholder group, 
headquarter location, and company size. Only those companies were used in the sample, 
where responses from at least two employees were available.  
In the following a comparison of the relevant subsample, with the full sample in chapter 5.3 
can be seen:  
Table 21: Comparison of sample and subsample 
 Number companies Number individuals 
Full sample chapter 
5.3 and 5.4 41 102 
Relevant sample 
chapter 5.6 17 55 
  
To show if the subsample is representative for the sample, analysis of variances was 
performed between the 55 individuals in the subsample and the 47 individuals excluded from 
the subsample on all the relevant variables97. Depending on the data characteristics Mann 
Whitney U-tests and independent t-tests were used. The analysis did not show any significant 
difference between the subsample and the individuals not included in the subsample. 
                                                 
97 Dependent variables as well as independent variables team diversity, feedback culture distinctiveness 
incl. subcategories, incentive system distinctiveness incl. subcategories, company size, company age, 
hitrate, average subjective knowledge, better-than-averageself-assessment, illusion of control. 
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5.6.1.2 Analysis of the difference in variance 
Companies were grouped in above and below average on the four facets regarding unrealistic 
optimism: (1) unrealistic optimism regarding chance of early and within budget completion, 
(2) unrealistic optimism regarding chance of higher than expected future revenues, (3) 
unrealistic optimism regarding risk of construction time and cost overrun, and (4) unrealistic 
optimism regarding risk of lower than expected future revenues. Of the seventeen companies, 
one was grouped above average on all four dimensions, two were grouped above average on 
three dimensions, eight were grouped above average on two dimensions, four were grouped 
above average on one dimension, and two were always grouped below average. 
In a second step it was analyzed if the groups were significantly different regarding 
institutional structure (feedback culture distinctiveness, team diversity, subjective knowledge, 
and incentive system distinctiveness), objective company characteristics (company age and 
company size), and overconfidence on company level (miscalibration and illusion of control). 
In the following, only the statistically significant differences will be reported. 
The institutional structure element feedback culture distinctiveness, singled out as only 
characteristic that differentiates companies with above and below average unrealistic 
optimism regarding chance of early and within budget completion. Prerequisites for non-
parametric tests are not fulfilled98, therefore a Mann-Whitney U test was run. Distributions of 
feedback culture distinctiveness are not similar, as assessed by visual inspection. Distribution 
of feedback culture distinctiveness is significantly different between above average (mean 
rank 6.95) and below average unrealistic optimistic companies (mean rank 11.93) U = 
55.500, z = 2.017, p = 0.043. Because a parametric test was not possible on feedback culture 
distinctiveness, further tests were conducted on the five different aspects of feedback culture 
distinctiveness (feedback speed colleagues/superiors, feedback importance 
                                                 
98 There is no normal distribution according to kurtosis/skewness z-scores not within ± 3.29 and there is 
one extreme outlier. 
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colleagues/superiors, and feedback culture company). Prerequisites for an independent t-test 
are fulfilled, however no significant differences could be found99. 
Statistical tests yielded no significant differences between companies that are above and 
below average on unrealistic optimism regarding chance of higher than expected future 
revenues.  
Concerning the third facet of unrealistic optimism several significant differences could be 
found between the groups concerning (1) company age, (2) company size, (3) incentive 
system distinctiveness, and (4) illusion of control.   
An independent-samples t-test showed that there were differences in company age 
between companies whose employees are above and below average on unrealistic optimism 
regarding risk of construction time and cost overrun. Prerequisites for this test are partly 
fulfilled. There is one extreme outlier in the data, as assessed by inspection of a boxplot. 
However, this point is unusual but possible, so it was kept in the analysis. Company age 
scores are normally distributed as assessed by kurtosis/skewness z-scores within ± 3.29. There 
is homogeneity of variances, as assessed by Levene's test for equality of variances (p = 0.330). 
Companies with above average unrealistic optimism regarding risk of construction time and 
cost overrun are younger (1988.2 ± 16.46) than companies with below average optimism 
(1942.83 ± 67.97), the difference of 45.37 years is significant (95% CI, 0.36 to 
90.37), t(13.504) = 2.170, p = 0.048.  
A Welch t-test showed that there are differences in company size between companies 
whose employees are above and below average on unrealistic optimism regarding risk of 
construction time and cost overrun. Prerequisites for this test are fulfilled100. Companies with 
                                                 
99 Feedback speed colleagues t(15) = -2.015, p = 0.062; feedback speed superiors t(15) = -1.696, p = 0.110, 
feedback importance colleagues t(15) = 0.584, p = 0.568, feedback importance superiors t(15) = 1.095 p = 
0.291, feedback culture company t(15) = -1.777, p = 0.096. 
100 There is no outlier in the data, as assessed by inspection of a boxplot. Company size scores are normally 
distributed as assessed by kurtosis/skewness z-scores within ± 3.29. There is no homogeneity of 
variances, as assessed by Levene's test for equality of variances (p = 0.008). 
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above average unrealistic optimism regarding risk of construction time and cost overrun are 
smaller in terms of the number of employees (8,339.2 ± 8,223.45) than companies with below 
average unrealistic optimism (52,455.33 ± 63,212.86), the difference of -44,116.13 employees 
is significant (95% CI, -84,728.44 to -3,503.83), t(11.858) = -2.370, p = 0.036.  
An independent samples t-test showed that there are differences in incentive system 
distinctiveness (measured on a 7-point Likert Scale) between companies whose employees are 
above and below average on unrealistic optimism regarding risk of construction time and cost 
overrun. Prerequisites for this test are fulfilled101. Companies with above average optimism 
regarding risk of construction time and cost overrun seem to have a more distinctive incentive 
system (5.49 ± 0.80) than companies with below average optimism (4.56 ± 0.64), the 
difference of 0.93 is significant (95% CI, -0.15 to 1.71), t(15) = 2.547, p = 0.022. Because this 
outcome stands in contrast to the individual effect that was found in the previous chapter, 
independent samples t-tests were performed on the four different elements of the incentive 
systems: (1) the level of accountability for own decisions and the (2) dependence of own 
compensation, (3) own career path, and (4) success of the company of project success. 
Prerequisites are fulfilled102. Companies with above average unrealistic optimism regarding 
risk of construction time and cost overrun can neither be differentiated on accountability t(15) 
= 0.435, p = 0.669, nor on success of the company t(15) = 0.461, p = 0.652. However, 
statistical significant differences can be found on the other two aspects of incentive system 
distinctiveness. Companies with above average unrealistic optimism regarding risk of 
construction time and cost overrun have an incentive system that places higher importance on 
compensation (5.73 ± 0.81) than companies with below average unrealistic optimism 
regarding risk of construction time and cost overrun (4.09 ± 0.80), the difference of 1.65 is 
                                                 
101 There is no outlier in the data, as assessed by inspection of a boxplot. Average incentive scores are 
normally distributed as assessed by kurtosis/skewness z-scores within ± 3.29. There is homogeneity of 
variances, as assessed by Levene's test for equality of variances (p = 0.416). 
102 There are no extreme outliers in the data and the data is normally distributes as assessed by the 
Sharpio Wilk test. 
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significant (95% CI, 0.73 to 2.55), t(15) = 3.865, p = 0.002. Second, companies with above 
average unrealistic optimism regarding risk of construction time and cost overrun further have 
an incentive system that places higher importance on career path advancement (5.67 ± 1.02) 
than companies with below average unrealistic optimism regarding risk of construction time 
and cost overrun (4.12 ± 1.01), the difference of 1.55 is significant (95% CI, 0.40 to 
2.70), t(15) = 2.880, p = 0.011. 
An independent-samples t-test showed that there are differences in average illusion of 
control between companies whose employees are above and below average on unrealistic 
optimism regarding risk of construction time and cost overrun. Prerequisites for this test are 
fulfilled103. Companies with above average unrealistic optimism regarding risk of construction 
time and cost overrun seem to have higher illusion of control (5.27 ± 0.66) than companies 
with below average optimism (4.50 ± 0.61), the difference of 0.76 is significant (95% CI, -
0.06 to 1.47), t(15) = 2.300, p = 0.036. Further, an independent-samples t-test showed that 
there are differences in subjective knowledge between companies whose average employees 
are below average in company illusion of control and those who are above average on illusion 
of control. Prerequisites for this test are fulfilled104. Companies with above average illusion of 
control have higher subjective knowledge (5.57 ± 0.47) than companies with below average 
optimism (4.96 ± 0.46), the difference of -0.61 is significant (95% CI, -1.10 to -0.13), t(15) = 
-2.696, p = 0.017.  
To complete this section, companies were grouped in above and below average regarding 
unrealistic optimism’s fourth facet i.e. the risk of lower than expected future revenues. Here 
only one detected difference was statistically significant as shown by an independent-samples 
                                                 
103 There is no outlier in the data, as assessed by inspection of a boxplot. Average incentive scores were 
normally distributed as assessed by kurtosis/skewness z-scores within ± 3.29. There is homogeneity of 
variances, as assessed by Levene's test for equality of variances (p = 0 .974).  
104 There are no outliers in the data, as assessed by inspection of a boxplot. Average subjective knowledge 
scores are normally distributed as assessed by Sharpio Wilk test. There is homogeneity of variances, as 
assessed by Levene's test for equality of variances (p = 0.984).   
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t-test, namely the objective company characteristic company age. Prerequisites for this test are 
partly fulfilled. There is one extreme outlier in the data, as assessed by inspection of a 
boxplot. However, this point is unusual but possible, so it was kept in the analysis. Company 
age scores are normally distributed as assessed by kurtosis/skewness z-scores within ± 3.29. 
There is homogeneity of variances, as assessed by Levene's test for equality of variances (p = 
0.330). Companies with above average on unrealistic optimism regarding risk of lower than 
expected future revenues seem to be younger (1994.00 ± 11.47) than companies with below 
average optimism (1940.42 ± 66.38), the difference of 19.83 years is significant (95% CI, 
10.54 to 96.63), t(15) = 1.761, p = 0.019.   
5.6.1.3 Construction of a predictive model 
Having identified statistically relevant aspects that are correlated with unrealistic optimism on 
company level, the following step is to build a model predicting a company’s unrealistic 
optimism on the basis of its objective company characteristics, institutional structure, and 
overconfidence on company level. Out of the four facets of unrealistic optimism for three 
characteristics could be identified that differentiate companies on unrealistic optimism, 
namely unrealistic optimism regarding (1) chance of early and within budget completion, (2) 
risk of construction time and cost overrun, and (3) risk of lower than expected future 
revenues. 
For none of these three facets of unrealistic optimism a significant predictive model was 
found. In the following the failed modelling attempts are reported to provide a base for further 
research. 
Concerning company unrealistic optimism regarding the chance of early and within budget 
completion feedback culture distinctiveness singled out as only characteristic that 
differentiates companies with above and below average optimism, as highlighted in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19: Focus on company unrealistic optimism regarding chance of early and within budget completion 
 
A linear multiple regression was therefore run to predict company unrealistic optimism 
regarding chance of early and within budget completion from feedback distinctiveness. 
Prerequisites for using the multiple linear regression method are fulfilled105. The multiple 
regression model does not statistically significantly predict unrealistic optimism regarding 
chance of early and within budget completion, F(1, 15) = 0.309, p = 0.589.  
Also, a binary logistic regression was run to predict if a company would be above or 
below average on unrealistic optimism regarding chance of early and within budget 
completion. Prerequisites for using binary logistic regression method are fulfilled106. The 
binary logistic regression model is not statistically significant, χ2(1) = 3.073, p = 0.080.  
                                                 
105 There is linearity as assessed by partial regression plots and a plot of studentized residuals against the 
predicted values. Independence of residuals is also given, as assessed by a Durbin-Watson statistic of 
2.297. There is homoscedasticity, as assessed by visual inspection of a plot of studentized residuals versus 
unstandardized predicted values. No evidence of multicollinearity is visible, as assessed by tolerance 
values greater than 0.1. The assumption of normality is met, as assessed by a Q-Q Plot. However, there is 
one outlier. This outlier has an unusual but possible value, so it was kept in the analysis.   
106  Linearity of the continuous variables with respect to the logit of the dependent variable was assessed 
via the Box and Tidwell (1962) procedure. A Bonferroni correction was applied as suggested by 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2014), using all two terms in the model resulting in statistical significance being 
accepted when p < 0.025. Based on this assessment, the continuous independent variable was found to be 
linearly related to the logit of the dependent variable. There is one studentized residual with a value of 
3.448 standard deviations, which was kept in the analysis.  
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For company unrealistic optimism regarding the risk of construction cost and time overrun, 
several characteristics differentiate companies with above and below average optimism. These 
characteristics are highlighted in Figure 20. 
Figure 20: Focus on company unrealistic optimism regarding risk of construction time and cost overrun 
 
 
Again, a linear multiple regression was run, now to predict company unrealistic optimism 
regarding risk of construction time and cost overrun from incentive system distinctiveness, 
illusion of control, company age, and company size. Prerequisites for using the multiple linear 
regression method are fulfilled107. The multiple regression model does not statistically 
significantly predict unrealistic optimism regarding risk of construction time and cost 
overrun, F(4, 12) = 2.844, p = 0.072.  
A binary logistic model could not be run due to the minimum case number of 15 cases 
per independent variable required. 
                                                 
107  There is linearity as assessed by partial regression plots and a plot of studentized residuals against the 
predicted values. Independence of residuals is also given, as assessed by a Durbin-Watson statistic of 
1.928. There is homoscedasticity, as assessed by visual inspection of a plot of studentized residuals versus 
unstandardized predicted values. No evidence of multicollinearity is visible, as assessed by tolerance 
values greater than 0.1. The assumption of normality was it, as assessed by a Q-Q Plot. There is no outlier. 
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For company unrealistic optimism regarding the risk of lower than expected revenues again 
only one characteristic, company age, singled out as statistically relevant differentiating 
companies with above and below average optimism, as highlighted in Figure 21. 
Figure 21: Focus on company unrealistic optimism regarding risk of lower than expected revenues 
 
A binary logistic regression was run to predict company unrealistic optimism regarding risk of 
lower than expected future revenues from company age. Prerequisites for using the multiple 
linear regression method are fulfilled108. The logistic regression model is statistically 
significant, χ2(1) = 3.843, p = 0.050. The model explains 28.80% (Nagelkerke R2) of the 
variance in unrealistic optimism regarding risk of lower than expected future revenues and 
correctly classified 58.8% of cases. However, the area under the ROC curve is 0.549 (95% CI, 
0.051 to 0.549), which is a poor discrimination, not much better than a coin toss. Sensitivity is 
83.3%, specificity is 0.0%, positive predictive value is 66.7% and negative predictive value is 
0.0%. Company age is not significant as predictor variable p = 0.212.  
A linear multiple regression was run additionally to predict company unrealistic 
optimism regarding risk of lower than expected future revenues from company age. 
                                                 
108  Linearity of the continuous variables with respect to the logit of the dependent variable was assessed 
via the Box and Tidwell (1962) procedure. A Bonferroni correction was applied as suggested by 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2014), using all two terms in the model resulting in statistical significance being 
accepted when p < 0.025. Based on this assessment, the continuous independent variable was found to be 
linearly related to the logit of the dependent variable. There are no outliers.  
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Prerequisites for using the multiple linear regression method are fulfilled109. The multiple 
regression model does not statistically significantly predict unrealistic optimism regarding risk 
of lower than expected future revenues, F(1, 15) = 2.189, p = 0.160.  
5.6.2 Discussion company influence on individual decision making 
As seen in chapter 5.4 of this dissertation effort, companies can reduce the unrealistic 
optimism of the individual employees with correctly set feedback and incentive systems. 
Unrealistic optimism is thus at least partly situational and not strictly rooted in the head of the 
decision maker no matter the circumstance. However, not yet addressed was if unrealistic 
optimism is purely individual and can be influenced by a company’s institutional structure, or 
if there are further differences between companies. Thus, the goal of this study was to close 
this gap by answering RQ4: What are the characteristics of companies that are less 
unrealistically optimistic than others?  
To answer this research question, a predictive model for further testing was build based on 
literature research, as well as analysis of mean and different regression techniques with a 
dataset collected among relevant stakeholders. 
Figure 22 illustrates the model that resulted from this explorative analysis.  
                                                 
109  There is linearity as assessed by partial regression plots and a plot of studentized residuals against the 
predicted values. Independence of residuals is given, as assessed by a Durbin-Watson statistic of 2.297. 
There is homoscedasticity, as assessed by visual inspection of a plot of studentized residuals versus 
unstandardized predicted values. No evidence of multicollinearity is visible, as assessed by tolerance 
values greater than 0.1. The assumption of normality is met, as assessed by a Q-Q Plot. However, there are 
no outliers.     
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Figure 22: Factors that characterize differences between above and below average companies on unrealistic optimism 
 
Major findings were that there are in fact differences between companies regarding average 
unrealistic optimism. At the same time these companies have certain characteristics 
concerning their institutional structure, their overconfidence, and their objective company 
characteristics. Therefore, classifying companies regarding unrealistic optimism in this 
industry is relevant, studies and well as practical considerations should not be limited to a 
classification of stakeholder groups, as it has been done in previous research.  
These results are highly relevant as the knowledge about characteristics related to unrealistic 
optimism at company level can be used as a basis to establish a more realistic risk assessment. 
At the same time unrealistic optimism is not an unchangeable characteristic of a company but 
one that can be actively influenced and thus controlled. In the following the most relevant 
detailed findings concerning (1) the institutional structure, (2) company overconfidence, and 
(3) objective company characteristics will be discussed. 
This study identified incentive system distinctiveness and feedback culture distinctiveness as 
characteristics that are related to unrealistic optimism on company level. Surprisingly, while 
these institutional structure characteristics influenced only the facets of unrealistic optimism 
regarding future revenues of projects on individual level, on company level they characterize 
companies that differentiate each other regarding costs and time overruns. Team diversity 
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interestingly was not related to any facet of unrealistic optimism. In the following these three 
outstanding findings are discussed in more detail. 
First, it is especially unexpected to see that high incentive system distinctiveness seems to 
characterize companies with high unrealistic optimism regarding risk of construction time and 
cost overrun. This finding is so unreckoned because on individual level incentive system 
distinctiveness was found to reduce unrealistic optimism regarding risk of lower than 
expected future revenues and had no significant effect on unrealistic optimism regarding risk 
of construction time and cost overrun. However, this finding is somehow in line with previous 
literature that warned of unintended effects of incentive system components such as 
tournaments (Heaton, 2002). 
A closer look on the incentive system’s subcomponents throws light on this seemingly 
inconsistent finding. On company level the subcomponents compensation and career path 
importance were identified to drive unrealistic optimism regarding the risk of construction 
time and cost overrun. On individual level no significant impact of any incentive system 
subcomponent was detected. On the other hand, examining the impact incentive system 
distinctiveness has on another facet of unrealistic optimism, namely the one concerning risk of 
lower than expected future revenues, a closer look reveals again differences between the 
individual and the company level. On company level no significant effect of any of the 
subcomponents of the incentive system could be detected, while on individual level the 
subcomponents accountability and career path importance were identified to have a bias 
reducing effect. In other words - while on individual level the accountability and career path 
component reduce bias concerning less revenues, the compensation and career path 
component increase bias regarding costs and time overrun on company level.  
The different role of costs and revenues has already been highlighted in this work – 
also here it is thinkable that the described effect can be due to the way the decision makers 
construction cost/time and revenue assessments respond differently to incentive systems. 
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While on company level the incentive system affects unrealistic optimism regarding 
construction costs and time risks, on individual level it rather influences unrealistic optimism 
regarding revenues. The fact that career path importance has a different effect direction on 
individual and on company level might be due to the different sample used in this analysis 
compared to the individual analysis. Although there was no significant difference between the 
subsample and the excluded fraction in this analysis on any of the factors, it is thinkable that 
there is a difference between the subsample and those not included in effect direction. 
Therefore, this finding must be treated with caution.   
Independently from this further to be investigated finding, the analysis indicates that 
the institutional structure of a company is relevant when assessing risks. Companies must be 
very careful when designing incentive systems and be aware that when placing high 
importance on compensation as an incentive system tool, they can increase biases on company 
level, even if on individual level this effect might not show.  
The second unexpected finding regarding institutional structure is that high median feedback 
culture distinctiveness seems to characterize companies with low unrealistic optimism 
regarding chance of early and within budget completion. Parallel to the finding on incentive 
system distinctiveness on company level, this finding is unexpected because on individual 
level, feedback culture distinctiveness reduces unrealistic optimism regarding chance of 
higher than expected future revenues and has no significant effect on unrealistic optimism 
regarding chance of early and within budget completion. 
Analyses run on feedback system subcomponent level to explain this finding showed 
no significant differences. Hence the difference described in the result chapter might be due to 
the focus of the non-parametric test on the median. Again, the overall effect can be explained 
by the different sample used in chapter 5.4 and 5.5. 
Independently from potential explanations, feedback culture distinctiveness as 
characteristic that distinguishes between above and below average unrealistic optimism must 
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be treated with caution and should be further explored. However, even though not the same 
effect could be identified on company level and on individual level, feedback systems seem to 
be important to influence unrealistic optimism. 
The third finding regarding institutional structure is that team diversity is an institutional 
structure characteristic that in this survey is not significantly different for above and below 
biased companies regarding unrealistic optimism. This is surprising, because literature hinted 
strongly that team diversity should lead to a larger mental model and thus to better forecasting 
ability (Schoemaker & Tetlock, 2016).  
This finding can be explained by the situational nature of unrealistic optimism that was 
revealed in chapter 5.5. The team mental model that is shaped through team diversity might 
only have impact in specific decision situations where many decision makers work together, 
not in general risk assessments that are often done in the four-eye principle in the 
infrastructure PF industry. 
Answering the call of Houghton et al. (2000), this work underlines that regarding 
unrealistic optimism team diversity does not play a role in this specific industry. So, while in 
chapter 5.4 it was concluded how important e.g. a focus on experience is when putting 
together a team for PF decisions in the infrastructure industry, it can be concluded that a focus 
on diversity does not seem as important to control for unconscious cognitive biases. However, 
since decision making is situational, the effect might be different for different strategic 
decisions. 
Concerning subjective knowledge, illusion of control, and unrealistic optimism regarding risk 
of lower than expected future revenues the same relationship was found on company level, as 
it was proven to be on individual decision maker level: subjective knowledge increases 
illusion of control, which itself increases unrealistic optimism regarding risk of lower than 
expected future revenues. 
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To begin with, this can be explained like the individual level finding - companies with 
high subjective knowledge are unlikely to consult experts and base decisions only on self-
assessed knowledge. Additionally, companies in general tend to be more unrealistically 
optimistic about future events that they believe they can control (Durand, 2003). This 
homogeneity on company level can imply that subjective knowledge is influenced by 
company characteristics e.g. the recruiting process. An additional explanation for this 
homogeneity is the current big data trend in the infrastructure industry. Companies provide 
their decision makers with countless data points today, so the decision makers believe they 
have all the information they need to make perfect risk predictions (subjective knowledge) 
and further believe they have an advantage over companies that seem not to have these data 
amounts available. However, they might be lacking knowledge of the actual decision 
situation.  
This finding has two important implications. Subjective knowledge is an institutional 
structure characteristic, that needs to be attacked not only in the recruiting of individuals, but 
also on company level e.g. through debiasing workshops. At the same time companies with 
high subjective knowledge need to account for unrealistic optimism regarding risk of lower 
than expected future revenues in their decision making. 
Finally, also objective company characteristics seem to influence unrealistic optimism on 
company level. Both company age and size are characteristics that differentiate above and 
below average unrealistically optimistic companies regarding risk of construction time and 
cost overrun with company age also influencing unrealistic optimism regarding risk of lower 
than expected future revenues. Above average unrealistic companies were younger and 
smaller than their more realistic counterparts. This finding is important, as age and size is 
something companies cannot influence, but can be aware off and take relevant counter 
measures. 
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Concerning the age, a first explanation of this finding can be that older companies are 
more likely to have established decision-making routines which reduce decision complexity 
and thus leave less room for bias, as previous authors have already shown in different 
industries (Lowe & Ziedonis, 2006). Further, Lowe and Ziedonis (2006) also argue that older 
companies have more historic data access and thus face less uncertainty in decisions. Both 
explanations could also hold in the infrastructure sector, as older companies have typically 
conducted more deals and thus got more experience, which should establish decision making 
routines even more.  
Unexpected was that large companies seem less subject to unrealistic optimism, which 
contradicts the findings of Durand (2003). A first explanation of this finding can be that larger 
companies are more likely to have established decision-making routines which reduce 
decision complexity and thus leave less room for bias, 
The deduction of this is that both the age and size of a company that evaluates risks 
does play a role. Therefore, when planning projects, age and size of the involved 
company/companies should be considered. Especially when it comes to young and small 
companies, it should be ensured that proper debiasing mechanism are put in place. Potentially 
this finding has a very important implication for the public sector. Experience of companies 
and established decision processes are so important that PF is indeed a solution to address 
certain problems. Both unrealistic optimism regarding risk of construction time and cost 
overrun and unrealistic optimism regarding risk of lower than expected future revenues is 
reduced by involvement of older and larger companies. Due to election periods in the public 
sector, decision makers often do not have the infrastructure decision experience, that decision 
makers in infrastructure investment funds have. At the same time for instance in Germany 
large infrastructure projects are not implemented by one specific public institution but are 
spread over states and provinces and located in different public authorities. In addition, with 
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the above-mentioned election periods the public body could therefore be seen as a quite small 
and young company, that is “reborn” at least every four years. 
In the following the (1) theoretical and (2) practical contributions are presented, (3) 
limitations are named, and finally (4) a brief outlook is given. 
5.6.2.1 Theoretical contributions 
Although literature about behavioral decision making in projects, PF in general, and factors 
affecting risk assessment take different angles concerning unrealistic optimism, the gap the 
first three mentioned streams have is overlapping: In this area there is no research that takes 
the organizational perspective on biased information processing. This work therefore answers 
the research calls of Durand (2003) and Müllner (2017) by showing how important it is to 
broaden the focus from only the individual decision maker towards also companies. Previous 
research did not determine what characterizes companies whose decision makers are on 
average unrealistically biased and bring a high degree of estimator related risk with them. 
Filling this gap, this dissertation effort shows that unrealistic optimism does exist on the 
company level, indicating unrealistic optimism is indeed a situational bias influenced by 
objective company factors and institutional characteristics and not merely rooted in the head 
of decision makers. Our research findings therefore not only add to these literature streams but 
significantly change ongoing discussions, that have mainly concerned the individual decision 
maker. Instead, better understanding how institutions affect their employees’ biases in 
decision making, has the potential to result in much larger practical benefits. This research 
represents a first step in showing what kind of company factors should be considered. It opens 
up an array of research to examine different decision biases on company level. By providing a 
theoretical model for unrealistic optimism, this dissertation further serves as a starting point 
for future research that attempts to predict a company’s likelihood to be subject to unrealistic 
optimism.   
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Also in the bias management literature, as described in chapter 4.3.2.4 there is the need for 
more research on the effects of institutional structures on biased decision making. This 
dissertation contributes to this gap by showing that effects on company level and effects on 
individual level can be different when it comes to debiasing decision makers. This study could 
identify incentive system distinctiveness and feedback culture distinctiveness as 
characteristics that are related to unrealistic optimism on company level, however on company 
level different facets of unrealistic optimism are influenced than on individual level, showing 
that a team does not necessarily represents the sum of individuals.  
5.6.2.2 Practical contributions 
The managerial implication of the findings above is that by analyzing their company 
characteristics, managers can identify well-grounded if their decision makers are likely to fall 
prey to unrealistic optimism. Managers should put significant focus on unrealistic optimism 
when a company is small, recently founded, incentivized heavily over employee 
compensation, and provides room for high subjective knowledge e.g. through relying heavily 
on big data. Especially for companies with these characteristics debiasing trainings and 
accounting for biases in decision making is important. Companies with very diverse teams 
should not have a false sense of security - team diversity has no impact on biases on company 
level. 
Further, managers can have impact on their institutional environment to shape it in a way best 
equipped to avoid overly optimistic decision making. When designing incentive systems 
managers need to be aware of possible unintended effects on unrealistic optimism. For 
instance, when placing high importance on compensation as an incentive system tool, they can 
increase biases on company level, even if on individual level this effect might not show. 
Additionally, subjective knowledge is an institutional structure characteristic, that needs to be 
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attacked not only in the recruiting process of individuals, but also on company level, e.g., 
through debiasing workshops.   
For public institutions an important learning is that experience of companies and established 
decision processes are so important that PF can indeed be a means to address certain 
problems. As described above, due to their structure public institutions could be seen as a 
quite small and young company and therefore have the characteristics of organizations that are 
on average more likely to be unrealistically optimistic. Thus, it is especially important to 
conduct debiasing trainings and to account for bias in decision making, as well as to 
implement an institutional environment that does not fuel unrealistic optimism. 
5.6.2.3 Limits  
The model itself and the measurement model have certain limitations that are explained in the 
following.  
One limit of the model tested is that it focusses only on infrastructure PF in the European 
infrastructure industry and thus can neither be transferred directly to decision situations in 
another industry nor to other continents. Further, important company characteristics such as 
the recruiting process or established decision-making processes had to be neglected due to the 
feasibility of this study.  
Naturally the measurement approach further has its limitations. This study was based on the 
same survey as chapter 5.4 and 5.5, thus the same survey related limitations apply. Only a 
limited number of questions was used and biases in a real decision situation might be 
amplified compared to a survey where participants were conscious that biases were tested. 
Finally, another limitation is the small sample size. Additionally, self-selection bias is also 
here possible: only the employees of a company answered that were either biased or not 
biased, thus not reflecting the company overall. 
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5.6.2.4 Outlook 
There are various avenues for future research – the three most important ones are presented in 
the following. First, using the above findings as starting point, future research should conduct 
tests with larger samples to build a predictive model. Further company unrealistic optimism 
should be linked to decision performance – answering the question if companies that are 
unrealistic optimistic perform worse due to bad decisions. Finally, it should be tested if the 
company bias effect is just the sum of the individual biases, or if the belonging to a company 
amplifies cognitive biases of the individual. 
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6. Conclusion and outlook 
In the following the overall conclusion is presented, followed by an outlook. 
6.1 Conclusion 
Shifting more from asset, public, and corporate finance to PF in Europe can be a way to 
achieve optimized public and corporate spending and thus contribute to closing the 
infrastructure finance gap, if the risk management and risk transfer in the PF work optimally. 
In chapter 3 a detailed risk typology was presented that highlights how important the topic of 
estimator related risk, i.e., cognitive biases and especially unrealistic optimism in decision 
making is when it comes to infrastructure PF. The fact that lenders and investors as project 
outsiders carry estimator related risks means that banks and funds do not only provide money 
needed to close the infrastructure finance gap but also take over risks attached to the risk 
management process. 
When analyzing individual lenders and investors regarding their risk assessment in chapter 5.4 
it became apparent that overall also individual lenders and investors are unrealistically 
optimistic. This optimism is influenced by subjective knowledge on personal level, feedback 
culture/incentive system distinctiveness on company level, and overconfidence bias, which 
itself is driven by subjective knowledge and reduced by experienced based knowledge. These 
results are highly relevant as knowledge gained about causal drivers of unrealistic optimism 
can at the level of involved stakeholders be used as a basis to establish a more realistic risk 
assessment; the unrealistic optimism therefore is not an unchangeable characteristic of 
stakeholders but one that can be influenced and thus reduced.  
Focusing on the difference between stakeholder groups in chapter 5.5 it became apparent that 
lenders are more unrealistically optimistic than investors regarding the chance of higher than 
expected future revenues. This finding is strengthened by the detection of a statistically 
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significant lower feedback importance from colleagues for lenders than for investors, further 
highlighting that cognitive biases are not purely rooted in the mind of decision makers but 
also have a situational component.  
How companies can influence this situational component was analyzed in chapter 5.6. It could 
be shown that important influencing factors of unrealistic optimism on company level are the 
company’s institutional structure, overconfidence, and objective company characteristics.  
Theoretical and practical contributions from these findings are elaborated in the following. 
6.1.1. Theoretical contributions 
The theoretical contribution to the PF, behavioral finance, risk assessment, and bias 
management research is manifold. This effort (1) develops the current discussion around PF, 
(2) shows the importance to test behavioral decision-making theory in different practical 
decision situations in order to develop theory further, (3) provides both a risk typology and 
models that can serve as a foundation for future research in different research fields, and (4) 
tests the applicability of methods not commonly used in this research field. 
In the PF literature stream no typology of risks has been defined for infrastructure projects 
financed through PF that shows exactly which risks are taken over by lenders and private 
investors. Further estimator related risks were not included in existing typologies and 
taxonomies. By using the knowledge from the megaprojects literature stream together with 
previous findings in the PF literature stream, this work collects a detailed list of risk factors 
and shows what the risks of a typical infrastructure project are and who typically carries these 
risks. This risk typology is an important contribution as it is specific to the PF infrastructure 
industry and shows concerning estimator related risk that not only planners and project 
managers, but also project outsiders that evaluate the project at a later stage are unrealistically 
optimistic. These results are highly relevant as currently it is argued that the involvement of 
an outside view, i.e. lenders and investors gives an important advantage regarding the 
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assessment of revenue and risks large and complex infrastructure project have (Flyvbjerg, 
2013).   
Finally, previous research in PF did not determine what characterizes companies, 
whose decision makers are on average unrealistically biased and bring a high degree of 
estimator related risk with them. Filling this gap, this dissertation shows that unrealistic 
optimism does exist on company level in infrastructure PF in varying degrees of severity, 
which means that certain companies are better equipped to take over estimator related risks 
than others.  
Moreover, this effort demonstrates the importance to test behavioral decision-making theory 
in different practical decision situations in order to gain knowledge about commensurability 
and develop the existing theory further. 
By developing the PF specific risk typology and identifying estimator related risk as a risk 
category, it was shown how important it is to connect the PF literature and the behavioral 
decision-making literature concerned with the reductionist school of thought. Further, in this 
field of research an important gap to close was to test the applicability and generalizability of 
findings from previous research, often tested in theoretical decision situations with students, 
to different decision situations of experienced industry specific decision makers. In this regard 
the main theoretical contribution is that existing behavioral finance models and hypotheses 
can be applied to the specific decision situation at hand (infrastructure PF decision making), 
but need modifications. Some causal connections between company/personal factors and 
unrealistic optimism that were found by authors in other industries are verifiable also in this 
one. Knowledge types known to influence facets of overconfidence for IT projects for 
instance do also hold for infrastructure projects and thus this finding seems to be 
generalizable. However, especially the influence of representative heuristic on unrealistic 
optimism seems to differ by industry and is not transferable without questioning. 
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Further, in this area there is no research that takes the organizational perspective on 
biased information processing, including company factors such as company age and company 
size. As this cannot be tested on students, it is important to use relevant industry decision 
makers to test models and hypotheses. Filling this gap, this dissertation shows that unrealistic 
optimism does exist on company level, indicating unrealistic optimism is indeed a situational 
bias influenced by objective company factors and institutional characteristics and not merely 
rooted in the head of decision makers.    
Additionally, this effort provides a risk typology, models, and hypotheses that can serve as a 
foundation for future research.    
The risk typology developed in chapter 3 is an important contribution as it is can serve 
as a basis for further research on cognitive aspects, perceived risk, and decision making in 
different industries - highlighting the importance to include the category “estimator related 
risks in all typologies to come. 
The causal model that differentiates between personal factors, organizational factors, 
and other biases/heuristics as enhancing/diminishing factors of individual unrealistic optimism 
can serve as a foundation for research on unrealistic optimism in different decision situations. 
Here it is especially important for future research that organizational factors showed to have a 
diminishing effect on unrealistic optimism, indicating that companies can influence individual 
decision making.  
The predictive model developed in chapter 4 and 5 can additionally serve as a basis for 
further research that tries to determine what characterizes companies whose decision makers 
are on average unrealistically optimistic. Further, the predictive model showed that effects on 
company and individual level can be different. This study could identify incentive system 
distinctiveness and feedback culture distinctiveness as characteristics that are related to 
unrealistic optimism on company level, however they influenced different facets of unrealistic 
optimism on company respective on individual level. 
189 
 
 
 
Finally, this effort demonstrates the applicability of methods not commonly used in this 
research field. 
While the latest typologies in the field of infrastructure projects rely on literature 
research, in this effort the CIT method was used to gain additional information from industry 
experts. Relying not only on existing literature but also integrating practical knowledge was 
proven to be important for the decision situation at hand – estimator related risks could be 
uncovered as important risk category. Thus, explorative research methods are not only 
applicable in fields were only little research is present – even in well researched areas, they 
can uncover new insights. 
Regarding the measurement of unrealistic optimism, a key contribution is that in 
certain decision situations unrealistic optimism needs to be distinguished between its facets 
regarding rewards and risks, as well as cost/construction time and revenues, resulting in four 
different facets of unrealistic optimism. These facets are driven by different factors in terms of 
incentive system distinctiveness, feedback culture distinctiveness, illusion of control, and 
subjective knowledge. Previous research typically only differentiates the facets regarding 
rewards and risks. This more distinctive way of measuring unrealistic optimism highlights the 
potential problem that previous findings about unrealistic optimism cannot be applied to all 
facets of this bias. 
Finally, while previous works e.g. Vetter et al. (2011) and Meyer (2016) use 
correlations in order to show causality in their bias models, making use of regression allowed 
to compare effect sizes and thus get a more holistic knowledge on causalities. 
6.1.2. Practical contributions 
As described in chapter 2, there are four areas of concern when setting up a project structure: 
(1) organizational structure (project ownership, source of financing), (2) governance structure 
(capital structure), (3) contractual structure (packaging of work, delivery models, and pricing 
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scheme), and finally (4) team structure. In the following the lessons learned from this research 
for the four project structure related aspects will be elaborated. 
For public institutions setting up a project, when it comes to the ownership decisions, they 
need to decide if they want to implement the project themselves as a public project or if they 
want to involve the private sector, to benefit from efficiency gains. When assessing the 
ownership structure public decision makers should keep in mind that the assessment of risks 
and rewards can neither be transferred unquestioned to a specific stakeholder group or 
subgroup, as all involved groups are subject to unrealistic optimism.  
When assessing how much debt to equity to use, decision makers should keep in mind that 
concerning unrealistic optimism regarding risk of lower than expected future revenues lenders 
are more affected than investors. Thus, a high debt to equity might allow equity investors to 
maximize their equity returns (Scannella, 2012) and transfer part of the downside project risk 
to lenders (Miller & Lessard, 2001), but it does not necessary mean that estimator related risks 
are transferred to the stakeholder that can best bear it.  
The contractual structure of a project is important to allocate risks to the party/parties that can 
mitigate them best or that can carry them at the lowest cost (Esty, 2004a). The detailed risk 
typology developed in chapter 3 can serve all infrastructure PF stakeholders as a checklist 
when evaluating the risks and returns they want to transfer. When choosing a consortium to 
award the project contract to, specific caution should be taken concerning transferring 
estimator related risk when companies are small in terms of employee number, were recently 
founded, incentivize employees heavily over compensation, and provide room for subjective 
knowledge e.g. through relying heavily on big data. 
Companies that are awarded a PF deal should keep in mind several in the following described 
points when putting together the project team. They should be aware of the phenomenon 
unrealistic optimism in the assessment of risks and rewards and the causal enhancing and 
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diminishing factors of unrealistic optimism. Companies need to act cautiously when staffing 
people with high subjective based knowledge on projects where the correct assessment of 
risks and rewards is vital, and ensure that each project team has an experienced decision 
maker when it comes to assessing risks and rewards. Companies should further install a 
distinctive feedback system for the team that focuses on the speed with which feedback is 
delivered, the importance their employees place on their colleagues’ feedback, as well as the 
overall feedback culture in the company. Finally, it is recommended that companies install a 
distinctive incentive system for the team that focuses on how the success of the individual 
influences their career advancement, as well as on the individuals feeling of accountability for 
her/his actions. Compensation as incentive system should be thoroughly rethought. 
6.2. Outlook 
Considering that up to now research in behavioral finance regarding unrealistic optimism 
covers either its occurrence or its drivers without taking into view the special features of 
different industries, the field of what remains to be done is wide.    
One first step would be to test the general applicability of the developed causal model for 
individual decision makers in the same industry with different stakeholder groups, in different 
geographies, in different industry settings, and for different decision situations. On company 
level, future research should conduct tests with larger samples to build a predictive model, 
based on the factors described in chapter 5.6.  
Further, the generalizability of hypotheses put forward should be tested. In chapter 5.4 it was 
proposed that the infrastructure industry might attract unrealistically optimistic decision 
makers - this should be tested using cross industry comparison. In chapter 5.4 it was proposed 
that more experiences decision makers are better decision makers regarding unrealistic 
optimism - testing this model in other decision situations can help to confirm this. In chapter 
5.4 is was proposed that representative heuristic had no relevance for the risk and reward 
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assessment in this study because of the infrastructure industry with its singularities - testing 
this model in other industries can help to confirm this.  
Due to the chosen research design, this research was limited to the analysis of cognitive 
biases, and did not focus on the impact on actual decision making. Future avenues for research 
could be to lift this limitation both on individual and company level. On individual level, it 
should be explored if the positive aspects of unrealistic optimism can outweigh the negative 
aspects.   
On company level it should be tested if unrealistic optimism can be linked to company 
financial performance, and if the company bias effect is just the sum of the individual biases, 
or if the belonging to a company manages to amplify biases. 
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Appendix 
Table 22: Risk typology of PF infrastructure projects based on Irimia-Diéguez et al. (2014) 
  Stakeholder that typically carries risk   
Risk factor category  Risk factor 
Public 
sector SPV  Contractor  Investor Lenders 
Consul- 
tants 
Clients/user/society Risk of changing customer demand x x     
Clients/user/society 
Risk of changing customer willingness to 
pay x x     
Clients/user/society Risks of third party users x x     
Clients/user/society 
Risk of cultural differences between main 
stakeholders x x     
Clients/user/society 
Risk of inappropriate alignment of 
stakeholders x x     
Clients/user/society 
Risk of non-involvement of host-
community x x     
Clients/user/society Risk of public opposition to projects x x     
Clients/user/society Risk of rate of return restrictions x x     
Clients/user/society 
Risk of reputation loss due to 
miscommunication  x x     
Clients/user/society Risk of non-compliance of stakeholders x x     
Clients/user/society 
Risk of user/customer opposition to 
project x x     
Clients/user/society Risk of changing social profitability X x     
Clients/user/society Risk of changing royalty payments x x     
Construction Chemical risk of construction   x    
Construction Construction logistics risk   x    
Construction 
Environmental damage due to 
construction of project   x    
Construction Physical risk of construction   x    
Construction 
Risk of archeological features in the 
ground   x    
Construction Risk of change in schedule   x    
Construction Risk of changing ground water level   x    
Construction Risk of contamination   x    
Construction Risk of ground water quality   x    
Construction Risk of historic monument protection   x    
Construction Risk of infidelity and theft   x    
Construction Risk of inadequate scheduling   x    
Construction Risk of inappropriate quality management   x    
Construction 
Risk of increased equipment costs and 
delivery lead time   x    
Construction Risk of increased material cost   x    
Construction Risk of infrastructure accessibility   x    
Construction 
Risk of reword needed due to supply chain 
quality   x    
Construction Risk of supply chain bottlenecks   x    
Construction 
Risk of constructability of building ground 
and subsurface conditions   x    
Construction 
Risk of unforeseen required site 
engineering   x    
Construction Risk of bankruptcy of contractor   x    
Construction Risk of bankruptcy of subcontractors   x    
Construction 
Risk of insolvency/default of 
subcontractors and suppliers   x    
Construction Risk of double work   x    
Construction Risk of inappropriate executive support   x    
Construction 
Risk of increasing land acquisition cost and 
delay   x    
Construction Risk of land acquisition/site availability   x    
Construction Structural engineering calculation risk   x    
Construction 
Risk of technical failure during 
commissioning   x    
Contractual Risk of excessive contract variation x x  x   
Contractual 
Risk of required change due to other 
contractors x x  x   
Contractual 
Risk of changed owner’s requirements 
during construction x x  x   
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  Stakeholder that typically carries risk   
Risk factor category  Risk factor 
Public 
sector SPV  Contractor  Investor Lenders 
Consul- 
tants 
Contractual Risk of change in kind-of-usage x x  x   
Contractual Risk of change of requirements of usage x x  x   
Contractual 
Risk of non-adherence to owner 
obligations x x  x   
Contractual 
Risk of claims/change orders due to 
contradictions in contract terms x x  x   
Contractual 
Risk of claims/change orders due to lack of 
clarity in contract terms x x  x   
Contractual 
Risk of claims/change orders due to 
omissions in contract terms x x  x   
Contractual Contractual conflicts x x  x   
Contractual Risk of high bidding cost x x  x   
Contractual 
Risk of inadequate distribution of 
responsibilities and risks x x  x   
Contractual Risk of inappropriate award process x x  x   
Contractual 
Risk of opportunistic behavior of 
contractual partners x x  x   
Contractual 
Risk of prolonged negotiation period prior 
to initiation x x  x   
Contractual Risks due to rights of third party x x  x   
Contractual 
Risk of inappropriate contract form and 
handling x x  x   
Contractual Risks of limitation to liability of contractors x x  x   
Contractual Risk of late design changes x x  x   
Design Risk of delay of contract formation x x  x  x 
Design Risk of inadequate delivery method x x  x  x 
Design 
Risk of inadequate licensing application 
quality x x  x  x 
Design 
Risk of inappropriately predicted attrition 
reserve x x  x  x 
Design Risk of scope changes x x  x  x 
Design Design approval risk (delayed, denied) x x  x  x 
Design Risk of flawed tender documents x x  x  x 
Design Risk of procedural shortcomings in tender x x  x  x 
Design Risk of design failure x x  x  x 
Design 
Risk of changing technologies during 
project x x  x  x 
Design 
Risk of lacking flexibility and function 
ability of design x x  x  x 
Estimator related risks 
Risk of under or over evaluating future 
revenue  x  x x  
Estimator related risks 
Risk of under or over evaluating 
construction cost   x    
Estimator related risks 
Risk of under or over evaluating 
construction time   x x x  
Financial/economic Risk of competition from substitutes  x  x x x 
Financial/economic 
Risk of operational revenue below 
projection  x  x x x 
Financial/economic Risk of too small yield/recovery efficiency  x  x x x 
Financial/economic Risks of inadequate working funds  x  x x x 
Financial/economic Currency risk/devaluation risk  x  x x x 
Financial/economic Currency transfer risk  x  x x x 
Financial/economic Demographical risk  x  x x x 
Financial/economic Funding cost (interest rate) risk  x  x x x 
Financial/economic Price index risk  x  x x x 
Financial/economic 
Risk of change in commodity market 
conditions (availability, price)  x  x x x 
Financial/economic Risk of competitive reaction  x  x x x 
Financial/economic Risk of currency inconvertibility  x  x x x 
Financial/economic Risk of inflation rate volatility (deflation)  x  x x x 
Financial/economic 
Risk of influential economic event 
(boom/recession)  x  x x x 
Financial/economic 
Risk of limited availability of project 
funding  x  x x x 
Financial/economic Risk of third party tort liability  x  x x x 
Financial/economic 
Risk of change in material market 
conditions (availability, price)  x  x x x 
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  Stakeholder that typically carries risk   
Risk factor category  Risk factor 
Public 
sector SPV  Contractor  Investor Lenders 
Consul- 
tants 
Financial/economic Counterparty risk  x  x x x 
Financial/economic Credit risk  x  x x x 
Financial/economic Equity risk  x  x x x 
Financial/economic Financial close risk  x  x x x 
Financial/economic Liquidity risk  x  x x x 
Financial/economic Performance determination risk  x  x x x 
Financial/economic Risk of bankruptcy of concessionaire  x  x x x 
Financial/economic Risk of default of one party  x  x x x 
Financial/economic Risk of default on debt service  x  x x x 
Financial/economic Risk of inability to refinance  x  x x x 
Financial/economic Risk of inappropriate indexation  x  x x x 
Financial/economic 
Risk of lack of commitment from 
public/private partners  x  x x x 
Financial/economic Risk of lack of creditworthiness  x  x x x 
Financial/economic 
Risk of low financial attraction of project to 
investor  x  x x x 
Financial/economic 
Risk of smaller than assumed residual 
value  x  x x x 
Financial/economic 
Risks of inappropriate quantitative 
demand projections  x  x x x 
Financial/economic Risks regarding pricing of product/service  x  x x x 
Financial/economic Risk of inappropriate NPV forecast  x  x x x 
Financial/economic Risk of misevaluation of bids  x  x x x 
Financial/economic Subsidy risk  x  x x x 
Financial/economic 
Risk of lack of tradition of private provision 
of public services  x  x x x 
Force majeure Climate change/natural disasters x x x    
Force majeure Risk of weather conditions x x x    
Force majeure Risk of changing standards during projects x x x    
Force majeure Risk of terror/war x x x    
Force majeure Risk of unethical behavior x x x    
Force majeure Risk of vandalism x x x    
Force majeure Another force majeure type x x x    
Labor Risk of increased labor rates  x x    
Labor Risk of insufficient capability and training  x x    
Labor Risk of labor availability and productivity  x x    
Labor Risk of inadequate work safety  x x    
Labor 
Risk of slow progress due to 
unclear/inappropriate incentives  x x    
Labor Organization and coordination risk  x x    
Labor 
Risk of problems due to different working 
methods/know-how between partners  x x    
Labor Risk of riots and domestic disturbance  x x    
Labor Risk of inadequate experience in PPP  x x    
Labor 
Risk of inefficient use of personnel and 
resources  x x    
Labor Risk of labor disrupts  x x    
Labor 
Risk of inadequate distribution of authority 
between partners  x x    
Labor 
Risk of (skilled) labor availability and 
productivity  x x    
Legal/political 
Risk of poor public decision-making 
process x x  x  x 
Legal/political Risk of strong political opposition/hostility x x  x  x 
Legal/political Lacking support by public decision makers x x  x  x 
Legal/political Risk of arbitration award default x x  x  x 
Legal/political Risk of change in tax regulations x x  x  x 
Legal/political 
Risk of changing environment protection 
regulations x x  x  x 
Legal/political 
Risk of changing norms and regulations 
concerning contaminants x x  x  x 
Legal/political 
Risk of changing regulations and norms 
regarding construction x x  x  x 
Legal/political 
Risk of corruption and lack of respect for 
law x x  x  x 
Legal/political 
Risk of delay in project approvals and 
permits x x  x  x 
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  Stakeholder that typically carries risk   
Risk factor category  Risk factor 
Public 
sector SPV  Contractor  Investor Lenders 
Consul- 
tants 
Legal/political 
Risk of expropriation/nationalization of 
assets x x  x  x 
Legal/political Risk of import/export restrictions x x  x  x 
Legal/political 
Risk of inconsistencies in government 
policies x x  x  x 
Legal/political Risk of increasing tariff amounts x x  x  x 
Legal/political Risk of inner and outer security x x  x  x 
Legal/political Risk of lack of government guarantees x x  x  x 
Legal/political Risk of legislation change/inconsistencies x x  x  x 
Legal/political Risk of political instability x x  x  x 
Legal/political 
Risks of gaining approval only under 
certain conditions x x  x  x 
Legal/political Risk of other regulatory change x x  x  x 
Legal/political Risk of concessional tax rebate x x  x  x 
Legal/political Risk of cancellation of concession x x  x  x 
Operation and maintenance 
Risk of expansion and major upgrading 
costs  x x    
Operation and maintenance Risk of faulty construction techniques  x x    
Operation and maintenance Risk of inadequate maintenance diagnostic  x x    
Operation and maintenance 
Risk of inadequate operability, integrity, 
reliability  x x    
Operation and maintenance 
Risk of inappropriate maintenance 
measures  x x    
Operation and maintenance Risk of inappropriate maintenance strategy  x x    
Operation and maintenance Risk of increased wear out  x x    
Operation and maintenance 
Risk of insufficient processes, procedures, 
and systems in operation  x x    
Operation and maintenance 
Risk of interface between construction and 
operation phase  x x    
Operation and maintenance Risk of low operating productivity  x x    
Operation and maintenance 
Risk of maintenance cost higher than 
expected  x x    
Operation and maintenance 
Risk of maintenance more frequent than 
expected  x x    
Operation and maintenance Risk of operation cost overrun  x x    
Operation and maintenance Risk of over aging  x x    
Operation and maintenance 
Risks of approving a deficient state of 
construction  x x    
Operation and maintenance 
Risk of rework needed due to poor quality 
of workmanship  x x    
Operation and maintenance Risk of increasing consumption cost   x x    
Operation and maintenance 
Risks of overpriced service level 
agreements  x x    
Operation and maintenance Offtake agreement risk  x x    
Operation and maintenance  Material risk in running operations  x x    
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Table 23: Relevant quotes from expert interviews 
Risk factor 
category Quote in original interview language 
Clients/user/
society 
- “There is something called outside risk in the [framework], I am not sure which one that 
is, or at least we had that at [client name]. And then it means if it is obviously not under 
the direct control of the project director, but he nevertheless has to have some way to 
managing that through a stakeholder type of management. Sometime, I will give you an 
example, a large copper project in Mongolia, the government decides to change the 
way they are going to collect royalties on the mining output, so obviously the poor 
project manager building the plant can’t do much about this but it can really have a 
detrimental impact on his project once it starts operations so he needs to have that risk 
responsibility back to someone in corporate that is going to go and essentially going to 
sit down with the government of Mongolia. That is just an example. So, in a case like 
that, that would be seen as a we need to identify this as a project risk, because it will 
impact the NPV. And the control of that is obviously not sitting inside the project team. 
So, you need to be able to allocate it to someone else.” (Consultant I) 
- “Looking at the typology I would assign risk of changing customer demand and risk of 
changing customer willingness to pay rather to owner than to contractor.” (Consultant 
I) 
- “Bei der Autobahn in Ungarn, da hat die Bevölkerung auf einmal festgestellt, dass da 
überhaupt keine Lärmschutzwand vorgesehen war. Hatten die einfach nicht. Und [da 
wurde] dann natürlich massiv protestiert, und dann hat der Staat gesagt: naja, gut. Also 
dann gib noch etwas Geld raus, und dann bauen wir dann noch eine Lärmschutzwand 
entlang der Dörfer." (Lender III) 
Construction - “Organization and coordination risks do belong to execution. For example, if an owner 
cannot staff his project team, it will impact the execution of the project. Coordination of 
sub-contractors will also impact the execution.” (Consultant I) 
- “I would add sub-surface conditions that is in the technical category and impacts a lot of 
projects (metro, light rail, tunnels, etc.) to your typology.” (Investor II) 
- „…Bau eines Protonentherapiezentrums, wunderbare Anlage, Protonen, zum 
Behandlung von Krebs, von Tumoren. Und da ist dann auch passiert, was Sie sagen, 
Bauzeitverlängerung eingetreten, das Ding ist nicht recht fertig geworden.“ (Lender III) 
Contractual - “Also hier im Hamburg, als zentrales Beispiel, Elbphilharmonie, die eben nicht als 
Projektvertrag gebracht wurde und wo gewiss von Beginn an gewisse Kostenpositionen 
offengelassen wurden.“ (Lender III) 
Design - “Gab's mal vor 10 Jahren, oder länger her, ein Projekt für eine Protonen und Ionen 
Schleuder für das Universitätsklinikum Schleswig-Holstein. […] Und da hat man damals 
gesagt, das können wir, man kann eine Protonen/Ionen Schleuder bauen. Das haben 
[Firmenname] als Projektfinanzierung gemacht, aber die haben dieses neue 
Technologierisiko nicht genommen als Bank, sondern gesagt [Firmenname] muss 
selber… Diese Maschine gibt's noch nicht und die haben keinen Beweis, dass es so 
funktionieren wird. Dieses Risiko müssen die tragen. [...] Und so war es dann auch, die 
Technologie hat nicht funktioniert.“ (Lender II) 
- “Ich kann mich hinstellen und sagen: ich weiß, diese Beinbrüche in Frankfurt im Januar 
im Durchschnitt passieren und kann das hochrechnen. Das ist ein Risiko. Ich weiß aber 
nicht, wie viel die Krankenkasse für einen Beinbruch in 50 Jahren zahlen wird, also das 
ist kein stochastisches Risiko, sondern das ist eine Unsicherheit, und das kann ich z.B. 
nicht verschieben. […] wenn es jetzt spezifischer um Krankenhaus, PPP oder 
Projektfinanzierung geht, können Sie die ganze Hotelleistung der Privaten übertragen. 
Wir können auch gewisse technische Dinge den Privaten übertragen (wie die Geräte 
funktionieren), wir werden aber nicht medizinische Risiken, wie viel die Krankenkasse 
wofür bezahlen wird, in eine Projektfinanzierung packen können.“ (Lender II) 
- “Diese Jahr fällt mit spontan ein Thema Energiespeicher, wo jemand von uns große 
Batteriespeicher finanziert haben wollte, sicher mit Technik, die wir in der Zukunft sogar 
noch verstärkt sehen werden, aber so wie das Projekt eben konstruiert war, haben wir 
das dann relativ schnell gesagt: Moment einmal… das Risiko ist zu hoch, obwohl man 
sich mit einem solchen Projekt deutlich hätte nach außen darstellen können, als 
Förderer innovativ von Energiesachen und alles, alle die Kriterien hätten toll gepasst, 
aber da fiel bei der Bank eine relative kühle Entscheidung… sorry... ist... mit hohen 
technischen Risiko, hohem Marktrisiko, geht es so nicht.“ (Lender III) 
Estimator 
related 
- “We’ve had even in my experience in the last couple years we had a solar project that 
the costs were lower than the anticipated. In this case, we were skeptical about the 
engineer's forecast.” (Investor I) 
- “We had a toll road as well that was a merchant bridge and part of it was financial 
crisis, but that was the scenario, where for instance we kept in a lot of equities in the 
beginning because the lenders were worried and as it turned out, the traffic was much 
better than planned.” (Investor I) 
- “On the other side I have been involved in toll roads and ports where the forecast and 
the numbers were not nearly as strong and therefore, you know, you were offside on 
your cover ratios and then the scenarios that we looked at were, we’re looking at okay, 
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Risk factor 
category Quote in original interview language 
chipping more, chipping in more equity and damming up the dividends, you know, 
potentially extending the term so that the amortization if it had an amortization facility 
could be managed a bit.” (Investor I) 
- “Wir hatten jetzt zum Beispiel einen Flughafen in [Land] und [Land], die liefen jetzt auch 
nicht so wie erwartet. In den Gegenden versucht man dann eher das Risiko zu 
minimieren und dann die Deals eher nicht zu machen. Sondern man steigt in die Märkte 
rein, wo man sagt, oh das läuft gut, davon ist man überzeugt. Das heißt aber nicht, dass 
man den Deal grundsätzlich nicht machen würde. Aber man hat eine etwas negativere 
Einstellung, weil man negative Erfahrung in dem Bereich hatte. Beim Asset oder über die 
Region halt.” (Lender I) 
- “Also zu gut bewertet, wo Sie es häufig haben, bei Projekten, die z.B. 
eben Verkehrsströme wurden häufig viel zu gut bewertet. Also das haben sie in Europa 
geschafft, sie aber global, dass z.B. ich habe es ja mit dem Herrentunnel geschildert, 
wissen Sie, dass man einen Tunnel macht und sagt, ist ja ideal für die Stadt. Die Leute 
werden den sicher super nutzen, und dann feststellt, tatsächlich ist der Verkehrsstrom 
nur ein Teil, also nicht grad ein Bruchteil, aber doch ein enttäuschender Teil von dem 
was man angenommen hat.“ (Lender III) 
- “Man muss sich schon täglich oder wöchentlich an die Nase fassen und sich sagen, 
Moment einmal, wenn ich mich stark für etwas einsetze, liegt es an dem, dass ich 
natürlich geprägt bin von 20 Jahren. Hat sich die Welt nicht geändert? Aber da sind Sie 
wie gesagt, also zumindest wenn alle aufmerksam sind... heutzutage kriegt man immer 
neue Elemente eingespielt... schauen Sie… deshalb, weil wir 20 Jahr Flughäfen gemacht 
haben, kann ich natürlich nicht sagen alle Flughäfen sind einfach gut und deshalb… und 
da halte ich daran fest. Umgekehrt sollte man natürlich auch nicht, wenn wir einmal 
schlechte Erfahrungen mit was gemacht haben, dann immer zu sagen alle sind schlecht. 
Das erlebe ich natürlich durchaus auch auf der Seite vom Kredit, wenn einmal etwas 
schwieriger wurde, wird sehr häufig pauschalisiert“ (Lender III) 
- “Selbstüberschätzung, ja gut dadurch, dass Sie heute kaum mehr was alleine machen, 
ist es so, dass Sie in einem ganzen Systemraster arbeiten. Früher war es tatsächlich noch 
so, ich habe noch ein Fall, der übrigens geklappt hat, und den kann ich auch erwähnen. 
Da wurde ich nach Weihnachten, bin ich nach Portugal geflogen, weil irgendwas nicht 
geklappt hat... und dann mit dem Anruf bei meinem Bereichsleiter und einem Anruf 
beim zuständigen Vorstand sollte ich da eine große Kreditsumme unterschreiben, und 
dann die retten. So etwas wäre heute unmöglich- ich wüsste gar nicht wie das 
funktionieren sollte. Würde sich auch kein Mensch mehr drauf einlassen. Kein Vorstand, 
gar niemand mehr.“ (Lender III) 
- “Wissen Sie, natürlich muss ein Investor, wenn der zu mir kommt, von seiner Sache voll 
überzeugt sein. Der muss auch eine optimistischere Einstellung haben, weil, sonst würde 
er das nie machen. Sein Vorteil ist natürlich, dass wenn die Sache gut geht, er 
hoffentlich damit auch deutlich besser verdient. Ich als Banker, schauen Sie, ich hab ja 
nur eine Marge von 1 bis 2 Prozent, davon muss ich Kosten decken, davon muss ich 
Eigenkapitalvorsorge treffen, und dann muss ich das Risiko abfedern und da sehen Sie 
schon, wenn ich jetzt sage das ist ein gutes Prozent, dann bleibt vielleicht ein 
halbes Prozent übrig, das können Sie sich vielleicht ausmalen, wie lange ich das halbe 
Prozent verdienen muss, wenn ich bei meiner Kreditsumme nur 30 Prozent Verlust habe. 
In der Infrastruktur haben wir ja zum Glück wenig Komplettausfälle, aber mit dem 
halben Prozent, da geht das 60 Jahre bis ich das ausgeglichen habe.“ (Lender III) 
Financial/ 
economic 
- “We financed a port with one of the German banks and it was right pre-financial 
crisis and therefore all the forecast of EBITDA growth and all the rest… because it was 
sort of financed pretty exact at the multiple… because the view was that the business 
would continue to grow and that would work. There were… some of the first 
assumptions, just did not pan out and therefore you had an underperforming loan.” 
(Investor I) 
- “Greenfield is particularly tough, because those are clearly based on just assumptions, if 
it is new then it’s a question of selling the story that there be increase of production for 
whatever reason, you get back to a port or an airport, you get more traffic because you 
had a different marketing strategy or they were macrodynamic factors in play, you 
know, and clearly macrodynamic factors will have a role. So, when you have a great 
financial crisis, the first boom in infrastructure was followed by 2006, 2007 and top 
liquidity and lenders were looking at even, you know, GDP related assets as being very 
stable and when we had a recession of one of these assets, I know I had a 10% decrease 
as opposed to 5 or 10% increase in EBITDA, and when some of these projects were being 
borrowing at 10 or 15 or even 20 times EBITDA you are way off your company targets.” 
(Investor I)  
- “I would add foreign currency exposure to your typology (market).” (Investor II) 
- “It is actually interesting so it happened the same with ethane crackers. In 2011 and 
2012 there were a lot of ethane crackers in South America and with the event of shell 
gas in the US they actually moved all those million-dollar projects from Chile to 
Huston…” (Consultant III) 
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Risk factor 
category Quote in original interview language 
- “Toll Roads haben wir früher auch gemacht, da wurde dann festgestellt, dass das 
Verkehrsrisiko doch schwieriger einzuschätzen ist, als wie das gedacht ist. Heutzutage 
machen die meisten noch Toll Roads wenn existierender Verkehr besteht, aber nicht 
mehr bei neuen Straßen.“ (Lender II) 
- “Dann haben Sie Flughäfen, da können Sie die Verkehrsrisiken auch gut einschätzen.“ 
(Lender II) 
- “Wo es halt schiefgelaufen ist, war immer, also oft bei Mautstraßen, oder bei dem 
Maut-Tunnel und Herrentunnel... in Deutschland, da waren einfach die 
Verkehrsprognosen zu optimistisch, das Ding wurde in der Zeit gebaut, zu dem Preis und 
so weiter und das war... nicht das Problem, einfach die... das Verkehrsaufkommen 
wurde überschätzt. Und das finden Sie in Portugal, das finden Sie in Spanien und in 
anderen Ländern auch. Also wie viel Straße ist sehr, sehr schwierig einzuschätzen, 
deswegen macht das heute auch kaum noch einer… Die Sponsoren haben eine 
Verkehrsprognose, wir als Bank habe dann meistens einen viel konservativeren, tieferen 
Base Case... und hinterfragen dann die Annahmen, aber dennoch trotz allem, waren 
Verkehrsstudien viel zu optimistisch.“ (Lender II) 
- “Lübeck, der Herren Tunnel. Bauzeit perfekt gelaufen mit dem Tunnel. Kein Problem. 
Kosten eingehalten. Alles. An was hat es gefehlt? Der Verkehrsfluss war enttäuschend. 
Also musste man die Kredite restrukturieren…“ (Lender III) 
- “Chicago Highway bei einer, und die andere war die große Verbindungsstraße da von 
Chicago sozusagen an die Ostküste, alle Banken begeistert gemacht, oder viele Banken, 
mit entsprechende Sponsoren, und dann kam Amerika in die Wirtschaftskrise, der 
Verkehr ist massiv eingebrochen.“ (Lender III) 
Force 
majeure 
- “I was working in a project. We were in a JVs with [company name] doing a refinery in 
[country]. Because we have a mine already there. So, the site is there. They are mining 
for decades, it is going well but the hurdle rate, the internal hurdle rate that they would 
put into the NPV was based also on the country risk and this was pre-Ebola right. This 
was 2012, 2013…” (Consultant I) 
Labor / 
Legal/ 
political 
- “I would add changes in the law, and risk of concessional tax rebate ending to your 
typology. This is if delays expire the tax rebates for any reason (delay in startup, etc.).” 
(Investor II) 
- “Law können wir nicht beeinflussen. Kann vielleicht der öffentliche Part eines Projektes 
beeinflussen, dann sollte er dieses Risiko nehmen, aber sicher nicht der Private.“ (Lender 
II) 
Operation 
and 
maintenance 
- “I would add (for power plants) risk of fuel availability, off taker agreement risk (credit 
worthiness of the off taker) to the typology.” (Investor II)  
- “Wir hatten ja auch mal, so eine Art von Müllverbrennungslage vor ein paar Jahren 
finanziert, es war keine richtige Verbrennung durch Feuer, sondern, ich kenn mich nicht 
so ganz aus, aus irgendwelchen Bakterien, oder sowas. Die haben dann halt nicht so 
schnell den Müll weggefressen wie es sein sollte… Also bei Müllverbrennungsanlagen 
kommt es extrem darauf an, wie viel Müll wird angeliefert. Dann erzeugen die halt auch 
Energie. Du weißt halt nie wie viel Müll da wirklich kommt. Das ist schwierig 
vorherzusagen…“ (Lender I) 
- “Wind können Sie auch relativ gut messen und einschätzen, wie die Kapazität da ist. 
Energie mit Langfristverträgen, Lieferverträgen und Abnahmeverträgen, immer, wenn 
Sie langfristige Abnahmeverträge haben, können Sie über Projektfinanzierung 
nachdenken.“ (Lender II) 
- “Dann haben Sie natürlich Öl und Gas, auch seit vielen, vielen Jahren, Spezialisten, die 
halt feststellen oder sich zutrauen zu sagen, wie viel Ölvorkommen in einem Ölfeld drin 
sind und daraus dann auch abstellen.“ (Lender II) 
- “We did one for a steel company in the US and... This was to install new melting 
capacity for pipes for oil and gas, right? And you know there is like no revenue. There is 
like no projection that this thing is going to run more than fifteen percent at the time. 
So, from the utilization standpoint it makes no sense. We just turned it off.” (Consultant 
II) 
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Survey about cognitive biases in decision making 
Figure 23: Survey - measurement of unrealistic optimism 
 
Figure 24: Survey - measurement of overconfidence bias 
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Figure 25: Survey - measurement of representative heuristic 
 
Figure 26: Survey - measurement of company factors 
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Figure 27: Survey - measurement of personal factors (1/2) 
 
Figure 28: Survey - measurement of personal factors (2/2) 
 
Figure 29: Survey - measurement control factors 
 
 
208 
 
 
Table 24: Expert interview relevant quotes to reduce causal model on individual decision maker cognitive biases 
Category Quote in original interview language 
Unrealistic 
optimism 
- “You do have institutional bias as well as, what I would say is, just the fundamental risk of 
human being not wanting to admit a mistake and take a write off so in certain cases and 
I’ll use an example, you know, port, we financed a port with one of the German banks 
and it was right pre-financial crisis and therefore all the forecast of EBITDA growth and all 
the rest… cause it was sort of financed pretty exact at the multiple… because the view was 
that the business would continue to grow and that would work. There were… some of the 
first assumptions, just did not pan out and therefore you had an underperforming loan, 
you are outside your covenant and I think the first inclination is the banks will want to work 
with you because no one wants to come and go into a default situation, no one wants to 
go and write down their loan, so the first bias will be to try taking, you know, a sober but 
optimistic view that things will get better, i.e., this is the last of the construction overrun, 
this is the last of the delays, the growth is slow but it eventually will go back, and therefore 
in those cases you might, you know, the bank will put pressure on the lender on equity 
owners to get them more equity but the equity owners at the same time will put pressure 
on the bank, say, okay, can we do, can we extend, can we have waivered off the covenant - 
things like that, so, so, so that is certainly something that I would say is probably the most 
common scenario is that whether willfully or just to try avoiding the messy scenario of 
a default, that there will be accommodation on the lender side.” (Investor I) 
- “We’ve had even in my experience in the last couple years we had a solar project for which 
the costs were lower than the anticipated. In this case, we were skeptical about the 
engineer's forecast, so we, as owners, and we are a public company so we didn’t want to 
leverage into the hills, as owners we put less debt in than the developers were 
suggesting because we assumed we would get less production and then after a couple of 
years, the plants were doing better than planned, so we, you know, we increased the 
leverage, increased the term, lowered the interest rates and you know, pulled out the 
capital. We had a toll road as well that was a merchant bridge and part of it was financial 
crisis, but that was the scenario, where for instance we kept in a lot of equities in the 
beginning because the lenders were worried and as it turned out, the traffic was much 
better than planned, so right now I think they are about to do a refinancing, I am no longer 
involved in the project, but they will be able to increase leverage financially.” (Investor I) 
- “I mean for basic ones, though sometimes it’s just cost, cost estimates are too high or they 
are delayed, but if it’s a volume driven deal either because of production or traffic then it 
could be that your forecasts were wrong including… greenfield is particularly 
tough, because those are clearly based on just assumptions, if it is new then it’s a question 
of selling the story that there be increase of production for whatever reason, you get back 
to a port or an airport, you get more traffic because you had a different marketing strategy 
or they were macrodynamic factors in play, you know, and clearly macrodynamic 
factors will have s role, so when you have a great financial crisis, the first boom in 
infrastructure was followed by 2006, 2007 and top liquidity and lenders were looking at 
even, you know, GDP related assets as being very stable and when we had a recession of 
one of these assets, I know I had a 10% decrease as opposed to 5 or 10% increase in 
EBITDA and when some of these projects were being borrowing a 10 or 15 or even 20 
times EBITDA you are way off your company targets.” (Investor I) 
- “Wo es halt schief gelaufen ist war immer also oft bei Mautstraßen, oder bei dem Maut-
Tunnel und Herrentunnel... in Deutschland da waren einfach die Verkehrsprognosen zu 
optimistisch, das Ding wurde in der Zeit gebaut, zu dem Preis und so weiter und das war... 
nicht das Problem, einfach die... das Verkehrsaufkommen wurde überschätzt. Und 
das finden Sie in Portugal, das finden Sie in Spanien und in anderen Ländern auch. Also wie 
viel Straße ist sehr, sehr schwierig einzuschätzen, deswegen macht das heute auch kaum 
noch einer… Die Sponsoren haben eine Verkehrsprognose, wir als Bank habe dann 
meistens einen viel konservativeren, tieferen Base Case... und hinterfragen dann die 
Annahmen, aber dennoch trotz allem, waren Verkehrsstudien viel zu optimistisch.“ (Lender 
II) 
- “Also zu gut bewertet wo Sie es häufig haben, bei Projekten die, z.B. eben Verkehrsströme 
wurden häufig viel zu gut bewertet. Also das haben sie in Europa geschafft, sie aber global, 
dass z.B. ich habe es ja mit dem Herrentunnel geschildert, wissen Sie, dass man ein Tunnel 
macht und sagt, ist ja ideal für die Stadt. Die Leute werden den sicher super nutzen, und 
dann feststellt tatsächlich ist der Verkehrsstrom nur einen Teil, also nicht grad ein 
Bruchteil, aber doch ein enttäuschender Teil von dem was man angenommen hat.“ (Lender 
III) 
- “Mir ist es z.B. mal passiert Bau eines Protonentherapiezentrums, wunderbare Anlage, 
…Protonen, zum Behandlung von Krebs, von Tumoren. Damals hat ein direkter Freund in 
der Bank Hirntumor gehabt, und ich hab gedacht Mensch wie kann man dem Kerl 
helfen. Da kannst du das doch mal machen. Selbst ich war... die technische Idee war 
toll. Gab auch schon welche in Amerika mit der Technik. Die die hier anbieten wollten, gab 
es aber noch nicht. Und da ist dann auch passiert, was Sie sagen, Bauzeitverlängerung 
eingetreten, das Ding ist nicht recht fertig geworden, hat eigentlich… ich glaub man kann 
sagen selbst bis heute nie richtig funktioniert, war also von dem her enttäuschend. Und da 
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Category Quote in original interview language 
muss man sagen, wenn man das nur ganz kühl entschieden hätte, hätten wir das 
wahrscheinlich nicht angehen dürfen.“ (Lender III) 
Representative 
heuristic 
- “Wenn man solche Projekte hat, die dann halt nicht so gut laufen, dann sind wir intern bei 
Banken schon negativen eingestellt. Dann machen wir solche Projekte eher nicht, oder sind 
weniger kompromissbereit, wenn man halt schlechte Erfahrungen hat.“ (Lender I) 
- “Beispiel, wir hatten ja auch mal, so eine Art von Müllverbrennungslage vor ein paar 
Jahren finanziert, es war keine richtige Verbrennung durch Feuer, sondern, ich kenn mich 
nicht so ganz aus, aus irgendwelchen Bakterien, oder sowas. Die haben dann halt nicht so 
schnell der Müll weggefressen wie es sein sollte. Das war halt schlecht, entsprechend ist 
die Bank dann jetzt eher anfälliger wenn die Projekte hat, die da irgendwo waren, dass sie 
es ungern wieder finanziert.“ (Lender I) 
- “Wir hatten jetzt zum Beispiel einen Flughafen in [Land] und [Land], die liefen jetzt auch 
nicht so wie erwartet. Und den Gegenden versucht man dann eher das Risiko zu 
minimieren und dann die Deals eher nicht zu machen. Sondern man steigt in die Märkte 
rein, wo man sagt, oh das läuft gut, davon ist man überzeugt. Das heißt aber nicht, dass 
man den Deal grundsätzlich nicht machen würde. Aber man hat eine etwas negativere 
Einstellung, weil man negative Erfahrung in dem Bereich hatte. Beim Asset oder über die 
Region halt.” (Lender I) 
- “Man muss sich schon täglich oder wöchentlich an die Nase fassen und sich sagen, 
Moment einmal, wenn ich mich stark für etwas einsetze, liegt es an dem, dass ich natürlich 
geprägt bin von 20 Jahren. Hat sich die Welt nicht geändert? Aber da sind Sie wie gesagt, 
also zumindest wenn alle aufmerksam sind... heutzutage kriegt man immer neue Elemente 
eingespielt... schauen Sie… deshalb, weil wir 20 Jahr Flughäfen gemacht haben, kann ich 
natürlich nicht sagen alle Flughäfen sind einfach gut und deshalb… und da halte ich daran 
fest. Umgekehrt sollte man natürlich auch nicht, wenn wir einmal schlechte Erfahrungen 
mit was gemacht haben, dann immer zu sagen alle sind schlecht. Das erlebe ich natürlich 
durchaus auch auf der Seite vom Kredit, wenn einmal etwas schwieriger wurde, wird sehr 
häufig pauschalisiert.“ (Lender III) 
Overconfidence - “Selbstüberschätzung, ja gut dadurch, dass Sie heute kaum mehr was alleine machen, ist 
es so, dass Sie in einem ganzen Systemraster arbeiten. Früher war es tatsächlich noch so, 
ich habe noch ein Fall, der übrigens geklappt hat, und den kann ich auch erwähnen. Da 
wurde ich nach Weihnachten, bin ich nach Portugal geflogen, weil irgendwas nicht 
geklappt hat... und dann mit dem Anruf bei meinem Bereichsleiter und einem Anruf beim 
zuständigen Vorstand sollte ich da eine große Kreditsumme unterschreiben, und dann die 
retten. So etwas wäre heute unmöglich- ich wüsste gar nicht wie das funktionieren sollte. 
Würde sich auch kein Mensch mehr drauf einlassen. Kein Vorstand, gar niemand mehr.“ 
(Lender III) 
Difference 
between 
lenders and 
investors 
cognitive biases 
- “Wir haben interne Rating Tools, wo wir dann halt Zahlen eingeben müssen und dann halt 
auch qualitative Faktoren, sowie Standort, glauben wir da dran, Kosten Controlling, 
Management Qualität, da kann man so zwischen sehr gut und mangelhaft eingeben. Und 
diese qualitativen und quantitativen Faktoren ergeben dann am Ende eine Rating Note.“ 
(Lender I) 
- “Wir wollen natürlich den Kredit rausgeben, weil wir haben natürlich auch unsere Ziele, je 
mehr wir rausgeben an Krediten, desto besser ist es für die Marktseite.“ (Lender I) 
- “Also marktseitig darf man natürlich nie voreingenommen sein, weil du halt ja versuchst 
möglichst viele Kredite zu machen. Das ist ja auch deine Zielvorgabe. Das ist ja dann jetzt 
egal ob es dann 100% läuft oder nicht, aber du musst halt deine Ziele auch irgendwie 
erreichen.“ (Lender I) 
- “Wissen Sie natürlich muss ein Investor, wenn der zu mir kommt, von seiner Sache voll 
überzeugt sein. Der muss auch eine optimistischere Einstellung haben, weil sonst würde er 
das nie machen. Sein Vorteil ist natürlich, dass wenn die Sache gut geht, er hoffentlich 
damit auch deutlich besser verdient. Ich als Banker, schauen Sie, ich habe ja nur eine 
Marge von 1 bis 2 Prozent, davon muss ich Kosten decken, davon muss ich 
Eigenkapitalvorsorge treffen, und dann muss ich das Risiko abfedern und da sehen Sie 
schon, wenn ich jetzt sage das ist ein gutes Prozent, dann bleibt vielleicht ein 
halbes Prozent übrig, das können Sie sich vielleicht ausmalen, wie lange ich das halbe 
Prozent verdienen muss, wenn ich bei meiner Kreditsumme nur 30 Prozent Verlust habe. In 
der Infrastruktur haben wir ja zum Glück wenig Komplettausfälle, aber mit dem halben 
Prozent, da geht das 60 Jahre bis ich das ausgeglichen habe.“ (LenderII) 
- “I think the bankers would have a different bias [than investors]. If the price is higher, 
barring better cash flows, additional debt will reduce the credit metrics and worsen the 
riskiness of the loan. An equity investor may be more willing to take a lower equity return 
to either reduce financing risk of get the project. So, I would believe that there would be 
different biases.” (Investor I) 
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Statistical tables 
Table 25: Pearson’s correlations for unrealistic optimism regarding risk of construction time and cost overrun and control 
variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 26: Pearson’s correlations for unrealistic optimism regarding risk of lower than expected future revenues and control 
variables 
 
 
 
 
Table 27: Pearson’s correlations for unrealistic optimism regarding chance of early and within budget completion and 
control variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 28: Pearson’s correlations for unrealistic optimism regarding chance of higher than expected future revenues and 
control variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Variable 
Unrealistic 
optimism risk 
time/cost overrun Gender Age Company age Company size 
Gender  -0.124   - -  
Age -0.144 -0.013    
Company age  -0.039 -0.016 -0.138 - - 
Company size -0.001 -0.091 -0.023 -0.210 - 
Team diversity -0.094 -0.023 -0.103 -0.157 -0.172 
Note: *= statistically significant at p < 0.05 level 
  Variable 
Unrealistic 
optimism risk 
revenues Gender Age Company age Company size 
Gender  -0.058   - -  
Age -0.078 -0.013    
Company age  -0.145 -0.016 -0.138 - - 
Company size -0.021 -0.091 -0.023 -0.210 - 
Team diversity -0.040 -0.023 -0.103 -0.157 -0.172 
Note: *= statistically significant at p < 0.05 level 
  Variable 
Unrealistic 
optimism chance 
early/within 
budget 
completion Gender Age Company age Company size 
Gender  -0.085   - -  
Age -0.037 -0.013    
Company age  -0.250* -0.016 -0.138 - - 
Company size -0.172 -0.091 -0.023 -0.210 - 
Team diversity -0.015 -0.023 -0.103 -0.157 -0.172 
Note: *= statistically significant at p < 0.05 level 
  Variable 
Unrealistic 
optimism chance 
revenues Gender Age Company age Company size 
Gender  -0.016   - -  
Age -0.169 -0.013    
Company age  -0.019 -0.016 -0.138 - - 
Company size -0.150 -0.091 -0.023 -0.210 - 
Team diversity -0.019 -0.023 -0.103 -0.157 -0.172 
Note: *= statistically significant at p < 0.05 level 
211 
 
 
Table 29: Pearson’s correlations for hit rate and control variables 
  Variable Hit rate Gender Age Company age Company size 
Gender  -0.179   - -  
Age -0.121 -0.013    
Company age  -0.047 -0.016 -0.138 - - 
Company size -0.067 -0.091 -0.023 -0.210 - 
Team diversity -0.019 -0.023 -0.103 -0.157 -0.172 
Note: *= statistically significant at p < 0.05 level 
Table 30: Pearson’s correlations for illusion of control and control variables 
 
 
 
 
  Variable Illusion of control Gender Age Company age Company size 
Gender  -0.059   - -  
Age -0.023 -0.013    
Company age  -0.156 -0.016 -0.138 - - 
Company size -0.151 -0.091 -0.023 -0.210 - 
Team diversity -0.161 -0.023 -0.103 -0.157 -0.172 
Note: *= statistically significant at p < 0.05 level 
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